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Historically, the hallmark of "independent Africa" is inextri
cable underdevelopment crises. Thus, the fundamental objective
of this study is to determine the causality of politics of underdevel
opment and evolving stiffening crises in post-colonial Africa, by
using Nigeria, a former British colony, as a case in point. Nigeria
was chosen whereas its economy personifies the pre-colonial African
kingdoms, empires, fiefdoms, and states, as well as arbitrary created
colonies by a model European colonial power - Great Britain. Thus,
the findings in the Nigerian dilemma could manifest a profound compre
hension of the raison d'etre of continuous political incohesion,
cum facts and factors of underdevelopment crises in "independent
Africa." And ipso facto enabled us to evolve generalizations indispen
sable in establishing an authentic theory of development in Africa
at the dawning of the 21st century.
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Based on African historiography, the fact evolved that pre-
colonial Africa/Nigeria was developing and transforming on its own
accord from tribal organizations to magnificent kingdoms, empires
and "city" states. Additionally, authentic universal history resolved
that African Kemetic (Kmt) kingdom - Egypt, evolved continental
and universal model of civilizations before the imposition of colonial
capitalist mode of production by European powers, two critical issues
were raised.
The first striking issue was whether or not colonial capitalism
originated contemporary unobtainable political incohesion with
astronomical underdevelopment dilemma in Nigeria. The second issue
was why are the post-colonial leaderships unable to minimize or
reverse underdevelopment?
To that end, we hypothesized that -
(i) colonial capitalism catalyzed contradictions of underdevel-
opment crises in post-colonial Africa.
(ii) that failure to Africanize the post-colonial development
strategies frustrates the resolution of underdevelopment
crises, or authentic and sustained development in post-
colonial Nigeria and
(iii) that the perpetuation of colonial superstructure by "post
independence" regimes catalyzed politics of underdevelop
ment in Nigeria.
The study, using a dialectical materialist method, affirmed
the hypotheses. Consequently, we recommended an authentic democrati
zation of governmental procedures, as well as a scientific indigeni-
zation of contemporary mode of production by a leadership committed
to concrete reactivation of the latter as a viable way out. In
this context a scientific development of Afrocentric paradigm and
evolving theory of development was asserted as a priority.
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Statement of the Problem
An historiography of African political economy asserts that
pre-colonial Africa was civilizing or developing on its own before
the European adventurism and colonization of the continent, vis-a
vis an imperial, implantation of colonial capitalism on the indige
nous mode of production. Thus, an authentic African history affirmed
that pre-colonial Nigeria was basically transforming or developing
from a communal to the feudal mode of production, for the most part,
when it was colonized by Britain in 1861. And that those stages of
transformation or development were essentially proper, albeit varied
in magnitude in a universal historical context.
Therefore, pre-colonial economic history of African nations,
en masse and Nigeria, in particular, resolved that indigenous forces
of production and manifest fundamental technologies, essential for
developing a sustained economic system in any society existed in Afri
ca, at large and Nigeria, in question. But in Nigeria (and in colo
nial Africa), this developing mode of production and consequent indus
trial development was stultified and gradually reversed after coloni
zation and forceful implantation of a more advanced colonial industrial
capitalism on the indigenous mode of production by colonists. Colonial
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capitalism, genuine history affirms, entailed a systematic and domi
nation of indigenous mode of production. Consequently making it a
satellite of the center.
Through the latter process, Britain and other centers estab
lished industries in Nigeria (or Africa), dominated and Europeanized
the indigenous economic system. As a consequence, Britain and associ
ated colonists mobilized indigenous resources and manifested wealth
to develop their centers respectively thus rendering Nigeria and Africa
underdeveloped.
Hence, in colonial Nigeria, the latter manifested an increasing
penury as well as underdevelopment of the indigenous productive forces,
and catalyzed nationalism which won independence in 1960. It was
the massive expectation that after independence, Nigerian leadership
would control and revitalize the economy for the benefit of its masses.
A process they envisioned would reverse underdevelopment and contain
colonial economic osmosis, which essentially means re-Africanization
of mode of production.
But disappointingly, the expectation of the masses and the
objective of the founding fathers of Nigeria in 1960, to end the me
tropolitan economic exploitation of the country has not, for the most
part, been attained. Nigeria today, after three decades of indepen
dence, remains an appendage of Britain as well as other developed
centers of Western Europe, North America, and Japan. She historically
depicts a stiffening underdeveloping political economy. Colonial
industries still dominate and exploit the economy.
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These transnational industries are basically owned and con
trolled by the industrialized centers. Because of this foreign owner
ship and control, these industries are siphoning off the surplus value
to the west, this being a necessary condition for their prosperity.
As a consequence, Nigeria, in reality, remains a neo-colonial nation
in profound historical contrast to its developing pre-colonial economy.
To remedy the crisis situation since independence in 1960,
various post-colonial governments have developed and implemented suc
cessive eclectic development plans or strategies, respectively, which
they perceived as profound development models essential for concrete
development of the country.
Such neoclassical economic models of advance capitalist centers
evolving from the doctrines of David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill
(i.e., government planning and regulation of the economy); Regnar
Nurske, Gerald Meir and Gottfried Harbeler Model of International
Development (i.e., stimulation of economic growth and maximum use
of world development aids) were crystallized into national develop
ment philosophy and plans.
Simultaneously, various regimes have embodied and implemented
recommendations of Nigerian academics as part of national development
plans, but to no avail. Besides the latter, even some nationalistic
oriented strategy as indigenization promulgation decree, which was
a policy aimed at placing the control of metropolitan industries in
the hands of the indigenes, and by such actions, contain economic
osmosis or foreign exploitation have been executed with no sustained
success.
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In a large part, it turns out to be anathema as penury of the
masses, social incoherency, or underdevelopment dilemma exacerbates.
And historically, whether in domestic programs or international pro
tocol, for the most part, the reality is that the more the contemp
orary plans were executed, the more underdevelopment crisis stiffened.
In this regard, an epidemic penury of the masses is the barometer.
Thus, superstructural crisis resulting in functional anarchy,
catastrophic change of leadership, intermittent and insidious coup
d'etats, inefficiency of policy executions as the causality of under
development became an epidemic. And the end is not in sight. Ob
viously, contemporary Nigeria is in shambles.
Today, Nigeria political economy depicts an historical substruc
ture and consequent superstructure of colonial capitalism. And foreign
economic and political exploitation which her masses lamented during
the colonial epoch has increased to astronomical proportions. Hence,
whereas contemporary regime, like its predecessors, is yet to mobilize
Nigeria's historically rich resources or develop its authentic forces
of production, the future is bleak.
Thus, this dilemma now impacts on Nigeria's immediate and stra
tegic potentiality to develop its indigenous productive forces, in
a quest to be and become a developing state of Africa and the world.
Therefore, whereas the post-colonial development strategies
or plans have not manifested authentic development or contained metro
politan exploitation as anticipated, a profound and dialectical study
of Nigerian historical political economy with an objective of ascer
taining the causality of failing development strategies becomes a
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profound essentiality. We must originate an authentic theory of de
velopment or resign our posterity to an abyss of undercivilization
by attempting to resolve the crisis within the existing national para
digm.
Thus, in light of the devastating gravity of this problem on
the Nigerian/African masses, the urgency of its resolution cannot
be postponed. Today, the suffering and exploited indigenous masses
are demanding an authentic development strategy and leadership that
would be committed to reversing underdevelopment, and guarantee for
all Nigerians a fair share of the evolving national wealth. They
want genuine political leadership that would minimize and contain
the vicious circle of underdevelopment in Nigeria. It is upon the
urgency of this essential demand that our purpose of this study
evolves.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to critically appraise and dialec
tical^ analyze the essence of colonial capitalism and politics of
underdevelopment in post-colonial Nigeria. This is a catalyst case
study intended to generate profound similar studies in the contemporary
underdeveloping post-colonial African states, and thus illuminate
a holistic causality of the politics of underdevelopment without which
a profound speculation for solutions to end underdevelopment would
continue to be a nightmare.
Consequently, our findings in this study would epitomize an
authentic development theory, essential for a concrete development
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of Nigeria, and strategically manifest development principle or gen
uine Afrocentric law of development essential for minimizing under-
development in Africa beyond the '90s, when embodied and steadfastly
implemented.
Such Afrocentric tenet would reactivate the eclipsed fact and
factors of amazing civilizations of pre-colonial Nigeria/Africa and
indigenous pre-colonial school systems; and ipso facto manifest a
fundamental African school system, cum paradigm as an essential star
at night.
Our contention here is predicated on two facts. First, the
fact that after three decades of post-colonial regimes efforts failed
to reverse underdevelopment and increasing penury of the Nigerian
masses, hence the urgent need to critically and dialectically deter
mine the essence of this failure, as a base for constructing scienti
fic strategies for a sustained concrete development of Nigeria be
comes a profound and uncompromising challenge in the '90s and beyond.
Second, the historiography of pre-colonial African societies
en masse affirmed that the pre-colonial Africans developed the first
university with a curriculum featuring subjects such as astronomy,
music, dialectics, arithmetic, rhetoric, grammar, philosophy, theo
logy, first picture writing models (to name just a few), and manifest
star technologies with civilizations, or strong developing economies.
And that this indigenous school system through its profound nature
study and great essential inventions attracted and educated foreign
personalities and societies (and in particular, Greece which is the
cradle of the civilizations of Nigerian/African colonizers) until
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successive invasions by foreign societies and colonization by Euro
pean powers.
Thus it follows that African heritage depicts a developing
economy or is replete with politics of concrete development. But
whereas the contemporary post-colonial Nigeria/Africa stands as a
contradiction to its heritage, a critical need to determine and re
solve the causality of the later contradiction or why the rich indi
genous African heritage or developing economy is eclipsed becomes
a profound scholastic necessity in the '90s.
Explanation of Concepts
The Socioeconomic Formation
By this term we imply the integration of those non-economic
aspects of society, such as the political system, the ideological
system, and the legal system, otherwise characterized as the super
structure (whose survival is dependent and determined by the economic
system) with the economic system or the substructure. In brief, the
superstructure and the substructure constitute the socio-economic
formation of the society.
Its significance lies in the perception that by our comprehen
sion of the socioeconomic formation of Nigeria, we would have a suc
cinct and clear notion of Nigeria's social existence, its contemporary
leadership consciousness, and therefore, could speculate on what appro
priate innovation needs to be made.
Neoclassical Economic Philosophy
By this is meant the adaptation of classical laissez-faire
economic theory with modifications, i.e., postulation that maximum
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economic growth could be attained in a stable or fixed economic con
dition wherefore a zero net per capita investment and a subsistence
wage is ascertained, with modifications which emphasized efficient
allocation of resources.
In other words, according to Charles Wilber (1979:54),
Neo-classical economics, beginning in the 1870s, turned away
from the classical concern with economic growth and concentrated
instead on the problem of efficient resource allocation. In
this abstract model, input supplies, including labor, were taken
as given. And, thus population receded into an ad hoc explanation
that was trotted out whenever the free market was blamed for
continuing poverty.
The significance of this philosophy in this study is twofold.
First, it catalyzed the process of colonial development plan in Nigeria,
in the colonial government for Nigeria, whereby the government intended
to establish business conditions essential for the free enterprise
or the survival of the metropolitan firms even after independence.
Second, it provided a philosophical orientation from which
the post-colonial regimes deduced the post-development strategies,
which have not yet minimized penury of the masses or reversed the
stiffening underdevelopment.
Dependence or Economic Osmosis
We use these concepts in alternation. In an economic sense,
"dependence [or economic osmosis] is the result of an unequal economic
relationship whereby the weaker of the two parties is dominated by
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the stronger,"1 or the wealth of the weaker party is amassed by the
stronger party by means of exploitation. Self-reliance is the antonym
of dependence. Self-reliance implies the ability to conduct a nation's
internal and external, social, economic and political affairs within
the international milieu with a minimal of (or, if possible, without)
external domination. Self-reliance, however, does not imply isolation
but rather cooperation which excludes economic osmosis, dependence
or exploitation. Two examples of dependence systems are colonialism
and neo-colonialism.
The concept of economic osmosis is significant to our study
because it illuminates the nature or pattern of the development gap
between the United Kingdom and its satellite colony of Nigeria.
Contradiction
This concept "is generally used to mean something that stands
in contrast to the way things are suppose to, or appear to be, to
contradict an argument is to show up the inconsistencies in it."2
Thus in ordinary terms, the world implies that two opposing phenomena
or "qualities cannot coexist within the same thing, or that something
cannot contain both its characteristic quality and its opposites at
once."3 We reject this unscientific definition.
timothy N. Shaw, The Politics of Africa; Dependence and Develop
ment (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1979), 75.




For the purposes of our study, therefore, of contradiction
as applied here is dialectical or logical and scientific or objective.
In this context "a contradiction is the simultaneous co-existence
and struggle of opposite forces within a process or a thing,"4 or,
as applied to this study, the capitalist mode of industrialization
in Nigeria.
In summation, contradiction is the symbiotic, but mutually
exclusive, opposite tendencies within a thing or a process and their
interaction or struggle to bring about progressive change in a particu
lar phenomenon.
According to Mao Tse-tung:
As opposed to the metaphysical world outlook, the world outlook
of the materialist dialectics holds that in order to understand
the development of a thing we should study it internally and
in its relations with other things . . .the fundamental cause
of the development of a thing is not external but internal .
. . Changes in society due chiefly to the development of the
internal contradictions in society—between the productive for
ces and their relations of production, the contradiction between
classes and the contradiction between the old and the new pushes
the society forward and gives the impetus for the suppression
of the old by the new.5
In retrospect, this concept implies that any phenomenon is
a manifestation of essential and complementary unity of opposing for
ces, hence without the latter forces, nothing could develop and grow.
Therefore, to comprehend a character objectively, it is necessary
to question profoundly afld analyze its holistic history. This entails
4Ibid.
5See selected readings from Mao Tse-tung, Selected Readings
(Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1971), 87-88.
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a determination of its nucleus or seed, its development and growth
like a seed-plant and its manifestations in the society like fruits.
This concept is highly significant in the present study because
it will enable us to see the basic nature of colonial capitalism and
the fundamental fact and factors of politics of underdevelopment which
pervades post-colonial regimes in Nigeria/Africa.
Second, it will enable us to determine whether or not Nigeria/
Africa with a remarkable developing pre-colonial economy is manifesting
insidious politics of underdevelopment today; or is yet to design
a workable scientific theory of development since independence in
1960.
Neocolonialism
According to Kwame Nkrumah, neocolonialism is a condition whereby
a state "is independent de jure and dependent de facto. It is a state
where political power lies in the conservative forces of the former
colony and where economic power remains under the control of interna
tional finance capital."6
In the final analysis, the country that is continually exploited
by foreign interests or by interests which are foreign to the masses
of the ex-colonized population, but are intrinsic to world capitalism,
is a neo-colonial state. It is a state we also refer to as having
a "flag independence." Nigeria perfectly fits this description.
Therefore, it is in this context that we use neo-colonialism to charac
terize Nigeria.
^Kwame Nkrumah, Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare (New York:
International Publishers, 1968), 8.
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Colonial Capitalism
Colonial capitalism, as operationalized in this study, is an
imposition of British mode of production on the indigenous or African
economic system during colonization, and the manifest colonial sub
structure and superstructure in Nigeria, as a fact of making Nigeria
a satellite of the center.
JJnder the aegis of the mother country, the catalytic indigenous
technologies, industries and outputs were either illegalized as was
with firearms, local gins, or were outright replaced by colonial fac
tories of scale whose mother technologies were at the center and was
its best kept secret or patent right, as with textile industries,
and indigenous essentialities gradually replaced and dominated by
European outputs, e.g., rice, cigarettes, clothing, et al., on one
hand. On the other hand, the indigenous superstructure was Europea-
nized. Hence, indigenous civilization was rendered dormant, and thus
the underdevelopment of indigenous mode of production was set in motion.
The significance of operationalizing colonial capitalism lies
in the fact that while the contemporary economic system does not mani
fest authentic development and political stability for the benefit
of Nigerian masses, it illuminates the fact that the present economic
system is a satellite cultured capitalism, designed to frustrate an
essential indigenous development, be it capitalist or socialist.
And by that fact, this concept clarifies the misconception that a
single comparable capitalist model exists for the center and the pe
riphery, when, in reality, colonial capitalism historically transforms
and subjugates a pre-colonial developing economy into its satellite.
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Historical and Dialectical Materialism7
Historical materialism is a scientific study of a society's
mode of production and manifest transformations since antiquity to
the contemporary. And dialectical materialism is a profound process
of critical analysis of the contradictions in a phenomenon such as
an economic system.
The significance of these concepts lies in the fact that they
would objectively enable us to cognize and study holistic Nigerian
economy, (i.e., since pre-colonial era) and then be in position to
locate where positive transformations or development was reversed
and why, in our study.
Statement of Objective, Hypothesis, and Testing Procedures
The phenomenon of colonial capitalism and politics of under-
development with neo-colonialism, and their consequential economic
crises cry out for a fundamental and critical investigation of colonial
industrial mode of production and its manifested superstructure and
politics. Such scrutiny is essential in order to profoundly determine
the causality of politics of underdevelopment, and thus formulate
a realistic or an authentic strategy and tactics as a fact of concrete
industrialization of Nigeria, and strategic Africa's emancipation
and development in general. Therefore, the primary objective of this
research is to understand the true essence of colonial capitalism,
7Both concepts are used here in the Marxian sense. For an
elaborate explanation of the concepts, see Joseph Stalin, Dialectical
and Historical Materialism (New York: International Publishers,
1973), 5; The Science of Revolution (Chicago: RCP Publishers, 1980),
6.
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its contradictions and its probable linkages to the insidious and
pervasive politics of underdevelopment in post-colonial Nigeria/Africa.
The latter, from the indigenous populace's point of view, could
serve as a predicate to objective comprehension of the underlying
forces of Nigeria/Africa's contemporary underdevelopment crises.
Consequently, such critical examination would also enable us to ob-
tively or realistically determine why Nigeria's post-colonial leader
ship philosophies and evolving development strategies are yet to re
solve its growing political incohesion and to minimize massive poverty
or the increasing politics of underdevelopment as promised and antici
pated by the successive post-colonial regimes.
Our second objective is to locate, recapture and organize fun
damental factors which inspired great civilizations or genuine developing
economies in pre-colonial Nigeria/Africa. Study of such economies
will provide the foundation essential for the reactivation of an indige
nous school tenet and development of an indigenous paradigm and manifest
Afrocentric development theory as a fundamental strategy of Nigerian/
African development, just like contemporary developed centers.
Historically, contemporary centers attain such great levels
of development by designing and fine tuning their development theories
or strategies on the basis of their holistic indigenous tenet, e.g.,
Eurocentricity. Thus an authentic Afrocentric theory when formulated,
embodied and steadfastly implemented could be a factor at night in
resolving Nigeria's/Africa's politics of underdevelopment.
We believe that for African economic problems to be minimized
or contained in the wake of neo-colonialism or hostile foreign centers
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seeking to perpetuate their economic dominance and exploitation of
Africa, the viable solution must come from genuine African school
and leadership. This implies the development of authentic development
theory that evolves out of a complete indigenous experience. Thus
to that end, we advance the following hypotheses:
1. That colonial capitalism catalyzed contradictions of under
development crisis in post-colonial Africa;
2. That failure to Africanize the post-colonial development
strategies frustrates the resolution of underdevelopment
crisis, or authentic and sustained development in post-co
lonial Nigeria;
3. That the perpetuation of colonial superstructure by "post-
independence" regimes catalyzed politics of underdevelopment
in Nigeria.
Our null hypothesis is the reverse of all the stated hypotheses.
These hypotheses are generated by our assumption that the understanding
of our social existence should form the basis of our social conscious
ness. The facts about our problem could best be described by us,
the victims of oppression, rather than by the foreign custodians of
our "existence," who basically are our exploiters.
Our position is contingent upon, or distilled from, historical
experiences of former underdeveloped states which have managed to
resolve underdevelopment dilemma. This experience objectively demon
strates that it is only the oppressed philosophy of liberation that
would free the oppressed, but not his adaptation of the oppressor's.
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Therefore, for us to become developed, we must contain the exploita
tive industrial model into our experience, instead of digesting our
native colonial mode of production by authentic indigenization. In
short, we must Africanize the colonial capitalism and center-oriented
development strategies, which have been implemented since flag indepen
dence if we really want to scientifically develop Nigeria or Africa.
It is in this context that we posit that it is an Afrocentric model,
not liberal Eurocentric neoclassically derived development strategies,
that will resolve underdevelopment crises in Nigeria and Africa.
In order to confront and resolve the latter problem, we would
be more inductively inclined and less deductive in our research ef
forts. In this regard, we hope that the valid generalizations of
these findings would lead to the development of a paradigm of Afri
can political economy with a view to catalyzing a development model
capable of containing underdevelopment in Nigeria.
Methodology—A Theoretical Frame of Reference
The method that we have chosen for this case study is dialec
tical materialism. This "is a method which gives primacy to material
conditions, particularly economic factors, in the explanation of so
cial life."8 This is, to our knowledge, the most appropriate method
that must be used in the study of contradictions in things. For "di
alectics in the proper sense is the study of contradictions in the
8Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (Nigeria: Longman
Press, Ltd., 1981), 1.
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very essence of objects."9 In summation of the utility of dialec
tical materialism, Mao Tse-tung posits thus:
. . .the world outlook of materialist dialects holds that in
order to understand the development of a thing, we should study
it internally and in its relations with other things; in other
words, the development of things should be seen as their internal
and necessary self-movement, is interrelated with and interacts
on the things around it.10
In other words, this case study method will enable us to see
the essence of the colonial capitalist industrial mode of production
and the contradictions inherent in it, which is the major concern
of this study. Further, by understanding the internal working of
the said mode of production, we will, in essence, understand the
problem of this study and simultaneously speculate on probable solu
tions.
The methodological implication of this approach is that we
must pay strict attention to the structure of colonial capitalism
and politics of underdevelopment in Nigeria by appraising its contra
dictions. In that context, we will use it as a point of departure
to study the underdevelopment problems and economic crises in post-
colonial Nigeria. Once we comprehend the character of the colonial
capitalist mode of production and its linkages to politics of under
development in postcolonial Nigeria; how the goods were produced and
distributed; what type of social relations arose from the organization
of production; how the colonial mode of production replaced the pre-
9Mao Tse-tung, Selected Readings (Peking: Foreign Languaqe
Press, 1971), 85.
10RCP, The Science of Revolution. 8.
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colonial mode of production; and the impact of the latter on the co
lonial and post-colonial development strategies, we will have under
stood the nature of the problem facing Nigeria, in particular and
Africa, in general. We would be in a position to clearly resolve
our hypotheses and to realize the objective of this study.
This method will also enable us to examine pre-colonial, co
lonial and post-colonial economics of Nigerian dialectically as op
posed to the functional school or mainstream Western social science
which discourages dialectical thinking and is presently utilized by
most Nigerian scholars.
Thus the dialectical method, unlike the functional approach,
is capable of uncovering the truth in the material world; it scruti
nizes people's ideas as the products of their social experience.
By more deeply grasping the laws of material world, and especially
society, it seeks to change the world and the people in it through
the critical analysis of the contradictions in a phenomenon under
study.
At this juncture, the major issues then become the following:
(a) How shall we organize our study? (b) What, precisely, will our
analytical approach entail? and (c) what will be the nature or charac
ter of the contradictions under study? A resolution of these issues
will unquestionably make our study quite objective or scientific.
In this context, our dialectical approach is most profound. Further,
historically, the dialectical method, Lenin observes, is: ". . .the
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way to an all embracing and comprehensive study of the process of
the rise, development and decline of socio-economic systems."11
Thus, we consider dialectical materialism imperative for our
purpose to avoid any hasty, superficial appraisal of any aspect of
our study of Nigeria. To that end we shall arrange our study into
five chapters and then utilize the dialectical materialist approach
to appraise or analyze the phenomenon per respective chapters.
Despite the contradictions permeating the process of develop
ment of every phenomenon, according to Mao,
Every form of society, every form of ideology has its own parti
cular contradiction and particular essence. . . Of course, unless
we understand the universality of contradiction, we have no way
of discovering the universal cause, or the universal basis for
the movement of things; however, unless we study the particula
rity of contradiction we have no way of determining the particu
lar essence of a thing which differentiates it from other things;
no way of discovering the particular cause or particular basis
for movement or development of a thing. . .Only after man knows
the particular essence of many different things can he proceed
to generalization and know the common essence of things.12
Thus, the pre-colonial mode of production and colonial capital
ism in Nigeria is no exception. Hence, in order to objectively illumi
nate the universality of contradiction in colonial capitalism and
use that as a point of departure to ascertain whether or not it has
any correlation to the politics of underdevelopment in post-indepen
dent Nigeria, we shall dialectically appraise the contradictions in
the pre-colonial modes of production as well. Such analysis is signi
ficant in this context since the pre-colonial cum colonial socio-
D 11V; J:.Len1n> Selected Works. English ed., vol. 1 (Moscow:
Progress Publishers, 1975), 25.
12Ibid., 96-97.
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political and economic developments constitute the antecedental base
of our study to determine the causality of politics of underdevelopment
in the post-independence era, in view of our objective and hypothesis.
This approach is necessary for the reason that, except we objec
tively establish bases of the current underdevelopment crises as depicted
by our research problem, our study is bound to be frustrated by superfi
cial perceptions. It is our contention that unless the origin of
a disease is known, it cannot be cured.
Significance of the Study
Since the granting of "flag independence" by the metropolitan
powers to African nations, the common thread that binds these nations'
post-colonial economy, unquestionably, is social, political and econo
mic crises. Related problems usually result in underdevelopment of
the economy and a hastily formulated (and usually unsuccessful) deve
lopment strategy to uplift the masses or the economy from such a chaos,
by military after military takeovers. These strategies historically
do not catalyze the anticipated developing economy. Thus, insidious
politics usually evolve and manifest political incohesion and sustain
economic inertia.
Such developments usually generate and buttress the ill-pre
conceived notion by the colonial powers that Africans, or in this
case Nigerians, are incapable of governing themselves, or developing
their economy; and this view furthers the myth of the "white man's
burden." Thus, the only option Nigeria has to develop an industrial
base is the neo-classical, colonial mode of capitalism. But amazingly,
the latter colonialist's view contradicts the great pre-colonial
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African civilizations or developing economies which historiography
affirmed. In retrospect, the preceding analysis seems to be a gross
misconception of the way situations really are. Consequently, the
post-colonial leadership spuriously embraces, embodies, and implements
the centeroriented development strategies. But the more this model
is used, the worse the economic crisis that the masses of Nigeria
and Africa face. Despite the magnitude of these problems, the va
rious regimes that usurp the state power in Nigeria basically are
not yet committed to question the appropriateness of the inherited
colonial capitalist development philosophy or to make rational changes
when necessary, based on developing pre-colonial African economic
experience which historiography asserts. Their main criticism of
the reason for crises in Nigeria is that the ousted government "stul
tified economic growth through inappropriate policies and corrupt
practices. The most universal pledge made by the new military juntas
is to provide honest and efficient administration in promoting eco
nomic development."13 in spite of this contention, the economic con
ditions usually remain the same or worsen.
It is in the light of these persistent failures in development
strategies that the essence of this study becomes unquestionably sig
nificant in terms of its expected theoretical or philosophical frame
work.
The problem of Nigeria's inability to evolve political cohesion,
essential to the containment of underdevelopment and of the penury
13Samuel Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa—Studies in
Military Style (New Haven! Yale Unviersity Press, 1977), 24.
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of the masses arises in no essential way from corruption in govern
ment, the mismanagement of resources, or failure to develop what al
ready exists. This is because the present economy is structurally
disarticulated as a satellite colonial capitalism or a peripheral
political economy still dominated by the center. And consequently,
like most post-colonial states that adopted the metropolitan strate
gies of development but historically failed, Nigeria is not capable
in its present setting of takeoff into economic development. Its
development "strategies and tactics" lack authenticity or clear indi
genous base. Ostensibly, there is a dilemma of developing a genuine
development philosophy and strategy; probably, according to Basil
Davidson:
What already exists, in this meaning and context, is either an
inheritance from a world that is past, or the merely peripheral
fragment or fragments of an international system built and con
trolled for the benefit of non-Africans. On the one hand, the
past cannot be recalled, however valid it may once have been.14
According to Eurocentric paradigms, Africans had no civiliza
tions worthy of fine tuning on their merit to catalyze political co
hesion, and concrete development, unlike the metropole. Hence, except
we model our economy after the metropole or adopt the center's suggested
development philosophies and evolving development strategies, Nigeria's/
Africa's economic future is a nightmare.
And although African historiography depicts pre-colonial Africa
as developing societies, and although the colonial development strate
gies have been implemented for over three decades, yet politics of
14Basil Davidson, Can Africa Survive? Arguments Against Growth
Without Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), 4-
5.
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underdevelopment pervades. Thus, this study encompasses a revisi-
tation of holistic pre-colonial economy of Nigeria/Africa with a view
to deducing therefrom such essential factors that generated positive
transformations or a genuine cohesive mode of production and manifest
politics of development in pre-colonial Nigeria/Africa. The latter
inferences, based on indigenous tenet and historiography, would be
used to resolve our hypothesis. Hence our generalizations would con
tribute to the formation of a realistic Afrocentric theory of develop
ment as well as a genuine African school with a unique scientific
paradigm, just like the contemporary European school and its "univer
sal" paradigm-personified by the centers in Europe and its diaspora-
-the United States.
Therefore, since our study would recapture historical fact
and factors, without which no historic nation-state could evolve a
cohesive developing economy, such as indigenous school, development
tenet, norms and traditions of pre-colonial African societies, our
study could offer a profound remedy in contemporary efforts to create
a scientific Afrocentric paradigm. In other words, our study could
minimize abstractive deductions from such Afrocentric ideas, such
as depicted by Molefi Kete Asante in The Afrocentric Idea (1987) and
thus evolve a realistic theory of development.
Our study compromises Asante's Afrocentric philosophy when
he articulates:
I am not questioning the validity of Eurocentric tradition within
its context; I am simply stating that such a view must not seek
an ungrounded aggrandizement by claiming a universal hegemony
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as it has frequently done in the social sciences. Both the posi-
tivist and the Frankfurt School theorists have contributed to
European thinking, albeit in quite different ways. And while
I sympathize with the critical theorists in regard to the philo
sophic error in positivism, where it is possible for a person
to have poor epistemological knowledge yet be able to test and
use first order theories in natural science, I am not convinced
that the critical theorists themselves appreciate the kind of
unity expressed in the African view of reality. They are, in
essence, captives of a peculiar arrogance, the arrogance of not
knowing that they do not know what it is that they do not know,
yet speak as if they know what all of us need to know ... To
know the African foundations of human society would be to po
ssess a built-in check on such arrogance.15
Thus, we think that to profoundly abstain from revisitating
a people's holistic history and utilizing its virtue is undercivili-
zation or politics of underdevelopment per se. Simultaneously, a
steadfast visitation of foreign societies' histories and an embodying
the latter's virtue historically eclipse a people's natural capacity
to develop and grow. Hence, we are convinced by a universal tenet
that ewery society has its genuine personalities, its unique culture
and virtue essential for its indigenous civilizations.
It is in the latter position that we find some Nigerian scho
lars and government development planners and regimes not manifesting
realistic theories and strategies of development. They simply embrace
the center's school norms, philosophies and theories of development,
without questioning its comparative historical significance. For
this reason, most of the theoretical constructs aimed at developing
strategies and guides to development fundamentally appear subjectively
derived from the industrial historical experiences of the European,
15Molefi Kete Asante, The Afrocentric Idea (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1987), 4-5.
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North American, the Japanese or Eurocentric paradigm, be it socialist
or capitalist in character.
In this context articulations of Nigerian scholars in such
volumes as Achieving Even Development in Nigeria: Problems and Pro
spects, edited by E. J. Nwosu (1985); Nigerian Government and Politics
featuring about fourteen political economists on Nigerian political
economy, edited by Oyediran (1979), as well as the state economist
and policies in post-independent national development plan, are point
ers to the latter postulation. From our position, the serious flaws
here are twofold. First, these academics are basically descriptive
in their analysis, not dialectical. Second, they have failed to re
visit and analyze, dialectically, Nigerian societies to determine
whether or not they had essential facts and factors of a developing
economy worthy of fine tuning and revitalization. A dialectical analy
sis of pre-colonial Nigeria could have probably manifested an indigenous
tenet essential for creating a profound and authentic development
strategy for post-colonial Nigeria. Hence, the center's strategies
can only be a complementary factor but not a fact of development.
Dialectics could have enabled them to overcome a subjective and super
ficial appraisal of the neo-classical model. Because of this intellec
tual inertia, Nwosu and Oyediran have failed to critically examine
colonial capitalism and determine why the neo-classical model, which
is the contemporary bedrock of the Nigerian development strategies,
is yet to enable the nation to overcome its structural underdevelopment
problems, or why politics of underdevelopment exacerbates.
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For instance, in the First National Development Plan (1962-
1968), designed by some of the nation's noted economists ("from the
Federal and Regional Ministries of Trade, Finance, Economic Planning,
Agriculture and National Resources and the Central Bank")16 or Joint
Planning Committee (J.P.C.), the utilization of the center's develop
ment model for post-colonial Nigeria was recommended. This essentially
entailed functioning within the center's technology and modernizing
same. Thus, continuity of the classical colonial industrial model
was guaranteed. According to the Plan, the major national objective
was "the achievement and maintenance of the highest possible rate
of increase in the standard of living and the creation of necessary
conditions to this end including public support and awareness."^
One other expectation of the Plan (according to J.P.C.) was that Ni
geria under this Plan would have a "modernized economy,"18 just like
the mother country. But nobody questioned whether a modernized economy
necessarily meant a developed indigenous economy or rather implied
must the vitalization of the existing satellite or colonial economy;
the latter would imply a sustained underdevelopment of indigenous
substructure cum the contradictions of colonial economy in the post-
independence era.
^Federation of Nigeria, Second National Development Plan,





A critical and dialectical appraisal of the colonial political
economy under the neo-classical (or colonial) industrial development
model could have revealed the contradictions of colonial capitalism.
The latter analysis could have objectively revealed the causality
of politics of underdevelopment in Nigeria. In other words, it could
have enabled the post-colonial Nigerian development planners to deter
mine whether the economic dilemma the colonized Nigerians encountered
had any correlation to the colonial capitalism based on such findings
and whether a metropolitan model could resolve underdevelopment crises
in post-independent Nigeria. But the latter critical study was not
steadfastly conducted, for the most part.
As a consequence of the uncritical celebration of the colonial
industrialization philosophy and model, the development strategies
in Nigeria are simply anathema. Despite the pessimism regarding the
success of this model which the reality of economic chaos pinpoints,
this group of scholars still posits that since the Eurocentric model
enabled the mother country to develop in a matter of time, Nigeria
using such a prototype model would also develop.
But did the desired results follow? No! For example, the
1966 socio-political and economic crises which resulted in a Civil
War and the stultification of the 1962-1968 Development Plan were
a consequence of metropolitan oriented political and economic devel
opment strategy. It fostered the growth the exploitative metropo
litan mode of production which drained the economy and it depressed
and underdeveloping at independence. Thus leaving the Nigerian eth
nicities fight for the control of the little that was left for bare
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survival. Hence, the plan failed to inspire authentic development.
The neo-classical colonial capitalist model-based First National De
velopment Plan was still enforced until the end of the Civil War on
January 15, 1970.
In 1969, the Federal Ministry of Economic Development and the
Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research conducted the "Iba-
dan Conference [on post war]* Reconstruction and Development from
March 24-29, 1969."19 The documents published by the Institute "show
that the foundations for the [Second National Development Plan, 1970-
1974 or]* or current. . .development efforts were. . .laid at the
Conference."20 The 1970-1974 Plan's objectives were to establish Ni
geria as a "united, strong and self-reliant nation; a great and dynamic
economy, a just and egalitarian society, a land bright and full of
opportunities for all citizens and a free and democratic society."21
The major flaw in the First Development Plan was not corrected, as
the Second Plan designers failed to dialectically appraise the neo
classical capitalist development model to determine whether it had








In fact, such findings would have enabled the state to opt
for an authentic rational national development model, and hence to
effectively or successfully manage the economic crises in the future.
Such an evaluation was never done. Thus, politics of underdevelopment
stiffened. Consequently, the economy was in a state of crisis.
Third, another example could be cited in a volume captioned Ni
gerian Government and Politics Under Military Rule, 1966-1979. edited
by Oyediran. In this volume, about fourteen Nigerian political econo
mists used the traditional approach to review the development efforts
of the military regime. Albeit their studies highlighted some of
the economic problems most Nigerians were experiencing, some of these
scholars remained, for the most part, uncritical or highly descriptive
of colonial capitalism and evolving metropolitan development philosophy
which was the base of the government plans. They failed to question
precisely the essence of the neo-classical-based development plans
as a viable remedy. Because of this flaw, they could not objectively
determine the causality of underdevelopment politics in an attempt
to mobilize the leadership toward the formation of an authentic de
velopment model for Nigeria. Consequently, these scholars could not
arrive at conclusions that would necessitate significant radical change
in the structure of the economy.
Furthermore, this uncritical appraisal of our colonial indus
trial experience has led most Nigerian scholars to base their studies
not on the indigenous mode of production, but to assure that the Ni
gerian past, and even the present, resembles the earlier stages of
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contemporary industrialized capitalist nations. Our study categori
cally refutes this assumption or assertion.
In sum, these forms of scholastic contributions are a misrepre
sentation of the Nigerian reality. They result in inadequate develop
ment models which are not authentically Nigerian or Afrocentric and
are thus incapable of catalyzing development toward egalitarianism
in the nation. Additionally, they exacerbate the superficial colonial
mythology that unless we follow the advanced capitalist states' develop
ment models, our future will be bleaker.
Therefore, to resolve this intellectual crisis, we intend to
go beyond the descriptive analysis by utilizing a dialectical method
of analysis in this case study. As a case study, we shall seek to
determine why politics of underdevelopment abounds in post-colonial
Nigeria. In retrospect, the burden of this study then becomes how
to objectively determine the causality of politics of underdevelop
ment in post-colonial Nigeria. And based on such findings, to sug
gest a realistic remedial theory capable of transforming the present
underdeveloping satellite economy to a coherent self-propelled devel
oping African economy.
A successful affirmation of our hypothesis and generalization
of our finds on the Nigerian situation could generate similar efforts
across neo-colonial and underdeveloping states in Africa. And whereas
no comprehensive studies have been conducted in a case study format
in this setting before, our efforts would lead to the formation of
scientific Afrocentric development theory in Africa. This, then,
is the essence of the significance of this study.
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Limitations of the Study
The study spans from 1960 to 1990. This is the period that
has witnessed both the civilian and the military governmental failures
to catalyze and sustain economic development of the country. As a
case study designed to contribute toward the formation of an Afro-
centric paradigm, however, we would be both inductive and deductive
in our quest to distill out of Nigeria's social existence and establish
a qualitative antecedent to the post-colonial crises. Hence, our
objective to utilize the pre-colonial experience as part of the ante
cedental data is indispensable. We intend to correct any misconceived
propositions on ending Nigeria's underdevelopment crises that are
rooted in colonial experience and do not depict authentic indigenous
experience. This is predicated on our conviction that errors not
corrected over a period of time, among the oppressed, might evolve
into damaging facts and myths that could manifest erratic development
theories, and consequently frustrate their development.
Organization of the Study
This study is divided into three parts. In Part One, we shall
provide the blueprint or antecedental historical base of this study
as a point of departure. Thus, Chapter I of Part One encompasses
the introductory statements which lay out the general guidelines of
the study such as statement of the problem, purpose of the study,
explanation of concepts, statement of objective, hypotheses and test
ing procedures, methodology, significance of the study, limitations
and organization of the study.
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Chapter II is a critical analysis of Africa Pre-colonial Econo
mic System. Our inferences here would be utilized as a basic historic
antecedent, essential for the resolution of our hypotheses. To that
aim, the following variables would be analyzed:
A. The Labor Development or Process - Indigenous technology
vis-a-vis the manifested industries and output would be epitomized
and dialectically analyzed to determine their fundamental impact on
indigenous societies en masse.
B. The Pre-colonial Superstructure of Africa/Nigeria - We
would revisit, epitomize and dialectically analyze the political sys
tem to determine the logical impact of leadership in mobilizing in
digenous masses to realize the end of the society.
Our major concern here would be to determine whether or not
the pre-colonial superstructure cum manifested politics (i.e., the
affairs of the society which are rooted in historical native authority
and culture), did catalyze strategies of developing economic system.
In the quest, we would seek to determine the role of the indigenous
school in mobilizing the society to realize its end; having in mind
that eyery society has a school as a fact of its civilization.
This historical analysis is essential in determining the effi
ciency and effectiveness of an authentic indigenous mode of production
in generating concrete development strategies and its probable poten
tiality if embodied as a fundamental of post-colonial development
strategies.
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C. Colonial Capitalism in Colonial Nigeria - The substructure
and the position of the colonized in it. We would determine the charac
ter and role of the colonial industries and its impact on Nigeria.
Colonial superstructure would be analyzed to determine its
role in sustaining colonial capitalism, as well as its logical impact
on indigenous productive forces. To that end, we would locate and
analyze the basic factor institutions that the colonialists set up
to consolidate colonial capitalism. The basic contradictions of the
colonial superstructure and substructure would be epitomized and di-
alectically analyzed as essential antecedent in the resolution of
our hypotheses.
D. A juxtaposition of colonial and pre-colonial mode of pro
duction would be made. The latter would be dialectically analyzed
and logically synthesized to depict the historical impact of colonial
capitalism on the pre-colonial mode of production on one hand, and
the post-independent economic system, on the other. In retrospect,
the preceding analysis will constitute an historical antecedent with
out which our hypotheses cannot be resolved in the subsequent analyses.
Part Two of the study would comprise three chapters, each repre
senting the hypothesis to be tested. Thus, Part Two is an summation
of the object of our study. In Part Two, Chapter One, Hypothesis
One would be tested. We would determine, based on our antecedents,
whether or not colonial capitalism catalyzed contradictions of underde-
velopment crises in post-independent Nigeria. We would determine
whether the contradictions noticeable and lamented by Nigerians under
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colonial capitalism repeated or noticeable in the post-independent
era (i.e., the character of colonial and metropolitan capitalism in
post-independent Nigeria would be evaluated).
- Type of industries then and now
- Process of labor in the colonial industries then and now
- Technologies and control of the colonial industries then
and now
- The output of the colonial industries then and now
- The character of labor then and now
- The factor institution of labor training (i.e. schools
as a producer of colonial labor then and now)
- The contradictions in the above variables then and now would
be synthesized and dialectically analyzed to determine
their consequences of scale on Nigerian masses as well as
on politics and manifest superstructure.
The deduction therefrom would resolve Hypothesis One. This would
constitute Chapter Three.
Herein, in Part Two, Chapter Four, Hypothesis Two would be
tested. Contingent on our antecedents, we would determine whether
or not the post-independent development philosophy and manifest plans
and strategies are essentially and dominantly indigenous or metropo
litan. And by such facts and factors, be objectively able to evaluate
their impact on national industrialization or development efforts.
We would also determine the extent of interrelatedness, if
any, of these plans and strategies as formulated, modified and imple
mented by respective post-colonial regimes to date; vis-a-vis why
the latter failed to contain political incohesion or manifest concrete
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development. A consideration would be paid to why no rational departure
has been implemented.
To that end, we would separately analyze various development
plans or strategies under different regimes. In each case, our main
issue would be to determine whether or not their implementation gene
rated concrete development and growth on a national scale or on the
contrary whether it further exacerbated the growth and development
of metropolitan industries. Our barometer would be the penury of
the Nigerian masses expressed in unemployment indicators. We would
precisely utilize the Nigerian national labor data to affirm whether
or not there is sustained massive unemployment since independence.
Sustained unemployment data in this study would indicate and thus
affirm failing economic policies or affirm the dominance of politics
or underdevelopment in the policies of post-colonial leadership.
The above deductions would be epitomized, dialectically analyzed and
synthesized to resolve Hypothesis Two.
In Part Two, Chapter Five, Hypothesis Three would be tested.
We would appraise, based on our antecedents, whether the post-colonial
superstructure is essentially and dominantly colonial and metropolitan
indigenous. Further, based on that, we would determine whether or
not colonial substructure manifested a crises-laden superstructure
cum underdevelopment dilemma in post-independent Nigeria and vice
versa; having in mind the contemporary development crises.
To that end, we would look at the character of colonial poli
tics, leadership, government, and institutions, cum their impact on
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the Nigerian masses, and compare and contrast with that of post-colonial
regimes. In view of the latter we would revisit class structure of
the colonial political elite and the position of the indigenes therein
and juxtapose it with the class structure of the post-colonial leadership
and the position of the masses in their respective regimes; we would
then be in a position to determine the character of national politics,
policies and implementations, etc. and thus their contradictions would
be revealed.
Then based on those findings, we would resolve Hypothesis Three.
The issue here is to locate the leadership orientation, evaluate same
to determine its failure in containing underdevelopment crises and
stiffening penury on the citizens.
Our objective is to determine why post-colonial politics and
regimes do not manifest civilizing theory of national development
to ensure sustained development and growth of the economic system,
but the contrary. Part Three shall constitute Chapter Six or the
Conclusion.
The final chapter shall be a synthesis of resolutions, com
pendium of the deductions from the hypotheses and/or generalization
complementing our thesis. By looking at the historical economic system
in this light, the essential causality of our undercivilization would
be located and solution concretized into authentic theory of develop
ment.
Data Collection and Analysis
In order to establish a strong theoretical basis for our study,
an exhaustive use of literature—books on political economy, scholarly
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journals, government statistics, and magazine reports on colonial
mode of production and model of development in Nigeria, Africa and
the Third World—is made. These sources are critically examined.
But, in general, the analysis is highly qualitative and utilizes va
rious secondary data from the literature at our disposal. In the
context of originality, the study is inductively and critically rooted
in Nigeria's colonial and post-colonial industrial development plans
and, in particular, incorporates reviews of the state of economic
development strategies or models in post-colonial Nigeria.
In sum, to attain this objective we shall use as much litera
ture and data from Nigerian governmental official development plans
or documents as our primary sources. These sources would be supple
mented with relevant literature written by African and foreign scho
lars.
Review of Relevant Literature
Books on Nigeria which analyze African pre-colonial economy
according to African historiography which depict contradictions of
colonial capitalism from which deductions about the [with a view to
theorizing that the source contemporary economic crises stem from
the latter (and hence, speculate that only a rational and radical
departure from the former could resolve the dilemma)], are in short
supply, vis-a-vis those devoted to the perpetration of the economic
status quo. In Nigeria, as in many other parts of Africa, a main
source of theoretical influence has been underdevelopment theory as
represented by Andre Gunder Frank and Samir Amin and as popularized
by Rodney and reinforced in important respects by Frantz Fanon's
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earlier devastating exposure of a subservient, imaginative, corrupt,
parasitic, and unproductive "national bourgeoisie." But such un-
derdevelopment theory is selectively incorporated into the ideolo
gical arsenal of the aspiring domestic bourgeoisie itself.
Therefore, we would unfortunately be exposed only to a hand
ful of books by Nigerians on this problem. However, efforts would
be made to supplement these materials by books and reviews on the
Nigerian economic situation by African and other "radical" inter
national scholars. Some of this literature is reviewed hereunder.
A book captioned An Economic History of Nigeria, 1860-1960
(1971) by Olufemi Ekundare provides a substantial insight into the
pre-colonial industrial mode of production in Nigeria. It analyzes
the developments in industries throughout the pre-colonial African
kingdom of the present British imperial creation called Nigeria and
the way their growth was summarily disrupted by the introduction of
the European capitalist mode of production. Olufemi's study is a
precise chronological presentation of development history of pre-
colonial Nigeria, and as such, does not emphasize the impact of co
lonial capitalism. His work manifests that industrial development
was commonplace in pre-colonial Nigeria.
Although Ekundare admits that this work would only serve an
"introductory" purpose for scholars on the economic history of Ni
geria which as "a vast subject has remained largely unexplored," it
will serve as a valid antecedent to our understanding of colonial
capitalism. This work attempts to piece together the fragments of
statistical information on the pre-colonial and colonial economic
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developments in Nigeria. Its major flaw is that is purely a descrip
tive work. No hypotheses have been raised to test the impact of the
imposed colonial capitalism on post-colonial Nigeria and thus deter
mine whether or not there is an objective correlation between colonial
capitalism and politics of underdevelopment in post-colonial Nigeria.
A Political Economy of Africa (1981) by Claude Ake provides
a "lively and stimulating study" of colonial industrialization in
Africa and cites a series of examples when reviewing the nature of
the contradictions of the capitalist mode of producing, using Nigeria.
It contains a series of statistical data on the colonial industriali
zation developments in Nigeria, in particular, and Africa, at large.
Besides, the author seeks to clarify the striking or salient phenomena
of the colonial mode of production by basing his discussion on the
laws of motion of society.
Ake succinctly argues that the fundamental contradictions of
colonial capitalism are yet to be resolved since the contemporary
development models in post-colonial Africa, for the most part, are
colonial based. Hence, such models could only exacerbate metropolitan
exploitation and consequently underdevelopment, as it would neither
allow for independent capitalist development nor transition to sci
entific socialist development. Albeit a profound analysis of African
economy, its failure to depict historical base of civilizing pre-co-
lonial societies, which African historiography asserts, ipso facto,
eclipsed Ake's potentiality to suggest a concrete way of resolving
the present politics of underdevelopment in Nigeria.
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Although Ake does not take a stand on the possible ways by
which transformation in Africa to socialism might be carried out
(which we intend to do), his thesis is a drive toward that goal.
Therefore, this book constitutes an indispensable resource in our
study.
Decolonization and Dependence—Problems of Development of Afri
can Societies edited by Aguibou Y. Yansane and published by Greenwood
Press, London (1980) is a volume with scholarly articles on African
underdevelopment and on that of Nigeria, in particular. Chapter Seven
of this volume is specifically devoted to Yansane1s analysis of the
impact of imperialism and multinational corporations in the underde
velopment of Nigeria. In other words, it attempts to appraise the
character and role that multinational corporations play in the under
development of Nigeria by revealing some striking contradictions that
are inherent in the industrial capitalist mode of production.
The author's position is validated by up-to-date quantitative
data, which would be instrumental in the proof of our hypotheses.
The major argument is that the Nigerian underdevelopment crisis is
a consequence of colonial and metropolitan capitalism, a capitalism
which today merges into and assumes the character of multinational
capitalist corporations. In effect, his hypothesis tries to provide
empirical validation for the basic Marxist thesis that the serious
problems of the Third World countries, like Nigeria, can be traced
directly to the maintenance of dependency operations by imperialist
41
forces whose most powerful catalysts are the colossal multinational
corporations. This volume concludes with speculation that revolu
tion shall be the only option for the transformation of Nigeria.
But as to how this would be conducted, the author remains somewhat
uncommitted. Thus, the major flaw of this volume is the author's
inability to objectively clarify the character and method of this
anticipated revolution. This lack of clarity makes his analysis
essentially abstractions for the most part. This is our point of
departure. We shall take a position on possible remedial strategy
or a way out in resolving the stiffening politics of underdevelopment
in post-colonial Nigeria/Africa.
A volume captioned Independent Africa, edited by Wilfred Cartey
and Martin Kilson, published by Vintage Books (1970), is a vivid doc
umentary based on the writings of African political leaders and writers.
In it, African institutions, resistance to European penetration, Euro
pean rule, and movements toward independence are appraised. Many
articles by Nigerians on the Nigerian colonial experience are articu
lated, such as "A Denunciation of European Imperialism (in Nigeria)"
by Nnamdi Azikiwe, "Early Political Organizations in Nigeria" by Oba-
femi Owolowo, "Unity and Diversity in Independence" by Alhaji Sir
A. T. Balewa. These articles trace the basis of nationalism, but
basically from a historical point of view. The fundamental argument
articulated is that colonialism, cum colonial capitalism, is basically
exploitative and manifests underdevelopment of Nigeria. Hence, Nigeria
must be freed from the center's domination if it must develop. Al-
42
though they do not root their analyses on mode of production, the
articles provide a solid base of departure on the essence of colonial
superstructure and contradiction therein, which resulted in "flag
independence." Albeit these elite by their positions attribute the
causality of Nigeria's underdevelopment to colonial capitalism with
which we fundamentally agree, their anticipated remedial strategy
is Eurocentric. They see no need of resubstructuring/resuperstruc-
turing for the most part. They also fail to revisit pre-colonial
African civilizations, objectively analyze them, and distill syste
matic virtue to design strategies and tactics of reversing underde
velopment. This failure is a major flaw and this is where we depart,
our study will critically revisit the indigenous world of production.
We consider it a highly essential and significant volume for our pur
pose since these Nigerians were the leading founding fathers of Ni
geria's nationalism.
Imperialism from the Colonial Age to the Present by Harry Mag-
doff, published by Monthly Review Press (1978), is a volume with a
series of essays rooted on modes of production and aimed at illumi
nating historical basis and essence of imperialism from the era of
Europe's global expansionism associated with the industrial revolu
tion to the period of the multinational corporation, or era of neo-
imperialism. The author profoundly argues that imperialism, and con
sequently colonialism and colonial capitalism, constitutes a factor
of underdevelopment of colonies and post-colonial states like Nigeria.
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Hence, for the development of the underdeveloped states, the essence
of imperialism must be understood and neo-imperial ism contained.
Furthermore, this volume examines the often neglected aspect
of the last bicentennial history of the spread of Euro-capitalism
in light of structural changes in the metropoles, which created the
need for colonialism and development of the peripheries like Nigeria,
cum nationalism in the colonial countries. The volume, therefore,
is highly significant for our study since it does reveal the moti-
vative force behind the colonialist self-proclaimed good intention
of developing the "under-industrializing" pre-colonial world like
Africa, in general, and Nigeria, in particular. Although this study
enables us to objectively comprehend the essence and strategy of co
lonial capitalism as exploitation, it remains objectively quiet in
suggesting specific and realistic means of containing the perceived
exploitation which could fundamentally resolve underdevelopment cri
ses in post-colonies like Nigeria. This is its flaw. Our study ob
jectively suggests realistic and specific strategies of ending under
development crises in Nigeria/Africa.
Can Africa Survive? Arguments Against Growth Without Develop-
ment by Basil Davidson (1974) is a volume that appraises the essence
and impact of Euro-capitalism in Africa. From his findings, the author
articulates that pre-colonial Africa was transforming toward a more
developed and civilized society until Europe colonized the continent
and introduced its capitalist mode of production. Under the Euro-
capitalism mode, African resources, like Nigeria's experienced growth.
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In his analysis, there was "more production, more money," but this
wealth was amassed by the metropole, and thus "the growth, if anything,
impoverished Africans, just as it enriched the Europeans." Second,
this process of colonialization resulted in the highly effective socio-
politico and economic institutions; thus what was left at the time
of independence was the dominant exploitative colonial institutions.
Davidson then raises an issue which unquestionably reflect our study's
intent, i.e., can these [colonial]* institutions work in [independent]*
Africa of which Nigeria is a part? And can the advanced capitalist
development model activate structural development in a post-colonial
state in Africa?
Since most of the factual base of his discussion is predicated
on concrete examples of Nigeria or the Nigerian situation, we consider
Davidson's work, although too general in scope, an additional solid
base of departure. The work is illuminating since his methodology
reflects the dialectical materialist approach. Its major flaw is
the author's failure to scientifically suggest authentic and specific
strategy based on indigenous African tenet and historiography, whereas
he disfavors Eurocentric paradigm for the most part. Hence, this
failure to reconcile articulation with African reality today makes
this volume a scientific abstraction, and thus practically a fantasy.





Federation of Nigeria, National Development Plan, 1962-68,
published by the Federal Ministry of Economic Development (Lagos,
Nigeria) is a tremendous original source for our study. This docu
ment reviews the epistemological foundations of previous development
planning in colonial Nigeria and affirms thereto that such colonial
development strategies, unquestionably, provided impetus for post-
colonial development planning in Nigeria. From that base, the govern
ment sets out development strategies which are conceived as the foun
dation upon which the future socio-political and economic development
strategies in Nigeria could be based.
According to the then Federal Minister of Economic Development
Waziri Ibrahim (1962), "in preparing this plan we [the government]
have drawn upon the pool of international knowledge and experience";
that includes "experts" from advanced capitalist centers, as well
as the Tatter's institutions. Thus, although the plan was designed
to resolve the colonial problem or enable Nigeria to win her economic
independence (from the Nationalist government perspective), it seems
to lose touch with concrete post-colonial underdevelopment problems,
insofar as it was for the most part designed by colonialists and neo-
colonialists who are traditionally against total independence of any
former colony, or who created the problem in the first place.
The plan's major flaw is that it has a neo-classical colonial/
metropolitan underpinning and is not based on Nigerian historical
experience, but rather on advanced capitalist nations' experience.
Hence the plan remains in self-contradiction on the issue of defining
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its major objective—development--in the interest of Nigeria. At
best it is tantamount to a rat seeking a safe custody from a hungry
cat. In this context, development strategies on application become
anathema and further exacerbate politics of underdevelopment.
This blind reliability on the exploitative philosophy and stra
tegy of the metropolis eclipsed post-colonial regimes' effort to
design genuine strategy of development based, for the most part, on
a holistic indigenous experience, just like the centers. To the lea
dership Nigeria is developing, which we refute. Development is viewed
as growth of the economy within the framework of modernization. But
on whether or not such growth could uplift the masses from present
poverty remains inconclusive. Our study seeks to scientifically refute
the government's assertion of Nigeria's development.
Second, in spite of this problem of underdevelopment, inasmuch
as the plan is the fundamental government document with well defined
strategy to develop post-colonial Nigeria, we consider it a highly
indispensable original source for our study.
A book captioned Nigerian Government and Politics Under Mili
tary Rule. 1966-79. edited by Oyediran, is a volume in which fourteen
Nigerian scholars articulate on different aspects of the post-colonial
dilemma in the political economy of Nigeria. For instance, the develop
ment strategies and their implementation, under the title, "The Military
and the Economy," are reviewed by Akin Iwayemi. In his analysis,
Akin appraises, albeit positively, the national development strategies
during the military regimes and pinpoints their achievement as well
as failures.
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In all, however, his work is highly descriptive; his major
flaw is that he does not hypothesize to move us toward the formation
of a model of development of Nigeria. Second, his traditional ap
proach only enables him to interpret modernization in Nigeria during
the military regimes as development. To him, as long as the economy
was recovering high gross national product (G.N.P.), that was develop
ment. Third, his major argument is that the failure of the economy
is a consequence of corruption and inefficiency in the government,
but as to what created and bred that syndrome or how the inefficiency
could be basically contained, his approach does not reveal.
We intend, in our method and hypotheses, to question the basis
of underdevelopment politics. Because of his traditional approach,
Akin cannot recommend a radical modification in the economy, even
when he acknowledges that there is economic crisis in the economy.
Because of his scholar critical analysis of the economy, we consider
his work a great resource for our study.
Federation of Nigeria, Second National Development Plan, 1970-
24, published by the Federal Government Printer (Lagos), is the next
major government document which contains the policy framework or na
tional development objectives which the government was committed to
at the end of the first development plan period.
This book is a review of the first plan and highlights the
problem encountered with a view of targeting this plan for a possible
resolution of underdevelopment crises. Although the government, un
like in the first plan, resolved that "its policies and actions
[would] be guided solely by the best interest of the people of Nigeria"
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because of its undetachment from the neo-classical metropolitan model
of the first plan, its commitment to resolve the underdevelopment
problem remained in limbo, just like the preceding strategies.
Although the government claims to make Nigeria a "self-reliant
nation. . .and a just and egalitarian society" by winning "economic
independence," the plan remains a paper tiger insofar as its strategy
for the economic liberation is designed, for the most part, by the
neo-colonial forces. Its major flaw is that no part of the plan ques
tioned whether the neo-colonial model has ever enabled post-colonial
states to win economic independence. Because of lack of profound
and dialectical analysis of the adopted neo-colonial model, spurious
judgements were used to legitimize the latter development plans.
As a consequence, no remedy was in sight; the crises stiffened. How
ever, for our purpose, we consider the Development Plan's original
data whereas it is a key document upon which the testing of our hy
pothesis could not be conducted without its elaborate information.
Another development plan characterized—Federal Government
of Nigeria, Third National Development Plan, 1975-80. published by
Federal Government Printer (Lagos)--is another original source we
will use. This plan which stresses "self-reliance" through indi-
genizing industries still remains unclear on how to precisely imple
ment the neo-classical international model of development. Just like
the previous plans, development is not concretely defined from the
viewpoint of the indigenous masses. No question is raised as to why,
in the face of the petroleum boom the country was witnessing during
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the second plan, the Nigerian masses were still dwelling in penury
just as they had been before the flag independence.
According to the Plan, development was still measured as the
growth of the gross national product (G.N.P.). This is the volume's
main flaw. In any case, since it outlines the development targets
for the country such as needed for rapid industrialization, as well
as prescribes the model to be used to attain that objective, we con
sider it a fine original resource for our study. A critical analysis
of it will manifest the causal factors of underdevelopment of Nigeria.
It will enable us to establish whether or not there is a correlation
between colonial capitalism and politics of underdevelopment in post-
colonial Nigeria.
Federal Republic of Nigeria, Second Progress Report on the
Third National Development Plan, 1975-80, published by the Central
Planning Office, Federal Ministry of Economic Development and Recon
struction (Lagos) is a review that highlights the achievements as
well as the failures of the Third National Plan, while pinpointing
the problems in its implementation and recommending measures for re
medies. For our study, the review enables us to determine whether
the measures were simply a symbolic gesture meant to mystify the
state's uncommitment to real or even development, and second whether
or not there was a consequential improvement on the state of the eco
nomy.
Achieving Even Development in Nigeria—Problems and Prospects,
edited by E. J. Nwosu and published by Economic Development Institute,
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University of Nigeria (1985) is a volume in which Nigerian scholars
appraise the post-colonial economy of Nigeria. Their debate, emerging
form their concern for underdevelopment syndrome in Nigeria, is cap
tivating. However, their analytical method is basically descriptive
and traditional; as such, they only give a peripheral appraisal of
the economy. This probably grows out of their commitment to their
Western capitalist or elitist orientation; as a consequence, no hy
pothesis that would have suggested the abandonment of neo-classical
international economic model to a radical model had been posited,
as we are committed to do.
Thus, while the book argues that the present model of develop
ment does not reflect, for the most part, the Nigerian reality, and
therefore could not ensure or contribute to equitable distribution
of wealth, or enable Nigeria to win economic independence, it remains
silent in the context of recommending ways out, which might have sug
gested a radical revolutionalization of the state. In spite of that
flaw, the work remains a scholastic masterpiece, based on its rich
data and sense of objectivity. From our position, it is tantamount
to intellectual inertia. Thus it is simply a research for debate
purposes but not for transformation of a neo-colonial state like Ni
geria. Since it is regarded as "the first of its kind [according
to the publisher] to deal in great depth with the issue of equity"
as a post-colonial development problem in Nigeria, we consider it
necessary original data indispensable in determining the causality
of underdevelopment politics in post-colonial Nigeria.
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The Challenge of Nigeria's Indigenization. edited by Akinade
0. Sanda and published by Nigeria Institute of Social and Economic
Research (NISER), Ibadan, 1982 is basically an analysis of the problem
that the state encountered in the implementation of industrial in
digenization model, characterized as The 1972 Enterprises Promotion
Decree (NEPD). Under this decree, the federal government sought to
have the control of foreign businesses legally transferred to Niger
ians, as a step to contain exploitation of the economy by foreign
businesses.
The book brings to light the pitfalls in the decree implemen
tation as exemplified by public discontent as well as the formation
of the Industrial Enterprises Panel to assess the problem. It also
informs the evaluation outcomes the panel uncovered to be the major
obstacles to successful indigenization of foreign business, such as
low level of patriotism on the part of Nigerians who cooperated with
foreigners to exploit their masses. Again, the major argument is
that the failure of development strategies is a consequence of cor
ruption in the polity, which is questionable from our position.
Thus, while the author brilliantly concludes that unless the
"human problems" frustrating the decree implementation are eradicated,
his silence on where the problem is centered (i.e., the state) indicts
the latter and unquestionably makes his work a manifestation of intel
lectual inertia. This stance consequently frustrates his ability
to determine objectively the causality of underdevelopment politics,
and realistically speculate for possible solutions. This is his major
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weakness. The volume will be very useful in our analysis, however,
of the indigenization model.
Review of African Political Economy, edited by Doris Burgess
and Judith Mohan, is a quarterly publication in which such distin
guished scholars such as Amin, Leys and Davidson critique the current
failing efforts of independent Africa to develop by appraising the
contradictions inherent in the capitalist mode of production on the
political economy of Africa.
Special volumes are particularly devoted to the critique of
the political economy of colonial and post-colonial Nigeria. For
instance, in volumes 5 and 13, a series of well-researched studies
on the colonial capitalism and their consequence for post-colonial
development of Nigeria are articulated. In volume 5, the impact of
multinational corporation and the Nigerian state (both a manifesta
tion of colonial industrialization) is examined as it affects the
development efforts in the post-colonial era.
In the findings, the state is reflected as a comprador per
se of the Multinational Corporations (MNCs). The government function
aries are satisfied from profit in the form of bribes they receive
from "organizing the access of foreign firms to local markets and
raw materials." This fact reveals an uncommitment on the part of
the state to contain the metropolitan exploitation and activate de
velopment in Nigeria.
In volume 13, an appraisal of the political economy of under-
developing states is conducted from a historical materialist perspec
tive. In the findings based (among other theses) on Frank's analysis
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of capitalism and its impact on post-colonial Latin America, and on
a critique of political economy of Nigeria by Segun Osoba, the volume
argues that the colonial capitalist mode of production (sustained
by classical and on neo-classical development models), is what con
stitutes underdevelopment in Third World states like Nigeria. Burgess
and Mohan's work contributes to our study by highlighting the facts
that the persistent crises in post-colonial Nigeria are outcroppings
of the contradictions of colonial capitalism and hence depicts essen
tial data from which we can deduce that there is a correlation between
colonial capitalism and politics of underdevelopment in Nigeria.
This volume concludes that only a rational departure from the
colonial-oriented capitalist model to scientific socialist model will
catalyze development in Third World states like Nigeria. And for
our purposes, these critiques shall be very useful when testing our
hypotheses. The major weakness in the book is that it did not specify
a realistic method by which the departure from colonial capitalist
model could be efficiently effected, which we intend to do.
Industrialization and Income Distribution in Africa, edited
by J.F. Rweyewamu and published by Codesere, P. B. (Dakar, Senegal,
1980) is a volume with scholarly articles in which industrialization
dilemma and strategies designed to resolve the latter (in post-co
lonial Africa) are quantitatively appraised and solutions advanced.
In chapters seven and eight, income distribution in English-
speaking West Africa (which includes Nigeria), and the impact of the
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (which is a development strategy
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designed to place the ownership and control of foreign industries
in the hands of Nigerians in order to arrest economic osmosis or ca
pital drain and underdevelopment) on indigenous ownership quantita
tively are analyzed by Kodwo Ewusi, Akinola Owosekun, and Moses Oligba.
Their approach to the studies is traditional and functional.
In their studies they depict the contemporary Nigerian economy as
structurally incoherent and, simultaneously, dependent on the center
for technological and economic support needed for its industrializa
tion insofar as it remains a raw material export economy.
Owosekun and Oligba articulate that this dependency problem mani
fests economic osmosis since most of the net earnings are ploughed
back to the centers.
Efforts to place the industrial assets equitably among Nigerian
people have been frustrated due to lack of political commitment by
the state to design and implement a development model capable of re
solving Nigeria's problems of dependency and its resultant penury.
They argue that such lack of political will by the state has been
the reason the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree has remained
a "paper tiger." In the face of this lack of decolonization of in
dustries and massive population increases, the Gross Domestic Product
(G.D.P.), they argue, does not fetch adequate foreign earnings to
improve the income per capita in the nation; thus the penury in
creases. Their findings are supported by a series of quantitative
data which would be a valuable supplementary resource in our efforts
to test our hypotheses. Thus, because of their traditional method
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of analyzing colonial capitalism they could not reveal the contra
dictions in the latter; hence, they simply analyzed the effects but
not the essence of colonial capitalism, which our dialectical method
would. Hence, their approach basically, then, does not suggest a
scientific indigenization of the colonial model and a revitalization
of the precolonial development tenet, if necessary.
Their major flaw is that they failed to hypothesize on the
problem, and consequently they could not move us toward the formation
of a theory and philosophy of development capable of bringing about
concrete development in Nigeria. Our studies basically would move
to formulate a theory of development in Nigeria/Africa based on a
holistic African experience.
A book entitled Path to Nigerian Development, edited by Okwu-
diba Nnoli and published by Codesere, P.M. 3304 (Dakar, Senegal),
features scholarly articles on the beginning and causes of underde
velopment in Nigeria. The method applied by these scholars is his
torical in some concerns and dialectical in others. They separately
argue that the problem of underdevelopment in Nigeria is a manifes
tation of unresolved contradictions of colonial industrial mode of
production, and that the lack of commitment on the part of the lea
dership to design a development strategy capable of resolving those
contradictions has simply stiffened underdevelopment crises.
The major flaw in this volume is that there is no sense of
dialogue, which could have enabled these scholars to agree on the
hypothesis needed to test the validity of their contentions. Such
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findings could have evolved a development theory and ideology of de
velopment for Nigeria in particular and Africa at large. In this
respect, they simply identify the problems but fail in their responsi
bility of theorizing toward the transformation of Africa in their
capacity as intellectuals. In this respect, their studies become
merely studies for scholastic debate, not for the resolution of con
crete African problems.
In retrospect, their studies are captivating in that they raise
critical questions that could help one to truly understand the root
of the underdevelopment problems in Nigeria. It is this aspect of
their contribution which we consider useful in our study and efforts
to test our hypotheses.
Nigerian Modernization: The Colonial Legacy (1972) by Ukandi
G. Damachi is an epitome of the colonial industrialization history
of Nigeria. The author's methodology is traditional-historicism.
In this volume, Damachi articulates or "attempts to present some of
the disruptive and constructive social aspects" of the development
of colonial industrial mode of production in Nigeria.
This study enabled him to posit and conclude that colonial
capitalism, in reality, has some positive impact or manifestations.
The objectivity of the studies in this volume is predicated on the
fact that they were separately and independently conducted in colla
boration with International Institutes for Labor Studies (IILS),
Geneva. It is the basic concern of IILS to ensure that development
strategies in underdeveloped countries contain the penury of their
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masses and underdevelopment syndrome, and catalyze concrete develop
ment. These concerns are depicted in articulations in this volume.
In chapter seven, Ukandi G. Damachi of IILS (a Nigerian),
critically analyzes Nigeria's post-colonial development models or
plans to determine whether or not they manifest real and even develop
ment as anticipated by the state. Some categories, such as employment
conditions, income distribution, the social relations of production,
and the position of the leadership in development planning and imple
mentation are utilized as measuring indicators of success or lack
thereof. The preceding indicators are in consonance with our study.
What is significant in Damachi's analysis is that his studies
are a compendium of inductive and deductive theories. Damachi's ap
proach in this study is traditional and functional. However, this
approach only enabled him to study the underdevelopment crises on
the periphery and thus its causality could hardly be located in the
colonial mode of production and evolving development strategies and
tactics.
In the study, the author reveals that Nigeria's post-colonial
regimes have failed in their efforts to contain underdevelopment di
lemma in the state. Based on his findings, Damachi contends that
the Nigerian development strategies have not yielded the desired ob
jective or have "not been successful because government plan design
ers] experts embark[ed] on grandiose or overly ambitious plans without
setting out clear techniques for realizing their targets; [hence]
the government becomes aware of these problems without knowing what
to do;" thus, the crisis escalates.
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In retrospect, Damachi rests his study on a position that except
some structural improvements of the economy are made by Nigerians,
the country's future could be bleaker. But as to how the development
should be attained, he remained silent. However, in spite of this
flaw, because of his familiarity with Nigeria (as a citizen), his
experience in working with the IILS, and the fact that this study
was performed in Nigeria (thus giving it more inductive cum deductive
underpinnings), we consider this work as an essential original re
source in our study.
In the volume entitled Africa: What Can Be Done? by Ben Turok
of the Institute for African Alternatives (IFAA), the author dialecti-
cally explores Africa's experience and thus argues that "Africa's
dilemma is a function of World Capitalism Crises in which the Third
World is the main victim."
Turok also argues that the crisis stiffens as a consequence
of chauvinism in Africa's post-colonial leadership. Thus the book
epitomizes African underdevelopment. Turok precisely depicts "why
African governments did not fulfill their promises of development
and democracy following the defeat of colonial rule." The volume
analyzes the basics of neo-colonialism in Africa and consequently
illuminates the essential contradictions in the post-colonial era.
The author concludes that whether or not these contradic
tions can be resolved will depend on how soon the academics and
other social forces agree on programs of development in theory and
praxis, which we share. Hence, we consider this volume indispensable
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in our efforts to resolve politics of underdevelopment in post-co
lonial Nigeria.
Besides the above volumes, books on underdevelopment theory
that influenced theoretical framework in recent years for underde
velopment studies in Nigeria or elsewhere in Africa are represented
in such volumes as Unequal Development (S. Amin, 1976), The Develop
ment of Underdevelopment (A.G. Frank, 1969), Political Economy of
Backwardness (Baran). Rodney's brilliant work, How Europe Underde
veloped Africa, also will be used as our basic point of departure
in our argument to test the hypotheses.
This is not all. Works of authentic African history such as
The Stolen Legacy (George James, 1985); African Origin of Civiliza
tion; Myth or Reality (Cheikh Anta Diop, 1972); Pre-colonial Black
Africa (Cheikh Anta Diop, 1987); The African Background to Medical
Science (Charles S. Finch, 1990); Africans and Their History (Joseph
E. Harris, 1987); Introduction to African Civilizations (John G.
Jackson, 1970); Black Man of the Nile (Yosef Ben-Jochannan, 1972);
Kemet and the African Worldview (Maulana Keranga and Jacob H. Carru-
thers, 1986); From Ancient Africa to Ancient Greece (Henry Olela,
1981); The Destruction of Black Civilization (Chancellor Williams,
1987); Black Africa, The Economic and Cultural Basis for a Federated
State (Cheikh Anta Diop, 1987); Egypt Revisited (Ivan van Sertima,
1989); The Egyptian Book of the Dead (E. A. Wallis Budge, 1967), et
al. would be used in our revisitation and dialectical analysis of
pre-colonial economy of African light of our study objective, as vide
our Chapter Two outline.
CHAPTER II
PRE-COLONIAL ECONOMY OF AFRICA/NIGERIA:
DEVELOPING OR UNDERDEVELOPING?
But what has Africa contributed to the world progress?. . not
the wheel, not the writing, not the mathematics, not art. . .not
the other thing. . .These critics of Africa forget that men of
science today are, with few exceptions, satisfied that Africa.
. .for many hundreds of centuries. . .was in the forefront of all
world progress.1
L.S.B.Leakey
Post-colonial Africa, indigenous historiography has affirmed,
is a watershed of stiffening, underdeveloping political economy. But
to what extent is this underdevelopment crisis a fact and factor of
aboriginal African societies as suggested by the above caveats and
many similar assertions? This issue shall be our focus here.
Today in Africa/Nigeria after decades of flag independence,
the hope for an autarky is just as remote, as it was in the colonial
era. According to African authentic post-colonial history, contempo
rary nation-states are largely dominated by wanton underdevelopment
crises, such as stiffening poverty of the masses and timely political
incoherence.
Consequently, contemporary African leaderships, and in particu
lar, Nigeria's, have historically become suspect. They are no longer
Quoted in Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (New York: Inter
national Publishers, 1970), 2.
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celebrated as the zealous nationalists they were thought to be at the
inception of flag independence by Nigerian masses.
Such dispirited, poverty stricken masses are not uncommon.
In fact, African/Nigerian historiography has attested that such dis
content is noted to generate friction in the regimes, and manifest
abrasive leadership. Nigeria has witnessed such political incoheren
ces in its regimes or leadership en masse. They manifest systematic
and insidious coup d'etats. Hence, there has yet to be a lasting es
prit de corps in the leadership capable of designing a functional or
viable development strategy for Nigeria.
According to genuine development history the absence of a vi
vid development strategy basically aggravates and frustrates the ca
pacity of under-developing societies and nation-states to design and
implement efficient and effective models for a concrete development.
This is a fact in Nigeria today. Hence, poverty of the masses exacer
bates in post-colonial Africa.
Consequently, haunted by violent outlash from the masses, au
thentic African/Nigerian historiography has affirmed the post-colonial
leadership historically solicit development philosophies and strategies
from the metropolis and manifest centers which historically colonized
and exploited Nigeria as a viable remedy. Indeed the masses resented
a reunion with the colonial leadership and opted for independence.
But has post-colonial leadership succumbing to the center di
rectives evolved a functional development model capable of arresting
and reversing underdevelopment? To the latter, objective national
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history of Nigeria, or continental Africa indicates the contrary.
For the most part, postcolonial history infers that the more the post-
colonial regimes utilized the centers' oriented development plans,
the worse underdevelopment crises among masses. Thus, it appears that
these centers derived development strategies are essentially inconsis
tent with the uncompromising need of catalyzing a developing political
economy for post-colonial Africa/Nigeria.
In reality, the latter model is structurally and practically
just an exploitative replica of the colonial administration. The co
lonial development strategies, history asserts, disarticulated the
political economy of the colonies and, ipso facto rendered the colonized
nations vulnerable to the exploitative tendencies of the centers.
Economic osmosis was the reality. Today this is still the order.
Therefore, whereas the more the center plans are utilized,
the more the underdevelopment crises deepen. Consequently, according
to post-colonial history, the evolving political instability and the
development strategies are probably perjorative to post-colonial de
velopment, philosophy and strategies of Africa/Nigeria. Historically,
the post-colonial leadership has yet to distill from the center's de
velopment philosophies a functional development strategy capable of
generating a sustained development and leadership resilience. There
is yet to be a supra nation-states development model. The post-colonial
economy is becoming bleaker and Africa seems to be retiring to the
colonists' characterization of a DARK continent.
In the face of all these failures and crises, the leadership
does not appear to be imminent. The Nigerian leadership today is yet
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to re-examine the centers' development philosophy that they inherited,
discounted, re-embraced, and applied as an optimistic remedy, albeit
to no avail. Such introspecture could illuminate the causality of
the inconsistencies, if any, in the applied center evolved development
strategies in the post-colonial era.
Objective systematic introspection informs or suggests to the
persons in control a fundamental modification in their plans. Simul
taneously, an examination or a profound nature study of the political
economy of the center which these leaderships emulate would have, pro
bably, catalyzed remedies in absence of the authentic development his
tory of Africa/Nigeria which the leaderships do not embody.
According to genuine omni history, societies and manifest na
tion-states become developing, as a result of embodying and exercising
their authentic culture, or holistic experience as essential facts
and factors of development and vice versa. Such axiom would have been
tested against the history of the centers, and unquestionably would
have made the post-colonial regimes to realize that the fundamentals
of development strategies can be distilled from their indigenous cul
ture just as the centers'. It would have emphasized to the leader
ships a historical postulate that development eclecticism not absorbed
or digested into one's history before implementation has always frus
trated authentic development.
In retrospect, neither of the above considerations appealed
to leadership. Despite successive failures, Nigeria's leadership today
still opts for metropolitan development philosophies and strategies,
academically, politically and economically. The regimes are languid,
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and the worst is that they are training in the colonial oriented school
system. They are being educated to embody the concept that Africa
could not develop without the center's guidance. Therefore, Africa
has no history worthy of revisiting to distill essentials for concrete
development. But to what extent is such position a logical argument?
The post-colonial leadership remains passive.
Hence, Basil Davidson's profound and fundamental delving into
omni historiography infers that:
The bundling of all societies into the same crudely linear con
cept of development process ignored the bulk of human history
To argue that Africans were undeveloped or underdeveloped peo
ples was tantamount to saying that they had no history of their
own; whereas, in fact, it lies beyond any serious question that
they were in no way undeveloped or underdeveloped, in terms of
their own frameworks. On the contrary, they had developed their
societies from Stone Age simplicity to Iron Age complexity. They
have passed from one stage to another of technological achieve-
7K£* If these Pe°Ples were undeveloped or underdeveloped in
1960, this could only be in terms of quite different history of
quite different peoples.2
And regrettably, the Africa/Nigeria colonial-oriented school
system and evolving elite are yet to compromise Davidson's caveat and
attestment.
Therefore, the striking issue becomes: why? In this context,
Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, in his findings, asserts that:
Colonialism imposed its control of the social production of wealth
through military conquest and subsequent political dictatorship
But its most important area of domination was the mental universe
of the colonized, the control, through culture, of how people per
ceived themselves and their relationship to the world. Economic
n i 2Basl1,Pavidson» Can Africa Survive? Augments Against Growth Without
Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), 74.
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and political control can never be complete or effective without
yovernmental control to control a people's culture is to control
their self-definition in relationship to others.3
Thus, in light of the preceding axiom and caveats, both based
on authentic omni historiography asserting that indigenous political
culture or -
. . .the distribution of patterns of cognitive, affective and eval
uation orientations among the population towards political ob
jects special roles of structures, such as legislative bodies,
executives or bureaucrats, incumbents of roles such as particular
monarchs, legislators and administrators and particular public
policies, decisions or enforcement of decisions.4
is only historical base for distilling genuine development philosophy
and strategies; our revisitation to pre-colonial Africa/Nigeria be
comes a highly profound and fundamental priority in the resolution
of our hypotheses. Our inferences here would enable us to determine
why these politics of underdevelopment pervades post-colonial Africa/
Nigeria and would be utilized as a basic historical antecedent, es
sential for the resolution of our hypotheses. To that aim, pre-co
lonial Africa/Nigeria, based on the following variables, would be analyzed:
A. The Labor Development or Process - Indigenous technology vis
a-vis the manifested industries and output would be epitomized and
dialectically analyzed to determine their fundamental impact on indi
genous societies en masse.
3Quoted in Asa G. Hillard, III, Lucretia Payton Stewart, and Larry
Obadell Williams, Infusion of African and African American Content in
School Curriculum (Morristown. NJ: Aaron Press,1989), 3.
4James A. Bill and Robert Hardgrave, Jr., Comparative Politics.
The Quest for Theory (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc.,
1981), 87.
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B- The Pre-Colonial Superstructure of Africa/Nigeria - We would
hereby dialectically describe and analyze Africa/Nigeria's political
system to determine the logical impact of leadership in mobilizing
the masses to realize economic independence.
And whereas, our study delves into authentic aboriginal history
of development in Africa or questions a historical African civilization,
development strategies become objective cultural issues. As history
asserts, culture is the essence of society's development.
The burden of our study or hypotheses is made culturally signi
ficant, while resolution could generate authentic political development
in post-colonial Africa/Nigeria at the dawning of the 21st century.
Therefore, according to Cheikh Anta Diop:
The cultural concept, especially will claim our attention here,
tne problem was posed in terms of restoring the collective African
personality. . .admittedly three factors compete to form the col
lective personality of a people a psychic factor, susceptible of
a literary approach; this is a factor that would be called national
temperament, and that Negritude poets have overstressed. In addi-
£n?h'c, Vk? th! J1?*01"1"1 factor» «nd the linguistic factor,
both susceptible of being approached scientifically - the subject
of our studies; we have endeavored to remain strictly on scienti
fic grounds. Have foreign intellectuals who challenge our inten
tions and accuse us of all kinds of hidden motives or ridiculous
ideas, proceeded any differently when they explain their own his
torical past that seems normal? Yet when an African does likewise
to help reconstruct the national personality of his people, dis
torted by colonialism, that is considered backward or alarming
We contend that such a study is the point of departure for cul
tural revolution properly understood. All who try to bypass this
effort can be explained by intellectual inertia, inhibition, or
incompetence. The most brilliant pseudorevolutionary eloquence
ignores that need which must be met if our peoples are to reborn
culturally and politically. Many Africans find this vision too
w?Jh +h -5° ^u^fj "?* so lon9 a9° some of them could not break
with the idea that Blacks are not existent culturally and histori-
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. . .Today, what interests most is to see. . .not passive readers
but honest bold research workers, allergic to complacency and busy
substantiating and exploring ideas. . .such as the Ancient Egypt
was a Negro civilization. . .We must restore the historical con
sciousness of the African peoples.5
Thus, in the wake of stiffening underdevelopment crises, (a)
political lack of cohesion with a potentiality for insurrection, cen
ter-oriented ineffectiveness in minimizing and/or reversing underdeve
lopment crises; (b) sustained passive embodiment and exercise of center
development strategies, in spite of their inefficiencies; (c) leader
ship inability to determine the failures in the respective develop
ment elitism implemented since independence, reminiscent of pre-co-
lonial political economy becomes our profound and fundamental concern.
In this quest, the essential issue then becomes what is Africa?
In a more soluble term, the question seeks to illuminate the character
of aboriginal-oriented civilization.
Thus, we precisely and dialectically seek to describe and ana
lyze the aboriginal or the indigenous society that manifest contempo
rary African nation-states. Historically, such objective analysis
enabled researchers to determine the basic character, or the fact and
factors of development and growth of a society's essential mode of
production. Consequently, we could then locate the historical cata
lysts which transformed and advanced that society on its own, or vice
versa.
5Cheikh Anta Diop, The African Origin of Civilization: Myth or
Reality (Westport: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1974), xiii-xiv.
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Therefore, the solubility of our essential issue here (what
is Africa?) would enable us to determine whether or not there existed
authentic "productive forces - labor power, objects of labor and means
of labor."6
Thus, according to Ake, whereas:
The productive forces express the overall productive capabili
ties of the society. They tend to develop at all times. When
one talks of the development of productive forces one may be
thinking of the quantitative and qualitative improvements in
labor power, for instance, when people acquire more scientific
education and technical skills, one could be thinking of the im
provements of natural assets such as irrigation of arid lands to
make it arable. One could be thinking of the technology with
which man produces. The importance of the development of pro
ductive forces to a society cannot be overemphasized. The state
of the development of productive forces decisively influences so
cial organization, culture, the level of welfare and even con
sciousness. The history of Africa itself bears testimony to the
importance of productive forces. . .Africa's economic backward
ness and object dependence today reflects the state of the de
velopment of productive forces. One major reason why we have
failed to make sense of politics and other events in Africa is
because we have not paid enough attention to the state of the
development of productive forces, and its powerful influence on
everything else.7
Hence, by analyzing the productive forces in pre-colonial Africa, we
would objectively determine antecedent facts and factors essential
for the attestment of our hypotheses. Therefore, Africa, before
colonialism, indigenous historiography affirms, was a compendium of
varied but culturally limited societies: the fundamental issue now
becomes: (a) where do we begin an analysis of pre-colonial Africa
6Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (Nigeria:




and why? (b) what correlation does an analysis of pre-colonial Afri
ca/Nigeria have in the resolution of our impending hypotheses?
To these issues, African historiography as articulated by Diop
asserts that: -
Our investigations have convinced us that - ancient Egypt was a
Negro civilization. The history of Black Africa will remain sus
pended in the air and cannot be written correctly, until African
historians dare to connect it with the history of Egypt. In par
ticular, the study of languages, institutions, and so forth, can
not be treated properly; in a word, it will be impossible to build
African humanities, body of African human sciences, so long as
that relationship does not appear legitimate. The African histo
rian who evades the problem of Egypt is neither modest nor objec
tive, nor unruffled. He is ignorant, cowardly and neurotic. Ima
gine, if you can, the uncomfortable position of a western historian
who was to write the history of Europe without referring to Greco-
Latin antiquity and try to pass off as a scientific approach.8
Thus, we deem it, not out of objectivity, to understand pre-
colonial Africa by describing and analyzing the Egyptian society of
antiquity and manifest civilization and development whereas the latter
was a star, or a model civilization aboriginal society of Alkebu-Lan.*
According to authentic history:
Among the many names Alkebu-Lan [the "mother of mankind" or "Garden
of Eden"] were the following: Ethiopia, Corphye, Ontegia, Libya,
"and 'Africa' - the latest of all." AlkebuLan is the oldest and
the only one of indigenous origin. It was used by the Moors, Nubians,
Numidians, Khant-Haddans [Carthagenians], and Ethiopians. "Africa,"
8Diop, Origin of Civilization, xiv.
*We infuse into this study the concept - Alkebu-Lan, to under
score the authenticity of indigenous society's history, prior to inter
continental contact, and shortly thereafter, but before colonialism
This is to objectively ensure that the essential fact and factors of
development here, if any, are indigenous.
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the current misnomer adopted by almost everyone today, was given
to this continent by the ancient Greeks and Romans.9
As a star or most advanced of the indigenous societies in anti
quity, pre-colonial Egypt played a pivotal role in historical African
civilizations. Egypt's positive culture pervaded continental Alkebu-
Lan or Africa, with probably an identical intensity which the "Greco-
Latin" culture of antiquity had on the European civilizations cum de
velopments. Therefore, "the return to Egypt in all fields is a nece
ssary condition to reconcile African civilization with history, to
be able to build a body of human sciences and to renew African cul
ture" !0 indispensable in the designing of authentic and essential de
velopment philosophy and strategies for contemporary underdeveloping
Africa/Nigeria. Thus, Egypt or "Kemet will offer fertile ground in
the areas of philosophy, culture and sciences for a new African and
a new paradigm for humanity which this implies."11
In retrospect, our study utilizes the African/Egyptian culture
as a point of departure because it personifies an authentic indigenous
outstanding civilization, according to historiography of Africa. We
share the position of African historians that:
It does not mean we minimize or neglect other African cultures,
but that we have an authentic ancient classical culture as a point
of departure, rich in primary sources, and complex and inclusive
9Yosef ben Jochannan, Black Man of the Nile (New York: Alkebu-
Lan Books Associates, 1973), 47.
^Quoted by Maul ana Kauenga in Kemet and the African World
View - Research - Rescue and Restoration (Los Angeles: Institute of
Pan-African Studies, 1986), xiii.
^Ibid.
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enough to offer foundations in the various disciplines on human
Knowledge critical to the posing of an authentic African paradigm
of human science, culture and society. . .to explore other cul
tural centers in Africa. . .and reject that which is intrusive
and alien to the African human spirit and integrate that which
is affirmative and expansive and contributive to human libera
tion and a higher level of human life.12
Since history attests that Africans become better by learning
from a holistic and African heritage, we deem such learning to be our
profound and fundamental point of departure. More importantly, because
the ancient Egyptians were "Negroes," the moral fruit of their civili
zation is to be counted among the assets of the black world.13
The Egyptian Ancestry; African or Not?
How do we attest that the Egyptians and their great civiliza
tions of antiquity are Alkebu-Lans or Africans? A resolution of this
issue is fundamental to establishing an essential base from which the
post-colonial societies, schools and evolving leadership that largely
question and doubt the authenticity of African "forces of production"
or indigenous development, could revisit, and ipso facto, desire to
distill their development strategies.
In sum:
It is simply a matter of providing few landmarks, to persuade the
incredulous Black African reader to bring himself to verify this
To his great surprise and satisfaction, he will discover that most
of the ideas used today to domesticate, atrophy, dissolve, or steal
his soul were conceived by his ancestors. To become conscious
of that fact is perhaps the first step towards a genuine retrieval
"ibid.
13Diop, Origin of Civilization, xiv.
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of himself. Without it, intellectual sterility is the general
role or else the creations bear not what imprint of the sub
human.14
The Egyptians, African historiography confirms, are abori
ginal and indigenous to the continent now called Africa. They had
lived there prior to intercontinental ethnic societies contact. Even
in contemporary Africa, there exist genuine cultural similarities,
i.e., in etiological development, with indigenous nationalities and
kingdoms such as the Yorubas of Nigeria, Walof of the Gambia and Sene
gal, as well as Ethiopia and ancient kingdoms of Mali Empire or the
belt of nation-states of western Sudan, i.e., West Africa.
But on the physiognomy, identify with other Africans, history
resolved that -
There are many physical varieties of African peoples. The
complexions of Africans are mainly black and brown. Most of the
light skinned people in Africa today are late comers or inter
lopers. They have little or no relationship to Africa's ancient
history. The Egyptians are a distinct African people. They did
not originally come from Europe or Asia. Their history and their
culture started in what is now Ethiopia and Sudan. It is incor
rect to refer to them or any African people as Hamites. There
is no such thing as Hamite people. This is another term that was
imposed upon African history by Europeans* who wanted to prove
that everything good in African history was brought in from out
side. The Hamites are supposed to be "black white people."15
In fact, after further profound investigations, Diodonus of
Sicily writes:
14Ibid., xv.
*European colonist - my emphasis.
15John Jackson, Introduction to African Civilization (NJ: The
Citadel Press, 1970), "6^ ~
73
The Ethiopians say that the Egyptians are one of their colonies
which was brought into Egypt by Osiris. They even allege that
this country was originally under water, but that the Nile, dragg
ing much mud as it flowed from Ethiopia, had finally filled it
in and made it a part of the continent. . .They add that from them,
as from their authors and ancestors, the Egyptians get most of
their laws. It is from them that the Egyptians have learned to
honor kings as gods and bury them with such pomp; sculpture and
writing - were invented by the Ethiopians. The Ethiopians cite
evidence that they are more ancient than the Egyptians but it is
useless to report that here.1**
This is not all; further evidence illuminates and objectively
resolves any doubts about authenticity of Egyptian African ancestry.
According to J. Olumide Lucas in Diop (1974) the Yoruba nation of con
temporary western Nigeria, and a manifestation of aboriginal African
kingdoms i.e., the Yoruba kingdom, share identical etymological foun
dation with ancient Egypt. Such conceptual underpinning has not been
found between Egypt and any ethnicity outside Africa, since antiquity.






Hor: to be high
Fahaka: silvery fish
. . .and most of the principal gods were well known, at one time
to the Yoruba. Among these gods are Osiris, Isis, Horus, Shu,
Sut, Thoth, Khepera, Amon, Anu, Khonsu, Khnum, Khopri, Hator,
Sokaris, Ra, Seb, and the four elemental deities. Most of the
gods survive in name, or in attributes or in both."17
16Diop, Origin of Civilization, 1-2.
17Ibid., 184-185.
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Besides the evidence of cultural semblance of Egypt and the
Yorubas by Lucas, Diop findings assert that: "Egypt proper and Senegal





Kaba Kaba, Keba, Kebe
Antef Anta




This list could be prolonged indefinitely and thus localize in the
Nile Valley the early habitat of all the Negro peoples scattered today
over the different parts of the continent."18
Finally, Gaston Maspero (1846-1916) expresses the attestment of
omni genuine historians on Egyptian ethnicity thus:
By the almost unanimous testimony of ancient historians, they
belong to an African race [read: Negro] which first settled in Ethiopia
on the middle Nile, following the course of the river, they gradually
reached the sea.19
In light of the preceding assertions and caveats, we resolve
that a critical, and dialectical analysis of Africa's Egypt could cata
lyze fact and factors essential in designing a concrete development
philosophy with strategies for undeveloping Nigeria in a continental
context. To this end, we visit Egypt.
19Ibid., 2.
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Ancient Egypt: Developing or Underdeveloping? - Why and How?
The preceding axiom and caveats have objectively resolved that
Egyptian ancestors were Black Africans, for instance, Egyptology affirms
that:
pharaohs (Narmer, first dynasty, the actual founder of the
pharaonic line; Zoser, third dynasty, by whose time all the tech
nological elements of the Egyptian civilization were already in
evidence; Cheops, the builder of the great pyramid, a Cameroon
type; Menthuhotep, founder of the eleventh dynasty, very black;
Sesostries I, Queen Ahmosis Nefertam; and Amenhophis I) show that
all classes of Egyptian society belong to the same black race.20
Second, whereas "Apollodories, first century before our era, Greek
philosopher" Aeyptos conquered the country of the black-footed ones
and called it Egypt after himself.21
Moreover, based on the language of and the literature by the
Egyptians of the pharaonic epoch - which the Egyptians had only. .
. =km=black. . .a collective now which. . .described the whole people
of pharaonic Egypt as a black people22, we attest that Egyptian so
ciety of antiquity is authentically indigenous African, and such is
their technological base and manifest civilization. Further findings
assert that:
The Edfu test - an important document on the early history of the
Nile Valley. . .found in the temple of Horus at Edfu,. . .account,
Egyptian civilization - was brought from the South by a band of
invaders under the leadership of King Horus, later deified and
became the Egyptian christ. The followers of Horus were called
"blacksmith" because they possessed iron implements traced back
to Somali land. Although it may have originated in the Great






Lakes region of Central Africa, in Somali land, there are ruins
of buildings constructed with dressed stone showing a close re
semblance to the architecture of early Egypt.23
Political Development
According to historiography, "Egypt first became an organized
nation at about 6000 B.C.24 That is several thousand years before
any settlement of foreign ethnicity or ancestry, like the "Asiatics
in northern Kmt25 or Egypt during the eighth dynasty" - ca 2173-216026
B.C. By 3200 B.C., Egypt had evolved an indigenous dynasty kingdom
of Ta Seti-Nubian Dynasty (xustul): ca 3400 (?) - 3200 B.C. . . .Kemitic
Dynasty 1: ca 3200 (?) - 2890 B.C. - King Narimr; xMenes)27 was the
first ruler over United Egypt.
Along with the art of governing which evolved from Ethiopia,
as we indicated earlier, the Egyptians also developed their techno
logy from an authentic African ancestry of Nubia. For instance, in
"Somaliland, there are ruins of buildings constructed with dressed
stone, showing a close resemblance to architecture of early Egypt."28
This is indeed a fact that has yet to be established about Egyptian








Further findings affirm that "the ancestors of Southern Egypt
came originally from this region.29 [Somalia] In fact, Professor G.
Brodeur, in his book The Pageant of Civilizations inferred that the
early Egyptians from the interior of Africa and Somali land entered
the Nile Valley through Nubia and brought with them a well developed
civilization.30
The latter1s findings succinctly assert that:
the Egyptian migration occurred long before 5000 B.C. That these
ancient Africans possessed tools and weapons of iron should oc
casion no surprise, for in the magazine, Natural History, Sept.-
Oct. 1932 . . .there is an article by the Halian explorer, Nino
del Grande, entitled "Prehistoric Iron Smelting in Africa" in which
he tells of his discovery of an iron smelting furnace in Northern
Rhodesia of an antiquity of from five to six thousand years.31
Northern Rhodesia is contemporary Zambia and in antiquity was an abori
ginal kingdom of Zimbabwe.
What does this imply? Our synthesis deduces that there was
an indigenous African iron processing technology in Egypt and the rest
of Africa which was all aboriginal. Hence, such indigenous technology
could be fine tuned and advanced, if iron smelting technology is to
catalyze in contemporary Africa. This is essential because mother
technology, history affirms, is the fundamental of developing society.
The Egyptian School System
After the formation of the monarchy in Egypt, a school system





university but the only notable one in antiquity, this African univer
sity, the Mystery order, developed a curriculum. The curriculum of
the Egyptian mystery system consisted of: "grammar, arithmetic, rhe
toric and dialectic, i.e. quadrivium, geometry, astronomy and music
(i.e. the trivum)."3?
Besides the liberal arts, the Mystery School evolved sciences
of monuments (pyramids, temples, libraries, obelisks, sphinzes, idols),
architecture, agriculture, mining and forestry. Art drawing and paint
ing were secret sciences33 as were myths and parables. This mystery
system curricula were effected by virtuous indigenous priests who
functioned as lawyers, judges, officials of government, businessmen,
sailors and captains.34
This program indicates that the priests "have been trained
in economics, civic law, government, census-taking, navigation, ship
building."35
Consequently, these virtuous faculty members of the mystery
system, history asserts, produced a genuine cultural cadre of Africans
or Egyptians. Thus, the African kingdom of Egypt evolved a magnifi-
cient society, replete with wonderful indigenous technology and inven
tions essential for her outstanding and sustained developing substruc





The latter made Egypt, authentic historiography resolves, a star
civilization in Africa, (before intercontinental ethnicity contact)
and a universal basic model of civilization in the era preceding inter
continental ethnic contact. The following are the facts.
Historic Indigenous Developments in
Science, Technology and Art of Government
In a revisit to African historiography, most scholars educe, and
thus assert that, contrary to the colonists, Africa/Egypt was a devel
oping political economy. These findings profoundly shatter the colo
nists' perception that Africa is a DARK continent, as in Dukes (1776),
and Baker in Hillard (1990). Both Dukes and Baker echoed the colonists'
characterization of Africans as DARK continent of uncivilized beings.
For instance, in 1776, David Hume, in reflecting on African heri
tage positioned that:
Negroes. . .in general. . .are naturally inferior. There was never
a civilized nation. . .nor individual eminent either in action or
speculation. No ingenious manufacturer among them, no arts, no
sciences. 3*>
Furthermore, like David Hume, Samuel Baker, while exploring the
Nile River, negatively characterized Africa, and/or Africans:
Human viewed in its crudest state, as seen among savages is quite
on the level with that of the brute and not compared with the noble
character of the dog. . .There is neither duty. . .no religion but
cruelty.37
In retrospect, these perceptions had been infused into the colo
nial and post-colonial school system. Hence, in contemporary post-colo
nial Africa/Nigeria, the leaderships, for the most part, embody these
36A. G. Hillard, III, L. P. Stewart, and L. 0. Williams, Infu
sion, xiv.
37Ibid., xv.
ideas. But to what extent are the positions of uncivilized Africa
valid? The findings on the latter could validate or invalidate the
optimism of seeking fact and factors of development from the center,
by the past regimes.
In this respect, African historiography and Egyptology have this
to attest:
For thousands of years, the Nile Valley was the mainstreet of the
civilized world. Especially in mathematics and natural sciences,
Egyptian scholars played a major role in building the foundations
of our modern science. Yet the full scale of this African contri
bution is either little known or attributed to other peoples - a
brief outline of the 4000 years of the Nile Valley pre-eminence
in mathematics . . .engineering and technology which developed
hand-in-hand with mathematics.38
The illumination of pre-colonial African political leadership would
not be out of order. The latter would enable us to affirm whether or
not the present politics of underdevelopment is an indigenous African
syndrome.
Science and Technology in Pre-Colonial Africa-Egypt
During the 1960s, a decade when most African nation states at
tained "flag independence," committed indigenous scientists and his
torians began to question some academic tenet of the dominant colo
nial school system that produced them, but celebrated, in the main,
the historical heritage of Europe. The paper freedom ignited freedom
of academic exploration into Africa's past, characterized by the colo
nialists as DARK. They questioned whether the latter (i.e. Dark Afri
ca) is a myth or fact. Cheiekh Anta Diop, a respected Egyptologist,
scientist and pioneer producer of African historiography, in his
38Ivan Van Sertima, Nile Valley Civilizations. Morehouse
College ed. (Journal of African Civilizations Ltd., Inc., 1989), 102.
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nature study of Africa in antiquity, resolved that Africa or Egypt pro
duced revolutionary models in sequences, like mathematics, medicine,
et al. In his study, Diop deduced that "since Struve edited the math
ematical papyrus of Moscow, the world scientific community knows that
Egyptian mathematics was highly elaborate and theoretical."39
To put it succinctly, the Egyptians invented the formula "S =
2 R2" to calculate the surface area of pyramids they were building,
long before any foreign ethnicity. According to Diop:
Those who have dealt with mathematics, even minimally, know how
delicate the treatment of the curved surface is. But the "for
mula" found by the scribe 1700 years before Archimedes is rigor
ously accurate: S = 2 R2 for the surface area of the hemis
phere. Indeed to solve the problem it was necessary to calculate
what the surface area of the hemisphere was and then multiply the
results by two to obtain the surface area of the whole sphere.40*
Further studies have affirmed that, besides mathematics, African
technological inventions became universal catalyst models universally.
In fact, these findings attest that:
There have been an impressive number of inventions in Africa, be
tween 2000 and 3000 B.C. This was the time in which indigenous
domestication of plants and animals occurred, and this was done
by means of indigenous techniques. It was that time that metal
lurgy was invented. The Egyptians of the ancient empire, no doubt,
knew the metallurgy of iron. Also, the recent archeological dis
coveries made by the Belgium in Burundi confirm our challenging
ideas concerning the first Iron Age in Africa.4!
A revisit to ancient Africa also reveals that
in 4236 B.C., the Egyptians had already invented a calendar based
on the helical rising of Sothis, or Sirius (the brightest star in
39ibid., 69.
For elaboration of the Egyptian mathematics, see Diop in Ibid.
41lbid., 78.
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kJL8^ ^ appeared every 146° ^ears- Indeed, the Egyptians
knew the two types of years: 365 days and 365 days + k The first
one contains 12 calendar months and 30 days = 360 + the epagomenUl
days which were dedicated to the birthdays of Osiris, HorSssIth
lllllZ* K^^' *»!« «ve Egyptian gods. . . So 'mSdicaHy
speaking, Osiris was indeed born the night of December 25 as was
Jesus Christ who can be compared to Osin's, in thTs case and S
many others. . Even Neugebauer, who was a great detractor of Egyp
tian science said that 'this calendar is indeed the only intelligent
calendar which existed in human history.'42 my iniem9ent
Thus, we deduce that whereas the calendar is, historically, in
strumental and fundamental to planning and implementation of events,
and hence, an indicator of objective organization, its invention attests
that Africa-Egypt was a highly organized kingdom by the fourth millen
nium B.C.43
Aeronautical Inventions
Further findings affirm that the African Egyptians made great
studies in mechanics. By the fourth millennium they had already in
vented a glider or aircraft model. Further studies affirm that "an
Egyptian glider dating from the third or fourth century B.C. was dis
covered in Sakkara in 1898."44 TnuSj we deduce that thepe wfls a pQ_
tential to develop an aircraft technology by Africans in Africa.
Medical Inventions
Egyptologists have found in the Egyptian official records or hiero
glyphics the outstanding accomplishments of the African Mystery System





Egypt leaves the rest of the world behind."45 Tne latter indicates
that "like all African medicine, Egyptian medicine has baffled scholars
because of the complete interpenetration of 'magico-spiritual' and ra
tional elements, based on authentic medical records of 5000 years
ago."46
More findings confirm that:
The Egyptians were writing medical textbooks as early as 5000
years ago. This indicates not only a mature civilization but
also a period of medical development. Out of the hundreds and
thousands of medical papyri that must have been written only 10
have come down, the most important being Edwin Smith papyri
The basis of what most Egyptologists know about Egyptian medi-
C1 lie •
A critical analysis of the medical papyri indicates that an
"ancient Egyptian diagnostic method reads disconcertingly like a mo
dern textbook on physical diagnosis.48 It details how:
ThJ^im,!!11;*'*^11!8*10"8-.*0 el1cit a descriPti™ of the complaint.The colour of the face and eyes, the quality of nasal secretions,
the presence of perspiration, the stiffness of the limbs or abdo
men, and the condition of the skin were all noted. . .smell of the
body, sweat, breath. wounds. . .urine, feces. . .the pulse, pal
pated and measured, and the abdomen, swellings and wounds probed
and palpated . the pulse-taking indicates that the Egyptians
knew of its circulatory and hemodynamic significance.49*





F°r elaborate medical developments in Egypt or Africa, see
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Hence, the findings conclude that the African-Egyptians were alone
among the nations of antiquity in the development of medicine.50 This
"belies the notion that African doctors were without some knowledge
of the body's physiological process5! and that the traditional doc
tors of Africa from the earliest times had a high level of medical and
surgical skills."52
State Craft
Based on a functional mystery school system, Egypt. . .through
science brought mankind out of pre-history to the real civilizations."
"The first state organization in the world was in the Nile Valley, in
Nubian Sudan, first in Qustul, then in Egypt with Menes (cira 3150
B.C.)."54
In fact Egyptologists attest that:
the bureaucracy - the scientific and scholarly organization of the
state. . was not an invention of the Indo-European city-state in
the period following the pre-historic era, it was without question
an African invention for controlling the organization of the human









The Egyptians Mystery Order developed the general principles of
governance56 as a fundamental of efficient effective people oriented
leadership. These principles, Egyptologists have stated, grew out of
ancestral African maxims, and we shall cite four of them here. Hence,
these principles are titled official maxims - and named after the reign
ing pharaoh.
A. State Control
The leadership is advised to be mindful "of the dangers and reme
dies for sedition, rebellion - factionalism"57 and to that end the
leadership has to "police the disaffected person."58 The maxims or
"the teaching here supports the general conclusion that division, parti-
sanism, factionalism and politics. . .are detrimental to the country
and should be decisively and efficiently destroyed before damage is
done."59
But, prior to policing the affected person, "the accused should
be given due process, i.e. brought to the court. - Except for the re
bel whose scheme is discovered - God wipes out his evil in blood."60
B. Communication and Virtue
A people's pharaoh was expected to personify his culture by
56Manlana Kerenga and Jacob H. Carruthers, Kemet and the African





embodying and expressing the indigenous maxims - efficiently and effec
tively. This principle states thus:
. . .be skilled in speech and you will be victorious. . . Words
are more powerful than all fighting. A wise pharaoh educates his
officials because truth comes to him without corruption, like the
wisdom in the saying of the ancestors. . .Imitate your fathers who
were first. . .in. . .speech, education and governance. . .all are
gifts from the ancestors.61
The statement is an embodiment and effective exercise of culture,
was regarded as a fundamental fact of a virtuous and genuine public
servant.
C. Generosity
The public servant was educated and expected to be generous to the
masses "because through benovolence the pharaoh achieves glory based
on the love of the people."62 Most importantly, the pharaoh was a per
sonification of the peoples authentic government. He was educated to
"show respect for the officials and bring prosperity to the people."63
The pharaoh embodied an historical assertion that, when the "officials
are made great, they will enforce laws."64 Only by alleviating inse








To that aim, the pharaoh is admonished to always speak the truth
so that officials will respect66 and "work for the future of the
nation."67 In sum, the pharaohship must be genuine.
Righteousness as a Fundamental of Civilizing Society
In order that society be realized as civilized, the pharaohship
or the leadership was educated to "do moat (justice) to every Egyp
tian. "68 For instance, a pharaoh was culturally obligated to "comfort
the weeper, not oppress the widow, not expel a man from the property
of his father"69 and to be "against unjust punishment, and capital pu
nishment, with the exception of. . .seditions70 in order to "prevent
factionalism which often grows out of alienation."71
To the above end, the leadership or pharaohship must abdicate
authoritarianism. These findings or "passages simply point out that
pharaohship is a collective office, because of the entourage of officers
who actually participate in decision-making process."72
Religion
According to omni historiography, a conviction about the exis






is the logos of the human family. Historically, the preceding convic
tion manifests righteousness from which evolves the systematic or ethnic
eschatologies cum religious esotericism or praxis. Hence, religious
maxims are natural to any ethnicity. Therefore religion is an essen
tiality of evolving societies' basic maxims. It is a fact of humane
society. Since Africans are organic components of the human family,
one would objectively resolve that Africans had their systematic reli
gion on a par with any ethnicity since antiquity.
Second, systematic religion is a commonplace and nationally mani
fest maxim, and African religious heritage had to be cosmic just as
any other ethnicity in antiquity. However, colonial history and foreign
religious associations dispute the existence of a fundamental cosmic
order in African heritage. To the latter, African heritage is inhumane.
The Africans had no righteous order, hence, they must embrace their
foreign religions which claim that African heritage is barbaric. In
addition, in regards to religion, history further asserts that it is
a fact of civilizing humanity by virtue of its being the basis for gen
uine culture and civilization. It follows naturally that a society
without a fundamental religion is an undercivilizing one.
Hence, inferring from the colonists' characterization of Africans
as uncivilized, it suggests to most post-colonial leadership that our
index of measuring ethics must evolve from foreign religious experiences.
To the latter, the foreigners' position, that Africans are uncivilized,
is true. The foreigners' position is personified by 1856 Putnam's Mon
thly, that -
the most minute and most careful researchers have as yet failed
to discover a history or any knowledge of ancient times among the
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Negro races. They have invented no writing, not even the crude
picture writing of the lowest tribes; they have no gSds, whereas
no epic poems and no legends, not even simple traditions There'
"?^ ^ -ver ruled
Thus, Africa since the colonial epoch becomes target and a deposi
tory of foreign-based religious associations and doctrines. The latter
associations historically appear to the colonized Africans as civilizing
agents.
Hence, Africans, and more importantly, the post-colonial leadership,
for the most part, tends to embody foreign religion as a fact of humane
and civilizing society. To this leadership, modeling Africa after for
eign ethical standards is the viable option to an essential social co
hesion. And whereas, history asserts that authentic religion is the
basis for genuine cultural unity, a fact which the centers' heritage
affirmed, it follows that the fundamental of cultural unity could mostly
be found in genuine African heritage. Regrettably, the dominant belief
in contemporary Africa is the colonial school position that African
heritage is barbaric. Therefore, the viable remedy imposed by foreign
religious order is that Africans must embrace foreign religions as a
means to regeneration.
As a consequence, most African/Nigerian elite become passive cus
todians of foreign major religious doctrines such as Christianity and
Islam as a means to civilization. For instance:
^J8!*0^ convJrt1n9 ^acks to Islam and Christianity
of Africans became non-Africans. Africans who were. .,
73Hillard, III, Stewart, and Williams, Infusion, xv-xvi.
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neither Muslims nor Christians were classified as pagans, and there
fore required to disavow their whole culture, and to regard practi
cally all African institutions as "backward or savage." The blacks
in their own right became none persons, members of a race of no
bodies, so hopeless that self-realization as personalization even
in subordinate status could only be achieved by becoming Muslim
or Christian. Indeed, in order to destroy not only their African
heritage. But identity psychologically, they were forced to change
their names to Arabic and Christian names. . .Therefore. . .during
the last thousand years widespread segmentation and attending dis
unity among the Africans made them easy to conquer and dominate.'4
Therefore, the religious order of Africa/Nigeria became eclipsed.
Africa became a DARK continent. Hence, Diop's question, (does African
heritage depict 'civilization' or 'barbarism') becomes highly profound
and fundamental, as we study to resolve politics of underdevelopment
in post-colonial Africa/Nigeria.
A resolution of religious factionalism as witnessed in the post-
colonial Nigeria and evolving regimes could mean an escape from poli
tical incohesion. Since independence, religious polarity between the
northern Moslems and the southern Christians has widened to astronomi
cal proportions. And the end to it is not in sight. Obviously, an
authentic righteous order is needed. Thus, to that end, we ask: Had
Africans or Egyptians any righteous heritage worthy of embodiment and
exercise by post-colonial states like Nigeria?
To this issue, our findings infer that "by 10,000 B.C. a
thorough-going religious system had already been formulated in Africa
for the first time in the intellectual world history."75
^Chancellor Williams, The Destruction of Black Civilization -
from 4500 B.C. to 2000 A. D. tChiczan-. ihirri un"u p,a» 1Qp7j
+75SlelS! From Ancient Africa to Ancient Greece. An Introduc-
/u orv of Ph11osoPhy- "'s*V Th» ^inrt p,.KH?u1nj rnmpnnj.
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History asserts that to African peoples man lives in a religious
universe, so that natural phenomena and objects are intimately asso
ciated with God.76 In a profound way, Africans. . .see in the uni
verse not only the imprint but the reflection of God, the only image
known in traditional African societies.77 Hence, all universal ob
jects are godly or cosmic. Thus, every life is sacred. From this we
deduce that in Africans' praxis, the sanctity of humans is supreme.
Here again we reiterate Diop's question - Does such conviction suggests
barbarianism?
In response, further findings affirm that:
. . .on top of high level organization and technical skill among
the ancient Egyptians was their religious devotion which consumed
daily life. . . .Gods worship took many forms in village norms.
As dynasties evolved, gods became personifications of kings or pha-
raohs. By the Third Dynasty (2700 B.C.), the Egyptians had docu
mented a clear intellectual concept of the origin of God and des
tiny of humans.78
This documentation is volumed as the "book of the coming forth
by day," or the papyrus of Ani. This papyrus was acquired by the Trus
tees of the British Museum in the year 1888.79 Hence, in light of the
preceding findings, we infer that African heritage is a cosmic order,
and this manifested fact and factors civilizing pre-colonial kingdoms
as Egypt.
76John S. Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy (New York:
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1970), 63.
77Ibid.
78Kerenga and Carruthers, Kernet, 71.
79E. A. Wall is Budge, The Egyptian Book of the Dead (New York:
Dover Publications, Inc., 1967), v.
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Ingenuity in African Heritage?
Based on the preceding inferences, we resolve that albeit, "Egypt
is essentially a red desert, without adequate rainfall, the land would
be completely inhabitable if not for the Nile River,"80 but most
importantly, Africans applied their mental powers in transforming these
arid lands into usable farmland. "The Mystery System enabled them to
undertake essential challenges - such as cleaning the marsh, cultivating
the land and controlling flood waters which became the economic basis
for Egyptian civilization."81
Reminiscence to pre-colonial African heritage reveals a technolo
gical kingdom. For instance:
. . .the technical precision required for pyramid building began
with the engineering and construction of irrigation projects along
the Nile. While the masses worked the land, a civil service class
emerged to coordinate the collective affairs of the community or
nome.1 Civil servants managed irrigation, collected taxes, managed
royal property and administered justice. They knew how to write
and keep records in the \/ery First Dynasty (3100 B.C.) They ful
filled intellectual, scientific and religious functions for the
nation."
Thus, by 1325 B.C. Rameses II, whose reign lasted sixty-six
years, conquered extensive territories in western Asia and built co
lossal temples in the Nile Valley.83 All these accomplishments re
solve that African ethnicities transformed from indigenous African





societies to kingdoms and eventually empires and were developing into
viable states much like the contemporary United States, England and
France. Also, on account of leadership in culture, Egypt was supreme
in the leadership of civilization,84 and students from all parts of
the world flocked to that land seeking admission into its mysteries
or wisdom system.85 Students like Pythagoras, a native of Samos,
traveled frequently to Egypt for the purpose of education according
to Herodotus Bk III 124.86
In the years that followed, however Egypt would become vulnerable
to the exploitative tendencies of foreign societies and was subjected
to foreign invasions.
. . .conquered by the Persians in 525, from then on it was con
tinually dominated by the foreigners. After the Persians, came
the Macedonians, under Alexander (333 B.C.) the Romans under Julius
Caesar (50 B.C.), the Arabs in the 7th century, the Turks in the
16th century, the French, with Napoleon, then the English at the
end of the 19th century.87
In light of the above findings, our striking issues become thus:
after the invasion, was there anything left that could be salvaged and
utilized as fact and factors of development in post-colonial regimes?
To this question, our findings are positive. Insofar as the cultural
history of Egypt is well preserved, and the progency of aboriginal
Egyptians are quite alive, then, the genuine cultural heritage of
Africans here is indestructible. It has only been eclipsed but never
84George A. M. James, Stolen Legacy (San Francisco: Julian
Richardson Associates Publishers, 1985), 42.
86Ibid., 43.
87Diop, The African Origin, 10.
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extinguished. For instance, the Mystery System is alive and some sci
entists wonder about the possibility of its revitalization. Therefore,
insofar as indigenous descendants, despite colonialism have not been
decimated, and whereas the Egyptians, like the rest of the African
forbears, passed on their knowledge, for the most part, orally, to new
generations, a determined research could manifest concrete facts of
the Egyptian star civilization. Culture is the lifeblood of society.
Hence, its contamination should not mean its destruction.
Thus, we deduce that the technological fact and factors which
manifested industries are still there in Egypt and the rest of Africa.
They were only rendered dormant or dwarfed by persistent foreign in
vasions and domination of the country.
Epitome of African Society
While the achievements of Egypt are the best known among African
nations, these are not the only achievements that African nations
can claim. The nations to the south, called Kush, Nubia and
Ethiopia, developed many aspects of civilization, independent of
Egyptian influence. These nations gave as much to Egypt as Egypt
John G. Jackson (1970)
A revisit to pre-colonial era manifested facts that advancing
and magnificent civilizations existed in Africa. Along the eastern
coastline of the continent, contrary to historical speculation that
Arabs and Moslems as well as early European associations catalyzed a
developing political economy, we find that:
their pre-colonial or early civilizations of this part of Africa
are splendid with achievements. . . .The influence of Islam and
the Arabs in East Africa has been highly overstated. . .In fact,
the Arabs, like other invaders, did more harm than good. They,
like the Europeans, destroyed many African cultures that they
did not understand. Their role in the East African slave trade
brought wreck and ruin to the nation states of this part of
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Africa. They were not without achievements, but their achieve
ments are outweighed by the harm they did.88
Islamic Arabic associations, unlike the European associations,
then compromised the objective of African cosmic conviction which sub
scribed to oneness or sameness in extended familihood. "Islam did offer
an attractive promise of equality in a Muslim community which required
little basic change from traditional African life."89
The Arabic Islamic fusion was successful, for the most part, be
cause of its basic cultural similarity. "Islam's heritage, like tradi
tional Africa, included the extended family and plural marriages, ma
gic and divination.90 The latter factors contributed to the steady
increase in Muslim African converts."91 This cultural accommodation
was consolidated with the 'building of Koranic schools'92 and evol
ving Arab settlements by the 8th century, for trade in African gold
and ivory, which was later abandoned for the enslavement of Africans.
More Arabs, under the name of Islam from Arabia are said to use
Arabic settlers in East Africa to enslave Africans. The early Islamic
settlers had inter-bred to produce Arab-African descendants called
88Jackson, Introduction, 26.
89Joseph E. Harris, Africans and Their History (New York: A Men
tor Book, 1987), 74.
92Ibid.
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Swahilis. Hence, Arabs were the principal slave dealers in East Afri
ca prior to the nineteenth century.93
The Arabs "ventured into the Hinterlands and purchased slaves
from coastal allies, many of whom were persons of mixed Arab African
descent - Swahilis" and took them to Persia, India, and China where
African slaves were used as mercenary soldiers, domestic servants,
concubines, crewmen on dhows,. . .pearl divers in Bahrain,. . . the
date plantations of Basra. . .and the Persian Gulf gang labor.94
Thus, the Arabic Islamic influence frustrated, for the most part, the
developing East African kingdoms.
Now, the striking question becomes, if the Arabs stunted the indi
genous developing economy of the East African kingdoms, what was the
status of the central and southeastern Africa that had not much Islamic
influence? We find that this area was civilizing because "these nations
have succeeded in keeping most of their culture intact."95 For in
stance, in Zimbabwe, Monomotapa and the kingdoms of the interior,.
. . remarkable development in nation building, and arts. . .had already
started.96 And "these were the main land-locked nations that saw fit
to avoid the troubles of coastal African states."
Some more stable tribes in the Congo region were bringing notable






(Libreville) to near the Congo; and the Kongo Empire was mentioned by
the Portuguese as early as the 14th century. These kingdoms, according
to Jackson:
. . .had been in existence for centuries. When the Portuguese
arrived in the fifteenth century, they spoke admiringly of its
capital Sette-Camo which they called Salvador. The kingdom of the
Kongo dates back to the fourteenth century. At the height of its
power, it extended over modern Angola as far east as Kasai and
upper Zambesi Rivers.97
Besides the Kongo, there were kingdoms in the interior with well
organized political economies. For instance, there were "the kingdom
of Anskia whose artistic talents were very remarkable,98 and the
"Bakuba kingdom (or Bushongo) still noted for its unity, the excel
lence of its administration, its arts, its craftsmanship and the beauty
of its fabrics.99 On the authenticity of the Bakuba or Bushongo king
dom, further findings resolve that:
. . .the Bushongo culture kept its records and transmitted them
almost intact to modern research. The Bakubas are an ancient
people whose power and influence once extended over most of the
Congo. Their history can be traced to the fifth century. For
many centuries, the Bakubas have had a highly organized social
system, an impressive artistic tradition, and secular form of
government that expressed the will of the people through a demo
cratic political system - the Bakuba hierarchy. . .composed of
six dignitaries responsible for cabinet-like matters, such as
military affairs, justice, and administration.100
The Bashongo had a humane monarchy, such as "Shamba Bolongon who





to say 'kill neither man, woman or child; are they not children of
Chembe (God) and have they not the right to live?"101
Besides the kingdoms of the central Africa which we have cited
above, were many other kingdoms and empires west of Sudan. This is
the area designated as west Africa. Some of the ethnicities of these
kingdoms, such as Nigeria, have cultural linkages to Egypt. In this
regard, the Yorubas of contemporary Nigeria are a case in point.
For instance, further findings affirm that:
. . .great trading empires namely: Ghana (700-1200), the first
great empire of the medieval Sudan, Mali (1200-1500), which ab
sorbed the empire of Ghana and expanded it westward; Songhay (1350-
1600), which took over the Empire of Mali; and Kanem-Bonu which
evolved separately further eastward in the Sudan.102
At the height of their power, most of these kingdoms had remarkable
technology that advanced their mode of production.
For instance, Ghana which covered contemporary "Guinea, Senegal,
Mali and Mauritania,103 produced artisans who engaged in metal-working,
such as blacksmith, goldsmith, silversmith and other specialized activi
ties as agriculture, fishing, animal husbandry and manufacturing of
clothing."104 Ghana also had an inexhaustible supply of gold105 and
salt. Our findings indicate that Ghana traded its outputs to the north







In Mali, "the rich soil was planted with cotton, peanuts, grains,
and variety of other crops. Poultry106 was also raised. With adequate
food supply, the foundations of the empire were greatly strengthened
. . . Law and order prevailed in her provinces and merchants traveled
freely having no fear of Banditry.107
In retrospect, we also find that:
in Mali - food supply existed in plenitude and was of such a variety
to assure a balanced diet to all. Large cotton crops were grown,
and cotton cloth was manufactured. From the baobab tree which grew
wild, there were derived a meal for making bread, a red dye, and
a liquid possessing medicinal properties. Besides weavers, dyers
and tanners, there were blacksmiths, goldsmiths, silversmiths, and
coppersmiths, but the life blood of the empire was trade. Taxes
were a paramount source of income for government.108
Other than Mali, at about the year 1475, the Songhay Empire arose
with its capital at Goa. Our findings indicate that the Songhay Empire
evolved out of indigenous group identified as the "Sorko" from around
Lake Chad in northeastern Nigeria.109 "Goa were the founders of the
Songhay nation" and their most important settlement was Koukya or
Gounguia, near the falls of Labbezenga in the Dendi country, lying on
he northwestern frontier of what is now Nigeria."110
History further resolved that at its peak, these indigenes








and also had an outstanding university at Sankore, in Timbuktu. A cri
tical revisitation to the empire's superstructure attests an existence
of a highly cultured administration in its monarchy.
For instance:
. . .the governors of the several provinces were the personal ap
pointees of the sovereign and a council of ministers was institu
ted, and was directly responsible to the crown. The important
ministerial posts were the chief tax collector; the chief of the
Navy; the chiefs of forests, woodcutters, and fishermen; and trea
surer. The Songhay Empire not only enjoyed a high level of ma
terial culture, but was also the home of intellectual achieve
ments of no mean order. In the principal cities of west Africa,
such as Goa, Jenne and Timbuktu, universities and other educa
tional institutions were established . . .and courses were given
in astronomy, mathematics, ethnography, medicine, hygiene, philo
sophy, logic, prosody, diction, elocution, rhetoric and music.112
Further findings attest that besides the civilizations cited in
the preceding empires, there were great states and kingdoms as well
as chiefdoms in the region now characterized as Nigeria.
Pre-Colonial Nigeria Revisited
After the colonization of Nigeria, in 1861,113 Ekundare attests,
that "it was thought that the people of Nigeria and for that matter
the whole of Black Africa, had no established history.Hll4 Hence,
they had no civilized heritage worthy of revisitation.
That sort of assessment historically dehumanizes the indigenous
nationalities and obstructs their authentic development and growth.
At best it historically distorts their African heritage and thus can
113R. Olufemi Ekundare, An Economic History of Nigeria, 1860-




create mental osmosis, causing them to seek such enlightment in other
cultures. Could this be the case in Africa/Nigeria?
In retrospect, contrary to the latter belief, archaeological find
ings assert that:
In pre-colonial Nigeria, the archaeological discoveries of such
things like axes, knives, spears, and arrowheads have indicated
that palaeolithic civilization existed in west Africa, as in other
parts of the world at that period. It is also believed that the
neolithic arts were introduced by those tribes which filtered into
Nigeria from the Sudan at about 7000 B.C.115
In any case, "the neolithic, aeneolithic and iron ages are believed
to have existed simultaneously at different places in west Africa."H6
In addition, iron ore which existed in abundance in Nigeria had been
worked for centuries for a number of indigenous smelting furnaces in
different stages of development have been discovered. "H7
This is not all; other archaeological findings resolve that:
. . .in and around the Bauchi plateau in what is now northern Ni
geria, archaeologists have demonstrated the existence of a com
pletely developed neolithic culture, the Nok culture, beginning
to turn to the use of iron and also producing fine sculptures,
from about 800 B.C. to about A.D. 200. This culture and its
peoples were directly ancestral to the kingdoms and peoples that
we can discern in the Nigerian region from about the eleventh cen
tury onwards.118
From the neolithic revolution evolved a mode of production which
manifested "the beginning of urbanization, an organized government and




118J. D. Fage, A History of West Africa (London: Cambridge
University Press, 1969), 11.
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all his subjects. . .have been in the neolithic revolution as it was
in that of ancient Egypt."119 Thus, "the neolithic revolution brought
to west Africa a new dynasty of kings and also great adventures in human
development."120
In light of the preceding development, the critical issue becomes
from which African ancestry did the peoples that inspired this develop
ment evolve? A resolution of this issue would enlighten us on whether
or not pre-colonial Nigeria had indigenous developing mode of production
worthy of distilling facts or factors for essential developing strategy
in the post-colonial era.
Here, our findings indicate that besides the Nok culture in
northern Nigeria, the Yoruba kingdom also flourished in southern Ni
geria. Outstanding among their accomplishments were the art of pro
cessing copper and governmental organization. In sum, history re
solves that -
the arts of using copper and bronze were introduced into Nigeria
from upper Egypt by the Yorubas, who moved down there from the
northeast around 2000 B.C. The Yorubas were followed into Ni
geria by the Bamba (Borgaua), the Bassava, Nupe, Oakkaherri and
Jukon. By A.D. 900, great civilization had grown among the Nupe
and the Yorubas who were later followed by the Benin culture.121
id., 10.
id.
121Ekundare, An Economic History, 9-10.
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From these advanced nationalities came extraordinary fine bronze and
brass works, the art of engraving on brass pottery, and carvings in
wood and ivory.122
On the monarchy per se, history asserts that "the kingdoms
established by them were well organized and controlled by a hierarchy
of nobles headed by semi-divine sovereigns."123
By "constant movement of invaders from Egypt. . .trans-Saharan
trade developed between north and west Africa.
. . .by A.D. 1000 Kano in northern Nigeria had developed into a
strong and prosperous trading center, and most of the earliest
cultivated crops and some domestic animals were introduced into
northern Nigeria from Egypt.124
Further findings assert that prior to the colonization of Ni
geria in the eighteenth century, the major ethnic groups, such as "the
Yorubas and the Binis in the south, and the Hausas, Nupes, Fulanis,
Kanuris in the north had founded a monarchial and civilized form of
government completely independent of any European influence."125
What must be objectively noted of the civilization here, is
that whereas these pre-colonial ethnicities in Nigeria evolve out of
indigenous African high culture of Egypt, the organizational struc
ture and evolving superstructure were the brainchildren of Egypt.
Thus, it was such scientific heritage that catalyzed a developing






At its peak in "the nineteenth century, the Yoruba kingdoms ex
tended in the west across what is now Dahomey and Togo Republics to
Accra, . . .in the south east to Benin;126 from where it influenced
the organization of 100 chiefdoms.127
According to history, "the king of Benin was a Yoruba and it was
believed that the king (Obi) of Onitsha was a descendant of the Oba
of Benin."128
With a coherent political economy or civilization in pre-colonial
Nigeria, evolved technologies which inspired industrial development
and growth in the pre-colonial societies.
The Nature of Pre-Colonial Kingdoms of Nigeria
Our motive here is to affirm whether or not pre-colonial economy
was developing on its own. And based on such findings would have a
profound antecedent to resolve our problem - colonial capitalism, and
politics of underdevelopment, and ipso facto, affirm or debunk the -
proponents of the primitive Africa of stateless peoples.129
Based on historiography of Africa, we find that there existed
institutionalized political systems in pre-colonial Nigeria. "Pre-co
lonial political systems were both centralized and non-centralized."13^
For instance, the centralized systems consisted of empires of Oyo,
126Ibid.
127Bade Onimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria -
The Dialectics of Mass Poverty. (London: Zed Press, 1982), 18-19.
128Ibid.
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Benin and Kanem-Borno, the Hausa states and some Igbo chiefdoms,131
besides other chiefdoms, like the Ibibios in the far southeast.
In fact, history attests that "from about the 9th century A.D.
to 1860, four major separate and successful experiments in statecraft
involving Kanem, Borno, Hausa states were recorded in Nigeria,132 be
sides the Yoruba kingdom.
For instance:
Oyo and Benin kingdoms were founded in the first millennium as the
two most powerful states along the west coast. Both spanned the
three pre-colonial modes of production. In the 16th century, Oyo
Empire, which was founded Oranmiyan, expanded into an empire con
trolling most of Yorubaland from the Niger to the sea and from
Benin to Togo.133
The character of the pre-colonial kingdoms/empires was similar
and well organized as in the rest of pre-colonial Africa, and Egypt,
in particular. In Nigeria, this is personified by the Oyo kingdom.
In the 16th century, in the Oyo Empire:
. . .the government was based on title grades and palace societies
organized around the Alafin or king, who ruled with three eunuchs
who were responsible for political, judicial and religious affairs.
The Oyo Mesi (kingmakers) selected the Alafin and controlled his
prowess. There were seven councillors including a Basorun or prime
minister. Feudal supervisors or ajele resided in vassal kingdoms
to oversee tribute payment to the Alafin. Balance of power was
maintained between the Alafin and his administration on one hand
and the Oyo Mesi and Ogboni society on the other. Oyo had a large
army including cavalry which was raised by the Oyo-Mesi and com
manded by the AreOna-Kakanfo. This empire survived long after 1549






In retrospect, in every pre-colonial political system currency
and fiscal arrangements evolved.135 In brief, the pre-colonial poli
tical systems emphasized democratic monarchy,136 just like the pharaoh-
ship of Egypt - the ancestral star civilization.
Pre-Coionial Industries
According to historiography, pre-colonial Nigeria was a compendium
of a coherent agrarian economy. Though dominantiy agrarian, the well
institutionalized democratic monarchy and chiefdoms created a harmonized
political system essential for development of essential technologies
and manifest industries. Hence, the bulk of pre-colonial population
were farmers - some people were engaged in local industries and
crafts.13?
According to Ekundare, "the canoe industries developed along the
coastal areas and the river banks."138 In Ibibio chiefdom, canoe
industry was commonplace.
Besides the canoe, for example:
. . .in Nigeria, cotton had been grown and manufactured into cloth
for many centuries past, had been spun handwoven in simple cloth
and dyed with colours obtained from natural plants; it provided
the clothing of the people and long before the nineteenth century
the people of Nigeria had been mining iron, tin, gold, salt and
other minerals. Iron works existed in many areas, including Ijebu-
Ode, Horin, Bida and Awka.139
135Ibid.




For the latter, blacksmiths manufactured "anvils, hammers, files
and other working tools."140 Wood carving was also commonplace. To
the north, "there was a long established leather industry utilizing
the hides of domesticated animals."141 And in the south, "soap in
dustry flourished.142 There was also technology for the production
of bows and arrows, spears, cutlasses, swords, knives, and later,
guns."143
In sum, according to findings by Onimode - "ox-driven ploughs,
industrial fuels, brewery industries" and many other were developing
in the pre-colonial mode of production. His findings also affirm that
pre-colonial Nigeria evolved from communal mode of production to feudal
mode of production - personified by her pre-colonial kingdoms and em
pires.
In the final analysis, we deduce and resolve in this chapter that
pre-colonial Africa/Nigeria had a developing mode of production. And
that it developed coherently from communal to feudal mode of production,
with all potentiality for growth and development when it was colonized
by foreign nationalities, who imposed their mother mode of production
on the pre-colonial mode?
Hence, in our next chapter we would dialectically analyze the
colonial mode of production or colonial capitalism in Nigeria to de






This would enable us to juxtaposition both mode of productions and resolve
our hypotheses in the context of determining whether or not colonial
capitalism is a fact and manifest factors of politics of underdevelopment
in post-colonial Nigeria/Africa.
CHAPTER III
AN EVOLUTION AND POSITION OF COLONIAL CAPITALISM IN AFRICA-
THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE REVISITED
In the preceding chapter, African historiography enabled us
to resolve and infer that pre-colonial Africa was a developing and
growing political economy. Furthermore, in our critical nature study
of the latter economy, we found that the pre-colonial societies en
masse were replete with essential and magnificent indigenous tech
nologies and manifest fundamental industries; a functional super
structure; a virtuously organized school and university system whose
"structural functional ism" profoundly personified, civilized and
advanced aboriginal societies into great chiefdoms, kingdoms and
empires.
From the latter school and university system, our study found
an acute personalities of culture evolved to fine tune and catalyze
societies into institutionalized democratic fiefdoms and empires,
such as Egypt, Nubia, Congo, Monomopata, Mali, Songhay, Hausa states,
Yoruba Benin, et al. The latter four formed most of contemporary
Nigeria in question.
Thus, we inferred in Chapter II that authoritarianism, or un
democratic societies, for the most part, is un-indigenous African.
The latter assertion was succinctly personified and validated by
the systematic functional ism of the Egyptian pharohship, the Yoruba
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monarchy vis a vis other pre-colonial chiefdoms, kingdoms and empires.
Hence, ingenuity abound pre-colonial heritage of Africa.
In view of the preceding inferences and caveats, we resolved
that pre-colonial Africa was a functional, and cohesive developing
economy. Consequently, the star indigenous technologies and virtuously
organized political institutions which ensured political cohesion
and guaranteed civilizing politics and essential cultural unity cum
magnanimity was a cultural fact.
Moreover, on a continental scale, the fundamentals of African
heritage were a model looking glass from which pre-colonial societies
utilized in planning, organizing, identification and resolution of
problems in the society. Therefore, the societies were harmonizing
and developing. The paradox is the case in contemporary post-colo
nial Africa, and particularly so in Nigeria.
In retrospect, the political incohesion and underdevelopment
crises which astronomically abound contemporary African nation-states
like Nigeria was minimal or negligible. Further findings affirmed
that the intellectuals of pre-colonial Africa as well as the leader
ship virtuously embodied and exercised their indigenous culture.
Such education made them to see the society as an end. And thus,
worked to better the same for the enjoyment of the polity. In this
context, contemporary African nation-states is a paradox.
Yolamu Barongo states that in Africa today:
Corruption and gross indiscipline—in order to get to the top
. . . deliberate. . .embezzlement of public funds, flagrant
Ill
regard for regulations. . .all these characterized the behavior
of African elite groups, and especially so in Nigeria.1
With a coherent developing pre-colonial economy whose elite
was not lacking in essential technological ingenuity, post-colonial
African nation-states by inheritance should be advancing a more de
veloped economy today. But amazingly, using the Nigerian example
and experience as points of departure, politics of underdevelopment
is the existing order. Hence, we explore in this chapter the issue
WHY? Why and how did an efflorescent developing pre-colonial mode
of production become eclipsed and how did it backslid into underde
velopment crises?
Since the native mode of productions and pre-colonial heritage
have no inherent fact and factors of manifest underdevelopment, and
whereas their dominancy was replaced by colonial capitalism, could
the present crises have evolved from the latter mode of production?
This will be our focus here.
The Causality of Political Underdeveiopment in Africa:
The Nigerian Experience
How is it that the nations of the underdeveloped world so for
tunately endowed with raw materials, a huge labor force, and
great potential markets as we have seen, are in fact so poor?
. . .in these nations, for the most part, lived the brown, black
and yellow people who make up roughly two-thirds of the world
population—the cradle of civilization—Egypt and the kingdoms
of Africa were flowing at a time . . .many parts of what we call
the underdeveloped world were once the richest and most culturally
advanced part of the globe!2 '
iYolamu Barongo. Political Science in Africa (London: Zed
Press, 1983), 29.
2Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Muller, Global Reach - The
of Multinational Corporations (New York: Simon and Schuster,
JO5
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Or putting the issue in a more soluble form, we reiterate—why is
post-colonial Nigeria enmeshed in politics of underdevelopment?
Pre-colonial Nigeria possessed a magnificent substructure and
superstructure. Its technological development and evolving industries
and monarchies were developing. For instance, according to Bade
Onimode:
industrial technology has been best documented for industrial
fuels, drinks, leather, food, soap, as well as for clothing,
in addition to soap and brewery industries, the leather in
dustry produced saddles, slippers, and handbags. From the
communal epoch, when cloth was made from tree barks, clothinq
has been a well established industry in Nigeria. With cotton
and indigo as ancient crops in West Africa, all stages of the
cloth manufacturing process, including ginning, carding, spinn
ing, dyeing, weaving, and cutting were performed locally in the
different Nigerian kingdoms, especially from the 18th century.3
In many parts of Nigeria, weaving with the handloom still persists.
For instance, at Ikot Ekpene, in the Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria,
handbags are still handwoven. Weaving in the pre-colonial era was
therefore, unquestionably a well developed trade. "Weaving is docu
mented to have boosted the fame of Kano to the same level of Manchester
by the 1850s."4
Simultaneously, industrial fuels such as wood and coal were
(produced) and used by early miners and blacksmiths. The processing
of staple foods and drinks (such as brukutu, peto, ogogoro, [or ufiop
mmin, "illicit gin"] or palm wine, etc.)5 were also produced. Also,
"before the end of the 15th century, craftsmen in Benin exchanged
_, 3 Bade. Onimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in




their surplus cloth and beads for the gold of the Akans in the Gold
Coast (modern Ghana*)."
Thus, the pre-colonial economy was coherent and cohesive.
In a coherent economy—"its regions and sectors will be complementary
and there will be reciprocity of exchanges between them."6 Moreover,
our findings also resolve that:
The pre-colonial political systems emphasize[d]* centralized
democratic monarchy, succession, balance of power, military action,
foreign relations and similar concepts of modern statecraft in
Nigeria.'
Consequently, these democratic underpinnings of monarchy made
the government people-oriented. Unfortunately, the contrary is the
case in post-colonial Nigeria/Africa. Post-colonial leaderships
are for the most part undemocratic and are characterized by ...
fragile legitimacy of authority, political corruption and cripp
ling political instability which have marked the persistent under-
development of Nigeria and other parts of black Africa8, were
not pervasive as we have them today.
Hence, we further deduce that pre-colonial Africa developed
on its own an efficient and effective people oriented administrative
hierarchy of civilized states. Based on our final deductions in
Chapter II, we resolve that pre-colonial Africa boasted manificient
civilizations.
Mine. Ghana was known under colonialism as "Gold Coast" until
the country obtained a "flag" independence on March 6, 1957.






For our purpose then, the striking issues become, if a heritage,
built over many centuries without contribution by foreign societies
or ethnicities, was naturally developing until the dawning of colonial
ism, could colonial capitalism manifest fact and factors that ob
structed the indigenous heritage and, by that very fact, arrest and
reverse its historical development?
To that end, we analyze colonial capitalism to determine whe
ther or not it contained factors or contradictions which inherently
and mechanically manifested political underdevelopment in post-co
lonial Africa.
The Character of Colonial Capitalism Revisited
According to history, from a dynamic viewpoint, the British
industrial mode of production in Nigeria or British colonies con-
tain[ed]* contradictions.9 And except those contradictions and
their probable consequences in Nigeria are determined, in light of
the findings that pre-colonial economy was developing, and that con
temporary capitalism was implanted in Nigeria, an objective causality
of politics of underdevelopment cannot be understood and resolved.
Neither would there be a modification or systematic departure from
the frustrating strategies of development which the post-colonial
leadership had utilized since flag independence in 1960, but to no
avail.
*Mine.
9Damachi, Nigeria Modernization. 112.
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Hence, a dialectical analysis of colonial capitalism is highly
significant here. In retrospect, we would determine whether or not
any noticeable contradictions and exploitative of colonial capitalism
lamented by the Nigerian masses in the colonial epoch are repeated
in the post-independence era. In this analysis, we would jaxtapose
the colonial substructure and superstructure with the post-colonial
political economy, by utilizing the following index factors:
-the character of colonial capitalism, i.e., the type of
metropolitan industries dormant then in colonial economy,
and now in post-colonial era.
-the process of labor in colonial industries then, and now
in the post-colonial industries.
-the technologies and control of the colonial and metro
politan industries then and now in post-colonial era.
-the character of labor and superstructure then and now
in post-colonial era.
-the factor institution of labor training (i.e., schools) as
a producer of colonial labor then and since independence.
-the authenticity of their academic program or vice versa.
-the contradictions in the above variables then and now
would be synthesized and dialectically analyzed to
determine their consequences of scale on Nigerian masses,
as well as politics and manifest superstructure.
The deductions therefrom would constitute our caveats and resolve
our hypothesis one: that colonial capitalism evolved contradictions
of underdevelopment crises in post-colonial Africa.
Character and Type of Colonial Industries
The primary salient feature of the colonial industries, for
instance, in Nigeria was their elementary processing nature. We
find that:
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Six out of the total of eleven of these industries established
in Nigeria during 1860-1960 involved the processing of agricultural
and timber products, while the seventh, cement, engaged in trans
forming domestic deposits of limestone. [It is important to
note in passing that mineral production which has been treated
as primary production has not been included] as so called "extrac
tive industries" are not factory processes. If such rudimentary
and secondary processing activities like oil milling, cotton
ginning, rubber processing and tanning are included, the number
of processing industries rises to ten out of the new total of
twenty-three colonial industries.10
ihe second feature of the colonial industries was their small
scale. For the most part, the colonist industries:
. . .had an average capital outlay of a few thousand pounds,
and employed 10 to 100 workers, while the largest ones, such
as textiles, cement, beer, soap and cigarettes, had an average
capital investment of about 2 million, employed about 300 to
700 workers each, consisted of only about nine establishments
by 1960, when Nigeria obtained her flag independence.11
And the third general feature was that:
. . .these small scale colonial industries were basically pro
ducers of consumer goods such as cigarettes, soap, textiles,
canned food, beer, margarine and plastics. [Of all]* only the
cement and boat building industries, which consisted of barely
five establishments, could be identified with capital goods.
[Lastly]*, most of these industries were owned by the British
imperialist, [as far as African ownership was concerned], Ni
gerians only owned two of twenty-two industrial establishments.
Private imperialist interest owned fourteen of them either solely
or jointly with government.12
In view of the articulated or noticeable features of the colonial
industries, what must be noted are the following: (a) that colonial
industries were not geared to producing or completing the transfor






mother industries in Britain. Thus, the colonial industrialization
process, for the most part, was ostensibly only a fraction of the
industrial processes, but never the whole as in the center. Hence,
the colonial industries were structurally and functionally satellite
industries or pre-colonial industries.
Thus, the colonial industries in Nigeria could be characterized
as incoherent, whereas its industrial processes or capacities did
not result in the complete manufacturing of products in colonial
Nigeria, as was the case with indigenous or pre-colonial industries.
The only exception to this was in the manufacturing. The colonial
industrialist deemed it unprofitable to complete its production at
the center before shipping output for sale in the colony. The trans
formation of the Nigerian or domestic limestone in the manufacturing
of cement is a case in point.
Hence, we resolve that the colonial industries were essentially
involved in the accumulation of domestic raw materials, transforma
tion of processed raw materials into parts, assembly of product parts
from the center, creation of capital goods to sustain the industrial
processes of the mother industries, distribution for consumption
of the center's industrial output, etc. Therefore, we deduce that
the colonial industries were basically a satellite industrial setup.
Because additionally, its structural incoherence, was reflected in
the colony economy. These colonial industries were established in
the colony for exploitative purposes since their establishment did
not evolve the concrete manufacturing. Such complete commodities
manufacturing could have essentially involved the transfer of the
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mother technology to Nigerians in the strategic future, a cohesive
integration of Nigeria's economy and consequently evolved a sustained
developing economy. But as the essence of colonialism pinpointed,
the contrary was the case.
(b) That the dominant nature of the colonial industries and
productivity over the pre-colonial societies' basically rendered
dormant the indigenous productive forces. This was obvious, contin
gent on the facts that the indigenous manufacturers abandoned their
trade because their productivity was outsold by the center's comple
mentary industrial outputs imported for sales in Nigeria at a mas
sive and cheaper rate; and because the indigenous technologists did
not develop a potentiality enabling them to compete favorably against
the mass productivity in auxiliaries of colonial industries in Ni
geria at the beginning of colonialism, or both. A typical example
of this is depicted by the indigenous textile industry. Our findings
reveal that the native industries became disarticulated and stultified
under the colonial industrial schema or model. Hence, the striking
issue now becomes, could this exploitative essence of the colonial
industries be contained using the very colonial industrialization
model in postcolonial Nigeria? This issue is the major concern in
the next chapter.
(c) That these industries were very small in nature, and there
fore, were only capable of employing a negligible fraction of Nigeri
ans.
Thus, in light of the very poor wages, overtaking of markets
for indigenous manufacturing, e.g., the textile market, and by that
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fact capping the growth of indigenous technologies and thus phasing
out the pre-colonial industries, massive unemployment and uneven
distribution of income, unheard of in pre-colonial economy became
prevalent in colonial Nigeria. Most Nigerians lived in want. What
is of significance here is that the sustenance of the colonial in
dustries was predicated on the aggressive and successful implemen
tation of satellite and exploitative industrialization philosophy
and model. This model aimed at exploiting the colony by imposing
the center's mode of production mechanically in the colony. Second,
it also aims at transforming the indigenous industrializing mode
of production into a dependent metropolitan industrial sector pro
ducing basically raw materials, semi-finished commodities, while
basically monopolizing the colonial market for the center's produc
tivities, as was the case in Nigeria.
Thus, in light of our analysis here, the emergent issue now
becomes striking. If the colonial industrialization model manifested
underdevelopment syndrome, cum socio-politico and economic crises
for colonial Nigeria, to what extent will a predication of the post-
colonial development strategies on colonial model arrest and reverse
underdevelopment in the latter? Again, this issue shall be our prio
rity as we move to resolve our hypothesis in Chapter IV.
Upon resting our analysis of the character of colonial indus
tries, their volume of productivity and consequently the impact of
colonial productivities on Nigeria, an appraisal of the phases of
establishment and types of colonial industries is highly necessary.
Without a precise knowledge of the density and types of a phenomenon,
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any objective effort to determine its manifestations qualitatively
could be superficial. Therefore, to determine the type and volume
of productivity in the colonial industries, the sequence of their
establishment and their types must be a priority.
The Evolution and Character of Colonial Industries In Nigeria
The Nigerian colonial industries, based on the various develop
ments that evolved in the course of colonization of the country by
the United Kingdom, will best be clearly examined in four phases:
(1) 1860-1900, (2) 1900-1929, (3) 1929-1945, and (4) 1945-1960.
(1) Between 1860-1900, the British were busily trying to re
concile and merge the indigenous kingdoms into one political entity
in order to acculturize them into the metropolitan sterotype, and
by so doing render the local institutions subordinate to the metro
polis. This move was designed to consolidate grip of the British
over the pre-colonial political economy. Thus, during this period,
pre-occupation with "pacifying the natives" left little opportunity
for economic concerns; therefore, "no industry has been identified
for this period"13 in consideration.
(2) However, between 1900-1929, which was characterized by
industrial growth and gains for the mother country, and which period
is usually identified as "the boom years," further findings reveal:
. . .about six industries including tanning, oil milling, rubber
processing and cotton-ginning (which started in 1905) were esta
blished. In 1927, the Miller Brothers established a saw mill
at Koko on the Benin River and became effectively the first com
pany to engage in organized industrial production in colonial
13Ibid.
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Nigeria. The venture, which utilized local woods, was inherited
by the U.A.C. and moved to Sapele in midwestern Nigeria in 1935.
The second industrial venture was soap manufacturing by Lever
Brothers (later Unilever) which, in 1925, established the West
African Soap Company, Ltd. at Apapa to utilize palm oil for the
production of bar soap.14
Unlike the 1900-29 industrial "development" years, though
phase three or showed little industrial development. Onimode observes
that:
. . .the 1929-45 phase witnessed the establishment of only one
new industry. This was the cigarette-making industry, established
by British-American Tobacco Company (later Nigerian Tobacco Com
pany, NTC) in 1933. Initially, tobacco input was imported un
til the company later encouraged its local production by distri
buting seeds to farmers. This succeeded so well that a new fac
tory was built at Ibadan in 1936. So, in these two and a half
decades, colonial Nigeria had only two additional industrial
establishments.15
Probably the reason for the decrease in the establishment of more
colonial industries at this period was due to world economic crises
(great depression), and imperialist World War II, both of which had
some regressive economic effects on the industrial development of
the metropole as more energy was diverted to containing the war in
an effort to secure the strategic capitalist interest of the Bri
tish Empire, i.e., safe and secured colonies. In that War the co
lonized Nigerians were recruited to defend the colonial interest.
After the war, stemming from the worsening global economy,
the discharged Nigerian veterans of the second world war, as well




nationalist sentiment generated by the limited Nigerian intelligent
sia, who found themselves cheated out of the great natural resources
of Nigeria, caused Nigerians to organize and to demand that:
-the government* 'guarantee for African workers a reasonable
standard of living';
-the government find money for free education;
-the government 'introduce measures to enable the peasant popu
lation to derive maximum benefit from the land';
-the government 'formulate and carry out plans ensuring that
within five years free medical facilities would be made avail
able to all men and women throughout the country, etc.'16
These demands catalyzed and exacerbated nationalist vision of political
and economic liberation of Nigeria from Britain. According to Onimode:
. . .this [nationalist fervor] prompted the post-war industrial
debate about the desirability of establishing industries in order
to alleviate poverty and reduce dependence on imperialist manu
factures [and] this development prompted the colonial ten-year
development plan~1946-66—which together with the post-war boom,
attracted four new industries and seven new industrial establish
ments or branches during 1945-50. For instance, in 1949, in
Lagos, the Department of Commerce and Industries started experi
ments with canning meat, fruits, and vegetables. In the same
year, two indigenous companies, with government assistance, esta
blished two textile companies in Lagos and in Kano with 30 and
60 looms, respectively. In 1949, the Nigerian Brewery Company
started producing 'star' beer in Lagos, using imported hops and
malt.
Finally, in 1950, the government established experimental boat
yards at Opobo and Mukurdi, with another one at Epe later.17
*colonial government
160bafemi Awolowo, Awo: The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi
Awolowo (Cambridge: 1960), 24. "
170nimode, Imperialism, 78-79.
*Ukaridem is the concept that in Ibibio nation's linqua franca
of Nigeria means self-government and independence.
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From 1950-60, as a result of intensified nationalist struggle
and agitation for Ukaridem* and a demand for rapid industrialization
of Nigeria from Britain, a regional government was established by
Britain under Nigerian leadership in 1952. As a token to nationalism,
three new industries and eleven new industrial branches were esta
blished.
Van Den Berghs (Nig.) Ltd. started production of margarine, with
annual capacity of 1,500 tons using domestic palm oil and kernel
in 1954. This was followed in 1957 by the establishment of the
2.25 million pounds Nkalagu Cement Factory owned jointly by the
federal and state regional governments, the Eastern Regions De
velopment Corporation, Colonial Development Corporation, Turnnel
Portland Company Ltd., F. L. Smith and Co., and the Nigerian
public; in 1960, this factory employed 300 workers. The third
new industry established jointly by the Western Regions Develop
ment Corporation U.A.C., and another British company was a plastic
factory, producing tubes, pipes and household utensils.18
Further nationalist pressures resulted in the establishment
of colonial industries.
. . .in 1951 and 1954, respectively, an experimental food canning
venture and the Lafia Canning Factory at Ibadan, and by 1955,
Kaduna Textiles Ltd. were jointly established by the Northern
Region Marketing Board, Northern Regional Development Corp. and
David Whitehead and Sons (Holdings) Ltd. at the cost of one million
pounds, which started production in 1957. Other establishments
that expanded existing industries were the West African Portland
Cement Company Ltd. at Ewekoro near Abeokuta, jointly owned by
Associated Portland Cement Manufacturing Ltd. (51%), Western
Nigerian Development Corporation (39%), and U.A.C. (10%), which
was started in 1958 and produced its first output in 1960; two
cigarette factories in Port Hacourt and Zaria in 1956 and 1958,
respectively; Aba Soap Factory by Alagbo Industries, Ltd. owned
by Paterson, Zochonis and Company, Ltd., with a capacity of 5000
tons of plain and carbolic soap per annum in 1960, and the Aba




In view of this general analysis, then, which precisely de
picts the salient phenomena of the colonial industries, we deduce
that the latter1s productivities fall into four industrial forma
tions.
In the first category are raw material processing factories.
These industries processed raw materials for the mother industries,
whose auxiliary establishments in Nigeria were considered less or
unprofitable. Their products include according to Okwudiba Nnoli:
Cotton for British textile factories, rubber for tyres and other
products, palm oil and kernel for soap and margarine, groundnuts
for manufactured oil, hide and skins for leather products, timber
for furniture.20
In the next category were industries involved in production
of capital goods. These included the cement and the boat building
factories and their products were cement and small river crafts,
respectively.
The third category industries were consumer goods production
factories. Their industrial output, so to speak, were textiles,
canned food, cigarettes, soap, margarine as well as plastics. These
were mainly produced for the local markets and not for export.
The last category was a composite of extractive industries.
These groups of industries were established to extract and process
crude minerals for eventual refinement into various chemical products
at the mother plant. Their products included "tin, limestone, iron
200kwudiba Nnoli, Path to Nigerian Development (Codesria,
B. P. Dakar, Senegal, 1981), 80-81.
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ore, marble, lead, zinc, and gold,"21 as well as coal and petroleum.
In sum, these were the chief products. At this point, our next strik
ing issue becomes, how voluminous was the colonial industrial produc
tivity? In this regard, based on the everincreasing rate of investment
in all colonial industrial concerns (which our analysis of the character
of colonial industries revealed), we posit that productivity was
commercially massive. In other words, commodities were produced
at commercial industrial estate, and research and industrial advertise
ment were offered between 1950 and I960.22
Moreover, as Onimode states:
The investment institutions included Regional and Federal Develop
ment Corporations, the 1959 Investment Company of Nigeria which
was established by the Commonwealth Development Finance Company;
Northern Nigerian Investments Ltd., and the Industrial and Agri
cultural Company Ltd., both in 1959-the latter by the Colonial
Development Corporation and the Eastern Nigerian Government.
Then between 1952-1958, clearly over-generous and dubious tax
incentives involving aid to foreign investors in so-called pi
oneer industries, accelerated depreciation of invested capital,
tax holidays, import duty relief, special duties on 'dumped and
subsidized goods' and full repayment of import duties on re ex
ports were offered. Research assistance involved the Institute
of Applied Industrial Research established in 1956, when 'Oppor-
tun ities for Overseas Investments in the Federation of Nigeria1
were also advertised.23
Eventually industrial estates were established by the colonial
federal government of Nigeria at various regional enterprising com
mercial/government headquarters, such as Apapa, Ikeja, in the western
21A. Y. Yansane, "Imperialism and Multinational Corporations:
A Case Study of Nigeria" in Decolonization and Dependency (Westport,




region; Enugu and Port Harcourt in the eastern region; and Kaduna,
Kano and Zaria in the northern region of Nigeria.
Further findings reveal that:
The supply of power was increased through peak output of 925,000
tons of coal in 1959 increased electricity generation; from 6 1
million in 1950 to 448.3 million kwh in 1960, of which 50B was
for industry and commerce. Expenditure on transport and communi
cation rose from 4.7 million in 1950-51 to 32.5 million in 1959-
60. In spite of these indulgent colonial incentives, the total
output of the industrial sector stood at barely 15.7 million
in 1960, less than 50% of the export value of cocoa alone for
that year.iDl
In light of the cumulative unimpressive performance (produc
tivity) of the colonial industrial sector—despite government sub
sidies in the development of Nigeria—and considering the fact that
pre-colonial political economy was industrializing, and given the
fact that the center, despite its war losses, was recovering very
rapidly economically, it becomes clear that probably inherent in
the colonial mode of production were economic factors or exploi
tative factors that only worked to the benefit of the center. In
light of the above findings, we deduce that colonial capitalism was
antagonistic to the indigenous mode of production.
Moreover, since it failed to harmonize colonial Nigeria, but
rather rendered it incoherent, colonial capitalism was inherently
contradictory. According to Ake:
. . .the contradictions of western capitalism impeded the accumu
lation of capital and forced the imperialist power to resort
to imperialism, particularly the colonialization of foreign lands,
in order to counteract the obstacles to capitalist accumulation
24Ibid., 81.
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arising from the internal contradictions of the capitalist mode
of production.25
The contradictions probably had repercussions for the stability
of colonial mode of production. Therefore, from the point of view
of its contradictions and their manifestations for change or continu
ity, a profound analysis of the contradictions here is a sine qua
non.
However, for an illuminating and objective analysis to be con
ducted, there must be a double focused critical analysis of the co
lonial economy. First, we would need to analyze the substructure
of the colonial industries, otherwise the colonial industrial mode
of production, and then secondly, the superstructure that it supported.
This is necessary as a scientific sequence, using our methodology
of dialectical materialism.
Since the economic structure of society [is the primacy]* on
which rises a legal and political superstructure, and to which
correspond definite forms of social consciousness. [For in other
words] the mode of production of material life conditions the
social, political and intellectual life process in general.26
Hence, for the contradictions of capitalism to be understood and
their exploitative capabilities exposed and resolved, the capitalist
structure must be examined.
25Ake, A Political Economy, 43.
*Mine.
26Lenin, Selected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975),
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The Nature of the Contradictions Within the Colonial
Industrial Mode of Production and the Consequences Therein
. . .[I]f Western capitalism failed to improve materially the
lot of the peoples inhabiting most backyard areas, it accomplished
something that profoundly affected the social and political con
ditions in underdeveloped countries. It introduced there, with
amazing rapidity, all the economic and social tensions inherent
in the capitalist order. It effectively disrupted whatever was
left of the 'feudal' coherence of the backward societies. It
substituted marked contracts for such paternalistic relationships
as still survived from century to century. It reoriented the
partly or wholly self-sufficient economics of agricultural coun
tries toward the production of marketable commodities. It linked
their economic fate with the vagaries of the world market and
connected it with the fever curve of the international price
movements. . . .This superimposition of business moves over
ancient oppression by landed gentries resulted in compounded
exploitation, more outrageous corruption and more glaring in
justice.27
The capitalist mode of production then, and the superstructure
concomitant of it, developed during the latter part of the 18th cen
tury and still more during the entire nineteenth century, a framework
for a continuous and, in spite of cyclical disturbances and setbacks,
momentous expansion of productivity and material welfare. Consequently,
the said material progress was not only spotty in time but inequitably
and unevenly distributed in space. It was confined to Western industri
alized capitalist centers vis-a-vis their violently created satellites
or colonies, where the industrial capitalist mode of production had
been instituted to cap or frustrate the progressive native mode of
production, as was evident in the pre-colonial Africa/Nigeria.
In retrospect, African historical development was harshly inter
rupted by the expansion of European capitalism. This new system
27Paul A. Baran, "On the Political Economy of Growth" in The
Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment. ed. ChaTTes
K. Wilbur (New York:Random House, 1979), 91.
129
growing out of capitalist economies that were replacing feudalism
in Europe generated some grave contradictions (albeit characteristic
of the capitalist mode of production) in the political economy of
colonial Nigeria. Their destructive character or effects frustrated
the development prospects for the country, and thereby rendered it
increasingly vulnerable to exploitation by the centers. Except these
contradictions are aggressively and critically analyzed and resolved,
the future industrial development of Nigeria resides on unsteady
ground. Consequently, politics of underdevelopment abounds post-
colonial Africa and especially in Nigeria. In order to contain likely
revolutionary violence which might end colonist exploitation, Ni
gerians were trained in the centers' culture.
The Essential Superstructure of Colonial Capitalism
In Nigeria, schools were set up to train Nigerians in the British
culture. The colonial school system, according to Cartey and Kilson:
by 1933 comprised 36,626 schools, 380,305 pupils, 240 European
and 8,815 Nigerian teachers (of this 2678 schools with 135,162
pupils with 51 European and 5,470 Nigerian teachers are supported
by the native administration) in Nigeria according to Table 8,
Nigerian Census 1933.28
The dominating colonial capitalism becamse highly pronounced
as it capped the indigenous technologies. As a result, massive unem
ployment ensued. Thus, Nigerian youth for the most part, had to
attend schools to learn the colonist culture with the objective of
finding employment in the colonial economy of Nigeria.
According to Nwafor Orizu:
28Wilfred Cartey and Martin Kilson, Independent Africa (New
York: Vintage Books, 1970), 65.
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. . .as time went on, English schools were established in Nigeria
and young boys attended these with one ambition: to learn enough
to become clerks and interpreters, or employees of European trades,
From these "pinnacles" they thence forth surveyed their ancestral
culture with high contempt, obeying no laws, and observing no
rules except the Englishmen. This contempt for culture and insti
tutions of their own people, then became a sign of "education".
The educated class became a new privileged class—because they
felt themselves above the chiefs, above the elder, above the
Nigerian diet, above the Nigerian attire, above the Nigerian
form of marriage, above the peoples ceremonies, in fact, above
Nigeria. . . .Later, this privilege expanded into study abroad-
-the young men go to Oxford or Cambridge. . .when they return
to Nigeria. . .become more English than English themselves.
When they talk to the other Nigerians, they say "but this is
not the way it is done in London". . .one has to know the
British parliamentary procedure in order to be acclaimed as cul
tured in Nigerian meetings. . .This educated class now exploits
the masses.29
In affirmation of Orizus' position, the colonial governor of
Nigeria, in 1920, described the educated class thus:
. . .men. . .who have peacefully pursued their studies under
British teachers in British schools in order to become ministers
. . .whose eyes are fixed not upon African history or tradition
or policy, nor upon their own tribal obligations and the duties
of their natural rulers which immemorial custom should impose
upon them but upon the political theories evolved by Europeans
to fit a wholly different set of circumstances, arising from
a wholly different environment. . .30
These elite found it difficult:
. . .to cogitate on native African philosophy and thought. To
them the colonists had better culture. That is not all. Auto
mobiles, telephones, flying boats in the air, diving engines
below the sea, electric fans, battleships. . .what more? Africa
has none. The intangibles and abstractions of Nigerian institu






In retrospect, the great developing political civilizations
affirmed in Chapter II were viewed with passive ignorance or as cul
turally insignificant. This practice has historically left intact
the colonists' culture.
Consequently, the authentic pre-colonial developing societal
facts and factors, which insured systematic social, political and
economic development before colonialism were eclipsed. The elite
embodiment and exercise of the colonist's capitalist ethics institu
tionalized colonial capitalism in Nigeria. Thus, the process of
westernization became complete. A cultured Nigerian leadership class
had emerged. Our findings indicate the following:
. . .the danger from the educated class does not lie wholly in
their helping the west stamp out the basis of a people's culture
and pride, but rather in their ability to substitute anything
for what they are taking away. Besides they have influenced
the younger generation to think that an educated man is one who
best knows how to deal contemptuously with indigenous institu
tions and original creative works of his ancestors. . .They
are sons of Nigeria, but the history of Africa. . .even of Ni
geria is difficult for them to grasp. It is difficult for them
to cogitate on native African philosophy and thought. They have
no understanding of the forces of history responsible for the
cyclical drama of the rise and fall of one nation and another,
even as it applies to Africa. On the contrary, to them every
thing is natural. Nigeria is. . .British.32
Further findings affirmed the above caveat. The post-colonial
economy is basically colonial. For instance, the industries, the
government, the bureaucracy and the facts and factors that sustain
them or insure their existence is essentially colonial.
32ibid.
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In sum, all the colonial industries enumerated in our Table
3.1 technologically are center-owned. The mother technology directly
instrumental in their productions or operations, to a large extent,
are metropolitan based. They exist essentially today as they were
in the colonial era. The labor relations are virtually the same,
nigerians are merely employees, and compradors, at best, insofar
as the technological underpinnings of these industries are concerned.
History has affirmed that whoever owns the technology owns
the industries, and, thus, the outputs and revenue. Therefore, as
long as the technologies used in the operations of these high-tech
industries are not Nigerian owned or based, but are center based,
their documentations and regulations on paper as Nigerian-owned is
merely camouflage. In fact, on a historical critical assessment
of the impact of metropolitan Transnational Corporations (TNC) which
are a manifestation of colonial capitalism Norman Girvan has this
to say:
The Transnational Corporation embodies not only a pattern of
economic relationships but also a pattern of domination, as ex
pressed in the power relations within it. Raw materials opera
tions have to be subjected to the absolute control of the parent
firm, for they are the basis upon which nets the whole edifice
of production and marketing, and hence capital accumulation.
Therefore, the social groups whose corporations are indispensable
for raw material flows. . .principally labor and then the state
bureaucracy in the periphery. . .must be subjected as far as
possible to the control of the firm. They must be relegated
to a dominant and dependent status. A diagrammatic view of the
principal relationship involved is given in Figure [3.2].* The
workers and the state bureaucracy in the periphery deal initially
with the managers of the local subsidiaries. But these managers
are themselves subject to the authority of the parent cooperation
*Mine.
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. . .Ultimately then, labor and government have to deal with
the management of the corporation as a whole. This implies a
considerable weakening of. . .power. Furthermore, the Trans
national Corporation normally enjoys a close relationship with
the government of its home country which means the center coun
try s government will bring pressure to bear on the peripheral
government in the interest of the firm.33
Hence, whereas the technology of the colonial industries and
the bureaucracy that oversees their essential operations are center-
based and oriented, these industries have not been fundamentally
taken over in post-colonial, as claimed in the Nigerian indigeniza-
tion promotion decree by the post-colonial regimes.
In the post-colonial era, the leaderships have sought to change
the colonial capitalism, in an effort to establish indigenous indus
tries. In Nigeria, the promulgation of Nigerian Enterprises Promotion
Act (NEPA) is a pointer to this initiative. The Act sought to preserve
certain essential industries for the operations by Nigerian citizens
only.
According to post-colonial regimes, these companies are Nigerian
owned. The question then becomes, what extent are the technological
basis of these industries indigenous? The answer is an unequivocally
J]one_. Their technologies are dominantly center owned. And whereas
technology is the essence of industrial ownership, its lack thereof
disqualifies personalities, or societies ownership. And this is
succinctly the status of colonial capitalism in Nigeria. The indus
tries listed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 as are essentially metropolitan.
33Norman Girvan, Corporate Imperalism: Conflict and
Expropriation - Transnational Corporations and Economic Nationalism
in the imrd World fNew York: Monthly Pow-in,., pra^ ig76j 36 37
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Whereas the status and roles of these industries have not been
altered in the post-colonial era; and whereas technology determines
the mode of production, our findings resolve that post-colonial mode
of production and manifest political developments are consequences
of colonial capitalism and evolving inherent contradictions.
Thus, we infer that the character of the industries, process
of labor, industrial output, labor status and roles, factor institu
tion of labor training, i.e., school and university programs, massive
unemployment and abject poverty of the colonized Nigerians, neglect
for development of indigenous pre-colonial technologies, leadership's
disregard for authentic social, political, and economic institutions
that existed in the colonial era, have not essentially changed in
the post-colonial era. Moreover, since the latter is a fact of
colonial capitalism, we deduce that colonial capitalism is funda
mentally the basis of post-colonial capitalism in Nigeria and evolv
ing unresolved socio-politico cum economic incohesion, or contradic
tions in post-colonial Nigeria and Africa in general.
Hence, we resolve that colonial capitalism catalyzed contradic
tions of underdevelopment crises in post-colonial Africa/Nigeria.
In colonial Africa, the developing mode of production that manifested
great civilizations, as we cited in Chapter II, became underdeveloped
and stultified by the implantation of colonial capitalism, according
to our findings. As a result:
Africa's. . .enormous wealth. . .is underdeveloped. Most people
live under conditions of abject poverty. That is, most of the
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African people cannot afford three good meals per day or meet
the basic necessities, such as good shelter and clothing.34
And this has been a consequence of the center-periphery economic
osmosis, which the implantation of colonial satellite capitalism
generated. Under the latter, the few colonists and colonial agents
amassed wealth in Nigeria by monopolizing the industries and markets,
thus leaving the indigenous masses to unemployment and abject poverty.
As Barongo notes in his work:
in Nigeria, for example, up to 9.5% of the great wealth of the
country is controlled by about .01% of the population. Many
of the wealthy Nigerians made their big money off the backs of
the poor farmers, through the marketing board device, or by ser
ving as compradors to the multinational corporations, which real
ly control the economy and dictate the manner and pace of the
countries development.35
Such practice of colonial aristocracy is historically, not uncommon
of colonial capitalism. Thus, we resolve that colonial capitalism
resulted in contradictions of underdevelopment crises in post-colonial
Africa and in Nigeria.
In our next chapter we will describe and analyze the development
strategies utilized by post-colonial regimes to reverse underdevelopment
in an effort to determine why underdevelopment stiffens. Our objective
here is to resolve our next hypothesis—that failure to indigenize
the post-colonial development strategies frustrates the leadership's
effort to contain politics of underdevelopment in Nigeria.
34Barongo, Political Science in Africa, 27-29.
35ibid.
TABLE 3.1













































































Source: Bade Onimode, Imperialism and UnderdeveTopment In Nigeria. 80.
138
TABLE 3.2
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT (LIST OF PIONEER INDUSTRIES) NOTICE
[CAP. 369 135<
Privatisation and Commercialisation Act
———————_
FIRST SCHEDULE Section X




Savanah Bank of Nieena
Limited "
Union Bank of Nieena
Limited
United Bank for Africa
Limned
International Bank for West
Africa Limited






Nieena Arab Bank Limited
Nigeria Merchant Bank
Limited




Merchant Bank of Africa
Agricultural. Co-operative
and Development Banks
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Present hoidine to be
maintained. ~
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Present hoidine to be
maintained."
Present hoidine 10 be
maintained."
Present holding to be
maintained."
Present hoidine to be
maintained. *
Present hoidine to be
maintained. ~
Present hoidine to be
maintained. ~
Present hoidine to be
maintained. ~
Present hoidine to be
maintained. ~
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Enterprises Preserr Maximum Federal
Federa Government Participation
Govemrrtnt as % of Eauin
Holding f-'o farter privatisation i
Oil Marketing Companies
Unipeiro!




Jos Steei Roiiinc Mill
Katsina Steel Rolling Mill
Oshogbo Steei Rolling Mill














Nigena News Print Manufac
turing Company Limited








100 Not more than 40%
60 Not more than 40%
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Present holding to be
maintained.
Present holding to be
maintained.
Present holding to be
maintained.
Present holding to be
maintained
Present holding to be
maintained
Present holdine to be
maintained.
1. Nigeria Hotels Limited.
2. Durbar Hotel Limited.
3. Aba Textile Mills
4. National Cargo Handling Limited.
2. Nigerian Dairies Companv Limned.
IS!11 c3",0",?1 Fish Company Umited.
Food Company Umited.
}*• ^jew N"genan Salt Company Limited






privatisation and Commercialisation Act
1-i National Salt Companv Limited. Iioko.
1:. Soutn-East Rumanian Wood Industries Limited. Calabar.
16. Nigerian-Rumanian Wood Industry Limited. Ondo.
57. Nisenan Veast ana Alcohol Company Limited. Bacna.
15. Vecnan Fiim Corporation.
;9. National Frcisnt Companv Limited.
20. National Animal Feed Companv Limited. Port-Harcourt
21. Opobo Boat Yard.
22. Madara Dairy Company Limited. Vom.
_j. Ore/irele Oil Palm Company Limited. Ondo.
-4. Okomu Oil Palm Company Limited. Bendel.
-5. National Livestock Production Limned.
.6. Road Construction Companv of Nieena Limited.
-7. National Film Distribution Companv Limited.
-S. Nigerian Ranches Company Limited. Kaduna.
29. Impressit Bakolon Nieena Limited.
jO. Nonh Breweries Limited. Kano.
31. Nigenan Beverages Production Companv Limited.
j2. \\est AJrican Disiillcries Limited.
33. Nieena Engineering Construction Company Limited
->4. Tounst Company of Nigena Limited (Owners of Federal Palace
Hotels).
35. Electricity Meters Company Limited. Zaria.
-•6. Amencan International Insurance Company Limited
£■•■ Guinea Insurance Company Limited.
£8. Sun Insurance Company Limited.
j9. Limed Nieena Insurance Company Limned.
40. Lmted Nigeria Life Insurance Limited.
■»!. Niger Insurance Company Limned.
42. Mercury Assurance Company Limited
•»3. Crusader Insurance Company Limited.
*4. Royal Exchange Companv Limned.
45. NE.M Insurance Company Limned.
46. Law Union and Rock Insurance Companv Limned.
47. Prestige Assurance Company Limned. '
48. British Amencan Insurance Company Limited.
-n ».est ,Af,n?n lnsurar>" Provincial Companv Limited.
30. Manchok Cattle Ranch. '
51. Mokwa Cattle Ranch.
52. Poultry' Production Units in Jos. Ilorin and Kaduna.
53. Kaauna Abattoir and Kaduna Cold Meat Market
54. Bauchi Meat Factory and Galambi Cattle Ranch.
55. Minna Pig Farm.
:6. Kano Abattoir Company Limned.
57. Umuahia Pig Farm.
58. Giant Cold Store. Kano.
59. Avip-Eku Oil Palm Company Limited.
60. Ihechiowu Oil Paim Company Limited.
61. Sokoto Integrated Livestock Company Limited.





Privatisation and Commeraaiisaion Act
t>3. F.our Mills o: Nigeria Limned.
64. Nisenan Veast Alconol Manutnctunng Company Limited.
65. Nichemtex industries Limited.
SECOND SCHEDULE Section 12
Partial and Fully Commercialised Enterprises
part I.— Partial Commercialisation
1. Nieenan Railway Corporation.
2. N'igenan Airport Authority.
3. National Electric Power Authority.
4. Nieenan Security Printine and Mintine Company Limned.
5. All the River Basins Development Authorities.'
6. National Provident Fund.
7. Aiaokuta Sicei Company Limited.
S. Delta Steel Company Limited.
9. Nieenan Machine Tools Limited.
10. Federal Housing Authority.
11. Kainii Lake National Park.
12. Federal Radio Corporation.
13. Nisenan Tcievwon Authority.
14. News Agency oi Nigena.
Part 11.— Fl-ll Commercialisation
1. Nieerian National Petroleum Corporation.
2. Nieenan Telecommunications Limited (NITEL1.
3. Associated Ores Mining Company Limited.
4. Nieenan Mimne Corporation.
5. Nieenan Coal Corporation.
6. National Insurance Corporation of Nieena.
7. Nieena Re-Insurance Corporation.
8. National Propemes Limited.
9. Tafawa Balewa Square Manacement Committee.
10. Nieenan Ports Authority.





•■'■•"""''"" ueve:ormen! (Income Tax Relief: Ac;
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT .LIST OF PIONEER s:.n,
INDLSTRIESi NOTICE -s«
under section i
Commencement: 29th April 19S2
1. The industries mentioned in the Schedule to this Decur«,on
Notice are hereov declared as pioneer industries to which ol Dionecr
the Act shall apply. wmcn ,„„„„„„.
(1 ?« "riPin^i maV bC CIled as Industnai Development sh«,,,.i..
(List oi Fioneer Inaustnes) Notice.
SCHEDULE
List or Pioneer Industries
Man™rf Processm? of food «°PS- vegetables and fruus
Manutacture of cocoa products.
3. Processing oi oiiseeus.
■}• Integrated dairv production.
5. Canle and other livestock ranchine.
o. Bone crusmne.
7. la) DeepSea Trawling and crocessine:
(o) Coastal lishing and shnrnpine: *
(c) Iniand lake nshine and processine
S. Manutacture of salt. "
10 mS!!10'1,*"1 Zlnc ores b>' ""dereround minine methods.
10. Manuiacrure of iron and steel from iron ore.
SSSSI lift? °f nOnf b i nd theIf ttlrif ?.
Mining and processine of barvtes and assoaated minerals
{ssr^^^rassE-1'comaimn? a pred
U. Manufacture of cement.
15. Manufacture of glass and glassware
6. Manutanure of lime from'local limestone.
l/. uuarmng and processing of marbles.
18. Manutacture of ceramic products
nS3""", °LbasiC and Inlenn«liate "ndustnal chemicals from
predominantly Nigerian raw materials.
-u. Manutacture of Pharmaceuticals.
-1. Manufacture of surgical dressings
—. Manufacture nt starch from plantation crop.
23. Manufacture of yeast, alcohol and related products
24. Manutacture oi ammais foodstuff
25. Manutacture of paper-pulo. paper and paoerboard
| gss
32 &re °\ 8°ods made who»v or panlv of rubber
1% °f Sf>are pam indudin8 "«o™ot,ve spJe pans and
37. Manufacture of building and home fuSng matenals.
CHAPTER IV
THE POST-COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES AND IMPACT
ON EVOLVING COLONIAL CAPITALISM AND POLITICS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT
As we resolved in Chapter III, in post independent Nigeria, the
substructure and its evolving superstructure is fundamentally an out-
croppings of an insidious and exploitative colonial capitalism. Thus,
in an essential move to contain the latter, the citizenry and manifest
nationalist leadership were united in optimism of ending the excessive-
ness of colonist capitalism, or realizing economic autarky in the pre-
colonial era. According to our findings in Chapter III, the flourishing
precolonial economy was depressed by colonist capitalism. Hence, in
colonial Nigeria, the systematic, coherent and developing pre-colonial
economy, was contained disarticulated and rendered underdeveloped by
the colonist. Consequently, underdevelopment crises abound Nigeria.
At independence in 1960, the colonial government, our study
found, left the first republican nationalist government of Nigeria with
an astronomical economic woe. The first post-independent government
was a parliamentary republican headed by Prime Minister Sir Abubarka
Tafawa Balewa.
In retrospect, we find that —
. . .the Balewa government* inherited a whole gamut of socio-
economic problems from the British colonial government. First,
First post-independent government of Nigeria, 1960-66 was headed
by Prime Minister Alhaji Tafawa Balewa.
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Britain left Nigeria with an inherent long-term adverse balance
of trade at independence. Post-second world war growth resulted
in the worsening of balance of payments situation, and over a six-
year period following 1955, the trade deficit increased by fifteen
times. Imports generally grew faster than incomes. For example,
while the gross domestic product in the 1950s was growing at annual
simple average rate of 8%, imports and exports were growing at 15%
and 6%, respectively. While imports remained relatively steady
at about 15% of the gross domestic product during the decade in
question, the growth in exports declined from roughly 6% in the
early part of the decade in question to about 4%. Given this trend,
it was evident that with the increasing importation of capital
goods, which industrialization demanded [and continues to demand]*
added to increasing loans commitments, Nigeria had difficulty in
obtaining enough foreign exchange.** This invariably imposed se
vere restraints on the growth of the gross domestic product when
Nigeria became independent.1
Thus, in view of the aforementioned worsening economy at inde
pendence, which the Balewa*** government and post-Balewa regimes were
destined to confront or compelled to resolve, the profound and essential
question becomes, what strategy would resolve this crisis in the new
Nigeria? Therefore, there developed a need to design and utilize a
viable development strategy to resolve the unfortunate imminent crises
in the new nation.
In view of the magnitude of the underdeveloping economy that
Nigeria's post independent leadership inherited from Britain, the citi
zenry anticipated a development strategy which implementation would
*Emphasis mine.
By foreign exchange (in this context) it is meant the process
by which Nigerian government arranges to settle accounts with foreign
trading centers, or with the international monetary institutions.
iUkandi Damachi, Development Paths in Africa and China (Colorado:
West View Press, 1976), 159. ~
Abubarka Tafawa Balewa was the first prime minister of Nigeria
until the outbreak of the Civil War in 1967.
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resolve an aggressive exploitation of colonial capitalism. Such would
entail a concrete reactivation pre-colonial mode of production. A re
activated indigenous mode of production basically means a revitalization
of a coherent and growing pre-colonial substructure cum evolving indi
genous political institutions which were systematically depressed, do
minated and exploited negatively by the center.
In the developing pre-colonial economy (affirmed in Chapter III),
the societies' resources were objectively mobilized by the leaderships
to civilize the indigenous nations. The resources were not exploited
to develop foreign societies at the expense of the native. Thus, a
choice of a development strategy based on the pre-colonial experience,
which ensured concrete developing economy becomes a highly demanding
option for the new government.
Our question then becomes, to what extent was the post-indepen
dent leadership themselves being pupils of the colonial school system
abandon the colonial capitalist legacy, and opt to apply the indigenous?
For our purpose, then, a revisitation of the post-colonial planning
history and evolving development strategy is essentially not out of
order here. In fact, an understanding of the latter could manifest
profound fact and factors towards a resolution of our impending hypothesis.
In this chapter, we seek to resolve that failure to Africanize
the post-colonial development strategies frustrates the resolution of
underdevelopment crisis, or authentic and sustained development in
post-colonial Nigeria.
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The Basis of Development Strategies By the Post-Colonial Leaderships
According to history, probably the most critical issue of
development planning is the philosophy that guides the planners in the
construct of the development model. This philosophy is usually based
on their intellectual orientation. Unquestionably, such orientation,
for the most part, is derived from the latter1s experience in the eco
nomic system that supported the educational system which produced them.
In this regard, the Nigerian elite that inherited the post-colonial
government embraced the traditional or colonial socio-political and
economic culture. They were mostly eclectic; to most of them the de
velopment approaches of the center should be the models to be emulated
in the development of Nigeria. This is demonstrated by their move (in
spite of the exploitative effects which nationalism rejected) to join
the Commonwealth, which the Crown retained a permanent seat as its head.
The leadership assumed, according to Adedeji (1983), that whereas the
colonial model enabled the center to develop into magnificent economic
power, the emulation of the latter could also catalyze development in
independent Nigeria.
Second, the elite nature of the nationalist government conse
quently inhibited from the state the ability to question the essence
of colonial institutions, historical experiences, and then compare it
to that of their African ancestors. A deduction from the latter may
have revealed to them that perhaps the African underdevelopment pro
blems developed from colonial capitalism, and may have suggested that
a rational departure from a center based development model could be
the only option that could contain the center's exploitation or
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activate development in Nigeria. But they failed to do so, deciding
rather to continue the structural and superstructure! leftovers of the
metropole, a problem which some intellectuals in Nigeria such as Adebayo
Adedeji lamented. According to Adedeji,
We ["independent Africans or Nigerians"]* have just assumed that
by continuing the way the [colonial]** economies have been run in
the past we would achieve transformation [and development]**. We
also made one very false assumption—we tried to fit ourselves into
words such as socialism and capitalism—instead of asking ourselves
how we really could achieve development. [For]** development is
a unique thing for each country, for each society. It is the cu
mulative result of cultural, political and social history and de
velopment. We got ourselves embroiled in ideological predilections
that were more destructive than helpful.2
In retrospect, the first independent government, or even the
subsequent governments of Nigeria (despite repeated failures of the
metropolitan models) negated in their decision the omni historiogra-
phically evolved cannon of concrete development. The latter asserted
that authentic development model, for the most part, historically are
known to manifest concrete and sustained developing economies. Such
as evidenced in both the center and pre-colonial Nigeria/Africa.
Additionally, according to Schatz (1977), the decision to adapt
a center oriented development strategy instead of designing an authentic
rational model could be traceable to nationalist and colonist 'devel
opment1 compromise of 1949. In that year, the colonial economic phil
osophy of absolute control of the Nigerian economy by the British
Adebayo Adedeji (a Nigerian) was the Executive Secretary of
Economic Commission for Africa, 1983.
**Emphasis mine.
2Africa Report 28 (September/October 1983):15.
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colonist was modified (because of persistent nationalist political
pressure) to reflect Nigerians' participation in the national indus
trial sectors.
According to Schatz, after 1949, this approach "involved the
dual goals of promoting some measure of modern development of the eco
nomy, and increasing Nigerian participation, both to be sought largely
by government nurture of private enterprise."3 Such orientation, in
the perception of the Colonial Nigerian Department of Commerce and
Industry, according to the Annual Report:
. . .will ensure the maximum participation by Nigerians themselves
in industrial enterprise [and] to provide all possible opportuni
ties for Nigerian businessmen to take an increasing share in the
trade of the country. The emphasis throughout [was]* to develop
industry and trade in such a way that Nigerians themselves will
play an increasingly important part in the commercial life of the
country. That was the main objective, and it was the general wish
that it should be pursued with vigor and with the utmost possible
speed.^
From the perception of the Department of Industry, the end of
colonial exploitation and its consequential ills could be contained
by opening up the formerly closed colonial economy to the indigenes,
in the short run, and by the eventual Nigerianization of all business
enterprises in the long run. In that context, it was implied that if
the Nigerianization of industrial concerns could be effectively and
3Sayre P. Schatz, Nigerian Capitalism (Berkeley: University





4Nigeria Federation, Annual Report of the Commerce and Industries
Department, 1949-50 (Kaduria! Government Printer, 1951), 4-5.
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efficiently implemented, foreign exploitation could be ended and the
underdevelopment process reversed in the strategic future.
Besides, the foremost concern in the mid-1950s (the period Ni
gerians assumed increasing power in the national economy) in the na
tionalist circle was the notion that except there was a Nigerian parti
cipation in the industrial concerns, which was mostly foreign-owned
and controlled, the containment of the latter's exploitation might not
be realized after flag independence. But the unanswered (or probably
unraised) questions were (1) Could the Nigerians be trained in just
less than a decade (before independence in 1960) by the colonial capi
talist (who saw the indigenous businessmen as a threat to the survival
of their businesses) to master the industrial operations? (2) Would
this training ensure or imply the exposure of the Nigerians to the tech
nology that determines the operations of these industries, since the
industrial control basically is predicated on the control of technology?
But by the close of the 1950s, it was clear to the Nigerian
nationalist parties that Nigerians were, for the most part, deficient
in the operation of profitable businesses and that they could not
possibly in less than a decade acquire skills to compete favorably
against colonial industrialists. Therefore, to contain this managerial
deficiency, the Nigerian public corporations were set up to undertake
the growing number of productive and profit-motivated enterprises.
This was seen as a way of promoting national (as opposed to foreign-
dominated) development of the large scale modern [industrial]
activities which few Nigerian entrepreneurs were capable of under
taking. To some degree, this turn to public enterprise also reflected
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socialist ideology which dominated African nationalism at that epoch.
It was not based on any scientific or concrete foundations. For example,
when Premier Okpara of Eastern Region explained that his party's [phil
osophy was] "pragmatic socialism",5 he never practically meant that
the state or his party had committed itself to socialist praxis. What
he really meant was a free enterprise commitment dressed up in socialist
gown, in order to win the support of the Nigerian masses.
This was the mood that dominated the nationalist party. With
this elitist orientation at the close of the 1950s, the country's post-
colonial government moved to adopt the colonial industrial capitalist
development philosophy. The leadership simply chose economic develop
ment orientation characterized as "nuture capitalism"* with "state
capitalist and welfare tendencies."6 This, in other words, implies
the adaption of Neo-classical and Keynesian economic philosophy that
held sway at the center or Britain, especially after the Great De
pression, i.e., 1923-33, "turned away from classical concern with eco
nomic growth and concentrated instead on the problem of efficient re
source allocation. In this abstract model, input supplies were taken
as given and thus population receded into an ad hoc explanation that
5Schatz, Nigerian Capitalism, 5-6. (By pragmatic socialism,
according to Okpara, it is meant "a system in which everyone had the
right to start his own business."
*By nuture capitalism, it is meant a developing capitalism pivoted
by the nationalist government of Nigeria, as well as other post-colonial




was trotted out whenever the free market was blamed for continuing po
verty," especially after the Great Depression. According to Onimode
(1982:115), "when the bourgeoisie science of wealth had nothing mean
ingful to say about the greatest economic catastrophe ever," out of
this context, the Keynesian revolution was born to disown Adam Smith's
"invisible hand" and invent a critical role for the state sector in
economic development. Both the neo-classical and Keynesian model imply
economic planning, whereby the state would seek to regulate the national
economy to the point that the private sector would profitably attain
the growth of the economy.
It is worth to note in passing that
. . .as the post-war reconstruction of Europe under American mar
shal plan represented the triumph of this state sector, the same
remedy was recommended for the colonies—hence a major role for
the public sector in the so-called 'mixed economy1 figured largely
in colonial planning. Government was to expand resources and ra
tionalize their allocation, and to provide infrastrutural facili
ties. [And] the residual laissez-faire element in this planning
philosophy dictated a special role for the capitalist private sec
tor. This was still to be guided by the 'invisible hand1 and con
stitute the engine of growth. Government was to provide the fa
vorable economic and social environment for the private sector to
dominate the growth of the economy. In effect, this meant that
these dominant British imperialist firms that had been exploiting
Nigeria should continue to transfer her economic surplus for Bri
tain's development. [Furthermore], foreign aid implying a resource
gap to be filled through grants and loans from London was to com
plement the activities of the private sector. This increased the
grip of the imperialist bourgeoisie on the colonial economy and
anchored the country to the 'debt trap'* of the international ca
pitalist.'
For elaborate reading on the consequences of the debt trap,
see C. Payer, The Debt Trap, the International Monetary Fund and the
Third World (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), Chapters 1, 2,
and 10.
70nimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria. 115.
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What must be significantly noted in this neo-classical/Keynesian
model is its bureaucratic component. It was to be formulated and imple
mented by the "British colonial civil servants and imperialist 'experts'
who were more concerned to use Nigerian resources to ameliorate Britain's
post-war dollar shortage than to develop the Nigerian economy."8 This
is not all. Peculiar Keynesian economic concepts as Gross Domestic
Product, "GDP, gross investment, fiscal monetary measures, and financial
accountability,"9 were used in the planning process, especially when
Africans started "running regional governments after 1951"10 in Ni
geria. This development marked the beginning of colonial planning using
GDP and per capita income to measure growth of the economy. This was
the model that the colonist used. Thus "economic planning [became]**
the accepted method of stimulating economic development [and]** has
been adapted in many of the colonial countries achieving independence
since World War II."H
In Nigeria, after 1951, the regional government started to use
the neo-classical/Keynesian model to plan development strategies since
this implied the benefiting from the "experts" advice of the colonial
bureaucrats. The consideration to accept the colonial development





nP. B. Clark, Planning Import Substitution (Amsterdam: North
Holland Publishing Company, 1970), 1.
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mance of the public corporations that was intended to compete with pri
vate [colonial]* business [but failed and]* led to the loss of confidence
in public enterprise,"12 and consequently made the nationalist to super
ficially conclude that Africans had insufficient know-how to operate
firms, or develop Nigeria.
A second factor was that since
the capital sink into the public development corporations was lar
gely lost or frozen and financial stringency set in, reliance on
[nationalist]* government to implement new development in the di
rectly productive sectors of the economy went on receding though
existing public enterprise continued to function.13
Such confidence in the metropolitan capitalist development model
produced serious impacts in the post-colonial government circles and
its development strategies in Nigeria. For example, ostensibly it fru
strated the nationalist government's hope to break away from the mother
country and carry on the development of Nigeria without outside dicta
tion. It simply had to continue with the colonial planning philosophy
of development for Nigeria, while at the same time, turning to the In
ternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)* for advice.
*Emphasis mine.
12Schatz, Nigerian Capitalism, 7.
13Ibid.
*■■
The IBRD, the largest of the world bank groups, chartered at
the end of World War II as a mechanism for financing the reconstruc
tion of war devastated Europe in the 1950s, embarked on lending and
economic development advisory missions to Third World states. Its
voting power among its Board of Governors (which is made up of all
active members' state representatives) resides with twenty executive
directors from most industrialized capitalist states. In fact, vo
ting power in the IBRD depends on each country's capital subscrip
tion. Thus, the United States has the greatest voting power—21,
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This embrace of the IBRD signifies not just the willingness to adapt
the neo-classical model but to internationalize it as well. Therefore,
the approach they considered then could be characterized as the neo
classical international model.**
In light of the IBRD's composition, it can be seen that Nigeria
joined a treeful of neo-imperial, capitalist hawks. As an outgrowth
of the colonial capitalist formation, we raise the question of whether
the IBRD could be counted upon by Nigerian nationalist government as
good friend or counselor whose aid could help her overcome underde-
velopment or vice versa. Thus, the profound and fundamental issue be
comes, to what extent would the chosen plan enable the republican go
vernment contain colonist exploitation?
In this quest, a critical analysis of the post-colonial develop
ment models becomes a profound and basic imperative. Therefore to jus
tify the significance of this analytical approach, one must agree with
Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy in their statement that:
Scientific understanding proceeds by way of constructing and
analyzing 'models' of the segments or aspects of reality under
study. The purpose of these models is not to give a mirror image
of reality, not to include all its elements in their exact sizes
and proportions, but rather to single out and make available
for intensive investigation these elements which are not deci
sive. We abstract from non-essentials, we blot out the unimpor-
48% of total). Several major U.S. allies have sizeable voting power:
United Kingdom, 8.12%; Japan, 4.25%; and France, 4.0%. Neither the
Soviet Union nor allied eastern European countries are members. [Fran
ces Moore Lappe, Aid As Obstacle, USA (ed.) Institute for Food and
Development Policy, 1980, 172.j
**See our operational definition of neo-classical international
model in Chapter I.
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tant to get an unobstructed view of the important, we magnify
in order to improve the range and accuracy of our observa
tion.14
Thus, to that end, the debate on legitimizing the development
strategy into a sovereign development model in the first republican
government is significant. The latter is essential, in that, it would
enable us to determine the commitment and authenticity of the post-co
lonial leadership activities vis-a-vis their pre-independence nation
alist ideology of resting the country from colonist.
Second, for the purpose of preasnen, the documents on develop
ment strategies shall be classified and characterized as distinct mo
dels depicting each of the post-independent regimes (e.g., first na
tional development plan, etc.). The latter would enable us to deter
mine the correlation between each leadership's development strategies
and evolving colonial woes - abrasive underdevelopment crisis.
The First National Development Plan (FNDP) Revisited:
Legitimization Process and Impact
In the first republican government, some "socialist" Nigerian
politicians began to debate what strategy of development was suitable
for post-colonial Nigeria. This faction of nationalist remained of
the opinion that "political independence without administrative and
economic independence was worthless."15 Tne implication was that
14Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital: An Essay
on the American Economic and Social Order (New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1966), 14.
15Chibuzo S. A. Ogbuagu, "The Nigerian Indigenization Policy:
Nationalism or Pragmatism?" African Affairs 82 (April 1983): 244.
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the sanctioning of the colonial industrialization development philo
sophy would not resolve the underdevelopment problems in Nigeria.
For instance, digressing from the parliamentary debate in 1959,
Jaja Nwachukwu, a ranking member of the Nigerian House of Representa
tives, put the fundamental concern of the nationalist leaders in the
following terms:
It must be remembered that nearly all our industries are in the
hands of foreigners. For instance, our cement company, our air
transport, our shipping, our tin and other mining industries, now
oil and probably iron and steel. . .16
Next, in further reflection on nationalist development intent,
another House member, K. 0. Madiwe, had this to say: "We do not want
to be hewers of wood and drawers of water all the time—we want to be
manufacturers."17 In view of the above debates, it becomes apparent
that the common theme running through the debates of most Nigerian na
tionalists was how to free the country from economic underdevelopment,
and all the elements of neo-colonialism. Ogbuagu asserted that "Ni
gerianization of the economy was therefore seen as a process for bring
ing about economic decolonization and emancipation."18 at least from
the perspective of most nationalists. On the contrary, some influen
tial socialist political leaders such as Obafemi Awolowo and S. G.
Ikoku argued that Nigerianization of the economy alone would not lead
16Federation of Nigeria, Han Sand, House of Representatives De
bates, Official Report, Session 1959-60, Vol. 11 (Lagos:—Federal
Government Printer, 1959), 578.
17Ibid., 585.
180gbuagu, "The Nigerian Indigenization Policy," 246.
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to the indigenous businessmen taking over the "commanding heights" of
the nation's economy from foreign investors. This group of politicians
was in favor of a more aggressive policy that would make it mandatory
for "all foreign enterprises established in Nigeria to be owned from
the outset in joint partnership with the government and/or the local
entrepreneurs."^ This group, for the most part, was implicitly in
favor of nationalization.20 But in spite of that contention, the
Balewa's government favored the demands for increased Nigerian nationals
participation in the economy; it objected to the strong approach [natio
nalization]* favored by Awolowo.21
In articulating the Balewa's government position, the then in
fluential finance minister, Festus Okotie-Eboh, argued that "the posi
tion of the federal government was that the council of ministers was
more inclined toward the creation of an independent economy through
Nigerianization than through nationalization."22 Therefore, from
the government's intention above, the government's conception of "an
independent economy" was based on a selective programme of indigeni
zation aimed at increasing the participation of the state
. . .and its people in the economy without such a policy hurting
or being prejudicial to continued and desirable foreign investment
19lbid., 346.
^Nationalization as used here is meant to denote government owner
ship of most of the means of production.
*Emphasis mine.
210gbuagu, "The Nigerian Indigenization Policy," 347.
22Ibid.
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in especially the intermediate and capital goods sectors. In all,
the policy that the prime minister [Balewa] and his cabinet pre
ferred was less radical than that proposed by Obafemi Awolowo and
some leaders of organized business groups represented not only in
the action group party of Awolowo [mostly western Nigerians of
Yoruba origin], but also in the N.C.N.C. of Nnamdi Azikiwe [pre
dominantly] a Hausa-Fulani party of Northern Nigeria.]23
Thus, the (first) post-colonial national government of Balewa
was practically of anti-radical economic philosophy, but favored the
continuation with little or no modifications of the colonial or the
neo-classical/Keynesian model. This was the basis of the First Na
tional Development Plan or model.
From the ongoing analysis, it is revealed that the post-colonial
government favored both the continuity of the industrial capitalist
mode of production; and this "neo-classical mode of production was de
cidedly capitalist, though there were remnants of feudal and village
communal modes of production mainly in the northern and rural southern
Nigeria, respectively."24 The strategy of development, however, was
initially conceived to be based on the neo-classical/Keynesian economic
model, and later modified to reflect a prototype of "neo-classical model
of international development."
In view of this metropolitan development path which the post-
colonial government decidedly sanctioned and adapted, one can see that
Balewa's neo-classical development model was based on eccentricism.
It did not reflect the Nigerian's historical materialism. This is why
23ibid.
240nimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria. 138.
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the people favored Nigerianization or indigenization,* over nationali
zation, based on neo-classical economic development strategy. The ques
tion now becomes: Could this plan contain the woes of colonial indus
trialization? The indigenization or Nigerianization (under Balewa's
neo-classical based development philosophy) implied the "open door po
licy"** to foreign capital since 1960. This process encouraged the
invasion of the Nigerian economy by multinational neo-colonial capi
talists. Thus, the initially predominantly British finance capital
became increasingly invaded by American, French, Western German and
other European neo-imperialist capital. This was the economic
atmosphere which preceded the beginning of the implementation of
Nigeria's official development plan. Thus, the neo-classical/
Keynesian based development model, adapted in the first two years of
flag independence,*** which favored the open door policy could be
traceable pre-independence development plan of 1946.
The Pre-Independence Planning History
A review of the pre-independence planning history revealed that
Development planning in Nigeria can be traced back to 1946 when
following the initiatives of Secretary of State for the colonies
in 1944, the ten-year Plan of Development and welfare came into
operation. The formulation and implementation of the plan up to
1954 was highly centralized, the plan being actually prepared un
der the general direction of a small central development board
Private enterprise system where Nigerian entrepreneurs are
expected" to compete "freely" along side with foreign counterparts.
**,
Open door policy as used here implies opening of the Nigerian
economy to more foreign capital or investment.
By flag independence is meant a political independence; with
out self-sustained economic development.
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consisting exclusively of senior colonial government officials.
[Due to the introduction of the federal system of government in
Nigeria, which meant that certain autonomy in decision-making was
to be given to each composite federal region from October 1954],
this brought the Plan to a premature end. And in 1955 each re
gional government as well as federal government launched new plans
. . .The 1955-60 Economic Development Plan [was] revised and ex
tended to 1962. At this time Nigeria had become a federation.25
Significant here is that (1) the nationalist parties up to the eve of
Nigerian independence had come to embrace the neo-classical/Keynesian
development model; (2) they had also come to modify that model which
formerly restricted Nigerian socio-political and economic ties to Bri
tain by considering "open door policy;" (3) the implications of open
door are two-fold: first, it allowed the pre-independent nationalist
parties to seek advice from the metropolitan development institutions
on what strategy of development Nigeria should take. For instance,
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) was
a consultant since 1954. "Two bureaucratic planning institutions [i.e.,
J. P. C. and N. E. C.]* were established on recommendations of the
IBRD Report of 1954;"26 (4) the nationalist inclination to develop
intellectual link with development planning experts outside the mother
country consequently legitimized their eccentricism as far as the need
25Federal Republic of Nigeria, Second National Development Plan,
1970-74 (Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1975), 6.
*The National Economic Council (NEC), created in 1955, was to act
as consultative body for the development of national, social and eco
nomic policies. Its membership included Crown's governor General
of Nigeria and four African ministers from each Nigerian region and
two from southern Cameroon. And the Joint Planning Council (JPC),
created in 1958, was to advise the NEC. It was a composite of ex
perts like the Governor of Central Bank and college professors.
260nimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria, 117.
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of keeping Nigeria open for foreign capital was concerned. The neo-
classical/Keynesian philosophy (or colonial plan), which was for
mally extended to 1962, reflected that orientation. This plan pre
cisely stated that
Nigeria is an open economy, whose development depends to a high
degree on her ability to pay for essential imports, both develop
ment goods, and of those consumer goods required for a risinq
level of living and as incentives for increased production.
Because the Nigerian economy depends so largely on the fortunes
of its export sector, whose prices and outputs depend on weather
and world markets, the balance of payments must be constantly
watched. Monetary and fiscal measures will be the primary means
of containing demand so that Nigeria does not lose the undoubted
advantages of a free economy, which is one of the prime assets
from the point of view both of domestic and foreign investment.27
(5) Since the First Development Plan philosophically implied the neo-
classical/Keynesian economic philosophy and was modified by experts1
advice from other international capitalist institutions such as the
IBRD, we hereby posit that the First National Development Plan of Ni
geria (FNDP) was rooted in the "neo-classical model of international
development."28
According to this model, national development in the world ca
pitalist economy could best be attained through the "stimulation of
economic growth and maximum and efficient use of the world's re
sources. "29 in otner wordSj the arguments in favor of th1s
posit that development could be attained through
^Federal Republic of Nigeria, National Development Plan. 1962-
68 (Lagos: Nigerian National Press, Ltd., 1962),24.
na!!J?meLPeil]": fj1*1*!0?1 Perspectives on Imperialism and Social




ImOn?1 traJ?' "restricted tariff [and other protec-
ZaSUres2" I * if] each nation should concentrate on pro
ng those products in which it has relative advantage in terms
of its national factor endowments. This concentration wil slrle
?heeand9vSnta°aeroTshmbfiaJl0W1^ ^^eveloped economy" £ overcome
tne advantages of small domestic markets. The additional income
9;fj™ this specialization will permit the purchase of new
forms of technology and other material goods needed to stimulate
development In addition, specialization is said to encourage fo-
JSnXL^?8*???* ™?S bun'ng1n9 add1t1°"al capital, technology and
?hS?9to arh?^!1^1"^ the ^Ono^ 4 • -[1t 1s also recommended
5,,^™ n • 6Ve the $0V.e obJectlve] underdeveloped nations pro
ducing primary commodities should continue. . .to the level of
specialization that international demand will support
Hence, since the composition of the FNDP. reflected the latter strategy,
It was largely distilled from the neo-classical model of international
development. Because of that, we hereby characterize the First Na
tional Development Model of uiyru as basically the neo-classical
model of international development. From the preceding analysis, the
key issues at this point are (1) What were the objectives of the First
National Development Plan (FNDP)? (2) Could this plan enable post-co
lonial Nigeria to contain and reverse the exploitation of colonial
capitalism cum politics of underdevelopment? (3) Could it activate
pre-colonial mode of production depressed by forcefully imposed co
lonial mode of production thereby making independent Nigeria a devel
oping economy it once was? If not, why? These shall be our foci.
An Analysis of th* First National Development Plan or Model
What necessitated this model? Ostensibly, the need for planning
in post-independent Nigeria grew out of the Africans' dissatisfaction
with colonial exploitation. The colonial industrialist siphoned wealth
from colonial Nigeria through the colonial industries to invest in the
3°Ibid.
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industrial development of the mother country. As a consequence, Ni
geria, "a potentially rich country,"31 was left underdeveloping. She
had experienced, for example, balance of payment deficit, massive un
employment, food shortage, high inflation, poor housing, poor infra
structures, incoherent economy, a dependency on foreign capital, and
technology. The country had been a rich but poverty-stricken nation
whose masses were persistently entertained by economic crises. In view
of the said economic osmosis, which Nigeria's colonial status has ca
talyzed, "its virile population [during the colonial era] has scarcely
yet been developed to a degree to alleviate poverty of the bulk of the
people."32
In fact, to the nationalist, there is no reason that the rich
natural resources of Nigeria cannot be developed to support and improve
the living conditions of the Nigerians. "It is on the basis of this
faith that this—the first national six-year plan for economic
devel opment—evol ved. "33
Goal of the Plan
In the wording of this plan,
The present First National Plan [was] seen as the first in a series
which will bring Nigeria to [economic development, or] "take off"
stage. This means that within a reasonable period of time, Nigeria
should be in a position to generate from a diversified economy,
sufficient income and savings of its own to finance a steady rate
of growth with no more dependence on external sources for capital





and manpower than is usual to obtain through natural incentives
of international commerce. This means that it will then be pos
sible to have established at optimum efficiency the institutions
. - -and essential industries which will make such growth possible,
[and also that] she intends to develop her economy to be less and
less dependent upon such external factors of development as foreign
private investment, and the sudden changes in the prices of her
primary export products. Until this stage is reached, Nigeria will
continue to need and indeed welcome foreign capital and skills.34
From the above contradictory articulation which basically is
derived from the neo-classical model of international development, we
ask: Were the desired objectives of this plan realized? If not, why?
In this context, we deem an analysis of the First National Develop
ment Plan (FNDP) a priority. We would precisely establish and analyze
the plan objective, and simultaneously evaluate the latter to determine
its success or failure to meeting its targets within the planned period.
Our intention here is to establish and translate the goals of
the FNDP into measurable indicators of objective accomplishment in the
real-life of the Nigerian masses. In this regard, our analysis shall
be complemented by data that pinpoints the actual performances of the
economy within planned epoch (as anticipated by the government).
The Objective of the First National Development (FNDP)
As designed in the planned document, the Balewa government's
objective was the following:
. . .to surpass the past growth rate of the economy of 3.9 percent
per year compound to achieve a rate of four percent per annum and
if possible to increase this rate [and] to develop opportunities
in education, health, and employment; and to improve access for
all citizens to these opportunities. . .[as well as among other
thingsJ to achieve a modernized economy consistent with democratic
political and social aspirations of the people. This includes the
34Ibid., 3.
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achievement of a more equitable distribution of income both amonq
people and among regions. It includes, more specifically the c?e
?he°Drovi^re J"?bVnd OPPO^I"" ™ non-agficuUural^ccupatfon.
men L ?L!dJ1S0ry a"d tra1nin9 services to Nigerian business
men to |nable them to compete more effectively at home and abroad
It must be noted that the plan did not appraise the role of exis
ting colonial industries in post-colonial Nigeria to determine whether
those industries had any correlations to the underdevelopment crises
in Nigerian leadership, and whether or not the plan could fundamen
tally reactivate pre-colonial mode of production. Such critical issues
could enable the government to set new guidelines for the foreign in
dustries still operating during the plan period, as well as the new
ones that might come in with a view to minimizing, containing and re
versing the centers exploitation.
Second, there has been no appraisal of the role of the colonial
superstructure in maintaining the colonial industrial mode of production.
Perhaps the plan itself should not have been based on the European ex
perience but rather on the pre-colonial African model. A strategy which
evolved developing economies affirmed in our preceding chapters two
and three. Had this been done, such appraisal would have been determined
just as findings detailed, that (1) the present crisis is an outcropping
of that mode of production and development model. Consequently, it
would have enabled the leadership to question the possibility of any
centerbased development strategy as a viable remedy for developing Nigeria
35Ibid., 23.
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Instead, the latter was spuriously rooted and distilled from
the British experience. With this problem in view, we ask: Could this
plan live up to its declared objectives? Did it enable Nigeria to over
come her underdevelopment problems, as stated in the plan? It is against
these criteria that the plan's effectiveness or success has to be objec
tively measured and consequently our impending hypothesis is offered
or nullified.
Evaluation of the FNDP
In retrospect, our findings reveal that at the end of 1968, when
the plan was expected to be concluded, most of the items on its agenda
were yet to be accomplished. To be more precise, in 1966, when the
Balewa government was ousted in a military coup, most of the items on
the agenda had not been implemented. For the implemented part of the
program, the desired objective had not really been attained in terms
of real development (or containing unemployment, effecting equitable
distribution of income et al.).
Albeit the government evaluation of the FNDP (in the Second
National Development Plan, 1970-74 (SNDP) document, p. 14) epitomizes
that whereas such major projects (essential for a modernized economy
and economic "take off") such as:
(a) the Oil Refinery, (b) the Nigerian Security and Minting Plant,
(c) the Paper Mill, (d) the Sugar Mill, (e) the Niger Dam, (f) the
Niger Bridge, (g) some trunk roads (including Marduguri-Benisheik,
Gusausokoto, Bauchi Gombe-Yola, Shagamu-Benin and Kano-zaria Trunk
Roads) [and] Ports Extension [were completed], the plan can be judged
on a balance to be a success.36
36Federal Republic of Nigeria, Second National Development Plan,
1970-74, 14. K "
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Second, according to the government evaluation (SNDP, p. 14),
"the behavior of the national economy during the period reflected a
good potentiality for expansion greater than the four percent minimum
annual growth rate set by the planners."
Third, the government also claimed in the SNDP that new economic
institutions such as Nigerian Industrial Development Bank was success
fully inaugurated in 1964 to finance industrial development. This move
was designed to boost Nigerians' increasing ability to participate in
the "industrial ownership, direction and management."
However, although the establishment of the claimed infrastruc
ture is unquestionable, the government's failure to establish how this
institution (in concrete terms) enabled Nigeria to develop, i.e., put
the real control of the industries under Nigerians, developed Nigerian
technologically based industries, increased education and employment
opportunities, and effected equitable income distribution, simply
amounts to a superficial characterization of the Plan's success. Thus,
the plan practically failed to contain the center's domination and ex
ploitation of the economy, m essence, a prototype of colonial eco
nomic osmosis was still in motion. Metropolitan industries were still
exploiting the economy, and most Nigerians were still unemployed and
poverty-stricken. According to pre-colonial experience and even the
historical development model of the centers, a viable development stra
tegy evolves out of a society's authentic experience. Thus, a universal
development historiography has affirmed the latter as a fact of authen
tic development. But the plan theoretically and practically negated
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the preceding position. Consequently, unemployment was alarmingly on
the increase. Economy was underdeveloping.
A critical juxtaposition of the government's objective as stated
in the Plan, and the real achievement of the latter further contradicts
the administration's claim that the Plan was a success. For instance,
the balance of trade was still in adverse state just as before the flag
independence. Unemployment was alarmingly on the increase and the eco
nomy was still largely dominated and exploited by the foreign firms.
In fact, further findings revealed that the "open door policy" espoused
by Balewa's government did not end the domination and exploitation of
the economy by expatriate firms. It only intensified the economic os
mosis from Nigeria to Great Britain as well as aggravated the penury
of the Nigerian masses.
In retrospect,
The 1962-68 National Development Plan failed to achieve its eco
nomic diversification targets. Consequently, the value added as
a percentage of gross output in most industries remain[ed]* re
markably low. Imported raw materials constituted about 45 percent
of industrial cost in the country. The problem [was]* even worse
in metal production where the value added was as low as seven per
cent. . . [And]* another [unresolved] problem facing industrial
development of Nigeria was the low level of indigenous ownership
and control [of industries].*37
Moreover, the growth rate in the GDP was seriously on the decline.
"In fact, between 1962 and 1967, there was hardly any growth in the
GDP."38
*Emphasis mine.
37Damachi, Development Paths in Africa and China, 165.
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The plan was also frustrated by implementation problems. Two
years after Balewa's administration was ousted, the military government
of Ironsi* and Gowon, respectively, could not commit even more than
a third of the plan budget to its implementation.
Damachi continues by observing that
The plan made provision for a capital expenditure of U. S. $270m ,
roughly 13 percent of public investment for the expansion of trade
and industry over the six-year period. By March 1968, when the
duration of the plan expired, less than one-third of the amount
had in fact been committed.39
In terms of employment, many Nigerians were out of the job market;
the "unemployment situation [was] critical. The National Manpower Board
estimated that about 2 million persons were unemployed at the end of
1970,"40 especially because of the influx of people to the urban areas
in search of jobs. From that standpoint, this was a consequence of
stressing the modernization of high-tech industries, which are foreign
owned and controlled, and the abandonment of the reactivating of indi
genous industries in the rural areas.
The plan was functionally a failure, whereas its application
failed to contain metropolitan exploitation and resultant politics of
underdevelopment by its failure to reactivate the pre-colonial tech
nologies and manifest industries on a national scale. Such reacti
vation of the industries would have helped arrest labor flow to the
urban areas, as more people would have preferred working closer to
Ironsi was head of the first military government of Nigeria in
1966, while Gowon was head of the second military government from 1966




their native villages or towns. It would also have catalyzed indi
genous technology and consequently the production of culturally-based
products as in the pre-colonial era. Such would have placed Nigeria
on a sure path to overcoming underdevelopment problems or regain its
pre-colon1al capacity to self develop its societies. The latter was
rendered dormant or incapacitated and depressed by forced implantation
of colonial mode of production on the natives.
Moreover, we find that "the objectives of the industrial
development programme [or model] though laudable were not matched with
articulated projects and closely defined policies geared toward their
achievements."41
For instance, further documentations reveal that
la.^Mnfl^T^r?*?1'51® Pr°J'ects were identified prior to
launching the plan. The iron and steel project which was
nRveJho°0^ **? 'ornerstone of ^e public industrial sector had
gatiSn stagl% P P °d (1968) paSsed beyond the 1nvesti"
Also, the liberal open door policy, in which the government gave
mostly foreign investors and entrepreneurs incentives such as: "liberal
income tax, and import duty relief, accelerated depreciation allowances,
protective duties and import quotas,"43 are not critically examined





Hence, we further deduce that the absence of such profound critical
assessment created loop holes in the economy, whereby the beneficiary
expatriate firms steadily amassed profits at the expense of the lawful
Nigerian taxpayers. The incentives only fostered metropolitan indus
tries, while simultaneously furthering the dysfunctional ism of authen
tic mode of production.
Fundamentally ~
. . .industrialization has long been a key issue for national and
anti-colonial movements, the colonies right to manufacture was a
factor in the American Revolution and the inability to develop
manufacturing industries in colonial and semi-colonial conditions
was a growing grievance in Africa, Asia and Latin America in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The experience of pri
mary exporters in the depression of the 1930s underlie the need
for economic diversification, and by the end of the second world
war industrialization had become an important component of devel
oping countries* aspirations.44
Consequently, the Belawa administration was under massive pres
sure to make good the promises of nationalism. A commitment to liberate
Nigeria from economic exploitation of the centers, and in that sense
give employment hope, at least, to the Nigerian have-nots through rapid
industrialization. Thus, "this impetus to industrialize led the govern
ment to seek external aid. The apparent success of obtaining foreign
aid led to the problem of utilization."45 But foreign aid, according
Developing countries, as used by this author from our viewpoint,
is purely symbolic. In this study it is synonymous with underdeveloping
countries or states like Nigeria.
44Pradip K. Ghosh, Industrialization and Development; A Third
World Perspective (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984), 1.
45Damachi, Developing Paths in Africa and China, 162.
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to Lappe, Collins and Kinley (1980) is an "obstacle" to concrete
development, a factor of underdevelopment per se.
This anomaly historically originates from the fact that
each donor country had its own requirements and as a result
project documentation had to meet the idiosyncrasies of particular
lenders. This called for versatility [or flexibility]* on the part
Sf sPk?f?e39ma°nP0wear!56and thUS accentuated *»» problems of shortage
Furthermore, the aid packages were often "tied to the financing of par
ticular projects in the development plan. These projects were not those
to which the government attached a high priority from the point of view
of development strategy."47 As a resultj the Balewa,s g0Vernn]ent was
adamant in terms of releasing its limited resources for implementing
the latter.
In conjunction with aid was the issue of matching the aid with
the local resources. In this context, our findings revealed that
. . .there was the practice of lenders providing aid for foreiqn
exchange component of approved projects, while Nigeria had to pro-
Vtitt heJ°-? COS5.component. . .where local resources were fully
stretched, it was difficult or virtually impossible to provide the
required local cost. This limited the utilization of the foreign




For precise consequences of aid as an obstacle to concrete development
nFFra""?cMn00^ f?Pe. Joseph Collins and David Kinley, Aid tsolsttlTe
(San Francisco, Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1980).
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Because of the aforementioned handicap, the Balewa's government called
for a "more generous local cost finance and program support."49 This
implied the financing of a fraction of the local cost of the planned
project, but it did not solve the problem since the "overall gap" was
greater than the foreign exchange.
Second, the Balewa's government also called for "an examination
of the development programme as a whole in the light of the resources
expected to accrue from all sources, and subsequently deciding on some
degree of financial support for the overall program.50
The essence of this modification was to increase "both the magni
tude and rate of utilization of foreign aid in Nigeria."51 Unfortu
nately, though, before this change could be effected, the massive out
cry against the administration's failure to achieve economic indepen
dence had reached a boiling point. Haunted by fear and in an apparent
move to salvage their privileged "juju prestige" in the state, the
nationalist politicians started politics of nationalities or tri
balism. Just as the destitution and economic insecurity among the
urban unemployed Africans in the colonial era catalyzed tribal unions.
The penury of the masses generated nepotism and the rebirth of the pre-
independent indigenous welfare cleavages in the form of tribalism.
This turn of affairs consequently ended prematurely the Balewa's go





capitalism catalyzed politics of underdevelopment in post-colonial
Nigeria.
Also what must be deduced here is that the military takeover
of the Balewa's government was symptomatic of a failing neo-classical
model of international development to resolve the contradictions of
a component, the First National Development Plan (FNDP). The latter
was theoretically the objective of the first plan which was to in
crease "the rate of economic growth and the standard of living of the
people,"52 among other things, has simply not been attained. What
this model did was simply generate growth without development in the
satellite post-colonial economy. The model simply had no place for
the development of the indigenous industries. At best, its incentives
component only served as an engine of modernization and growth of the
metropolitan industries. Besides, since industrialization in the First
Plan was seen as modernization and modification of the existing in
dustries by the application of foreign technology, it ip so facto
failed to reactivate technologies or develop indigenous skills essen
tial for sustained developing economy as in the pre-colonial Nigeria/
Africa. But, unfortunately, the objective of developing the economy
in the First Plan was not attained. It was not attained because the
First Development Plan was an extension of the colonial model; for that
very fact, it was based on the neo-classical colonial industriali
zation model. This model essentially was designed and supplanted to
52E. J. Nwosu, Achieving Even Development in Nigeria, Problems
and Prospects (Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1985),
0 •
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secure the colonies of European powers like Nigeria as markets for Euro
pean oriented products, as well as sources for vital raw materials,
instead of generating the further development and growth of native mode
of production.
In Nigeria, the latter was achieved by setting up in the colo
nial epoch, center-based auxiliary factories to process raw materials
for export to Britain for use in the mother factories, whose finished
products would then be exported from the center to the colonial markets
like Nigeria for sales.
In addition, in Nigeria, some auxiliaries of the center facto
ries were also set up to manufacture (using local productive forces)
a prototype of metropolitan products just for sales in Nigeria, but
not for export to the metropole. What is important of note here is
that the colonial industries were owned and directed by the colonial
bourgeoisie. Since they were foreign-owned, the profits from those
colonial firms were ploughed back at will to the center for strategic
industrial development. For short, under the colonial development
strategy, Nigeria was a monopolized economy of the metropole; hence,
economic osmosis was the order. Therefore, since the First Develop
ment Plan of Nigeria did not change the substructure of the colonial
industries or their superstructures and the center continued to drain
the resources of post-colonial Nigeria, our findings resolved that the
first plan only sustained underdevelopment syndrome. The first plan
therefore was a fact of economic inertia and manifested politics of
underdevelopment.
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The only modification in the post-colonial industrial formation
was primarily that the overt presence of Europeans was minimized by
the latter's mobilization of Nigerian compradors to function as
managers of the colonial firms. Second, the center industrialists in
the post-colonial era, in a move designed to maximize their profits
as well as to give "independent Nigeria" a false optimism that she is
now a manufacturing state, established subsidiaries of mother factors,
which could now manufacture in toto European products for sales in Ni
geria just to escape the payment of any small tariffs that might have
been imposed on imports from the centers.
Thus, at best, the "open door policies" which the Balewa
government coined into the indigenization concept of the First Plan
only exacerbated the influx of the multinational corporations to ex
ploit Nigeria. Because of the centers' fear of losing their colonial
markets, because of intensified nationalism in their colonies or former
colonies, worldwide competition for markets and raw materials had inten
sified. This consequently, as Onimode notes:
. . .compelled MNCs to shelter behind the protective tariff bar
riers of satellite countries for the development of their subsi
diaries as 'tariff factories.' In the process, the MNCs have
sought both economic and political control, through co-opting and
corrupting willing indigenous comprador bourgeoisie in order to
dictate events in their exploitative interest. In Nigeria, since
1960, these mechanisms have been employed to ensure the domination
of such critical economic sectors as petroleum, and mining, manu
facturing, banking insurance, construction, import-export trade,
transport and communications as well as agriculture. Exploitation
of these sectors by MNCs is based either on full foreign proprietor
ship or on joint venture, with private indigenous capitalist or
with the government.53
530nimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria, 141-142.
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Hence, the latter further affirmed that colonial capitalism fos
tered politics of underdevelopment in Nigeria. Therefore, under the
First National Development Plan, Nigeria remained locked in underdevel
opment problems, just as in the colonial era. Further, a revisit to
the post-colonial industrial activities revealed a domination of the
economy by evolving metropolitan multinational corporations (MNCs) in
conjunction with the colonial industries.
But the influx of the latter (MNCs) essentially has manifested
as a capitalist challenge to the hegemony or exploitative monopoly of
the latter, which held sway the colonial Nigeria, by aggressively in
vading the economy and seeking to reduce the benefits enjoyed by the
colonial industries in every aspect of Nigeria's post-colonial poli
tical economy. In fact, since the implementation of the "open door"
aspect of the FNDP according to Nnoli (1981:80), other capitalist
centers such as "the U.S.A. and Japan have been seriously challenging
British hegemony in this country [Nigeria]* in a framework of multi
lateral integration of the country into world capitalism." What must
be noted here is that, in the face of this challenge or the threat to
the future of the colonial industries from the invading MNCs, the co
lonial industries altered its operational character, and consequently
became more institutionalized in Nigeria.
Thus, most of products which used to be shipped to the mother
firms as raw materials would now be processed into finished products
in Nigeria. Furthermore, most of the managerial staff would now be
*Emphasis mine.
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recruited from the indigenous elite to supplement the Europeans in
an effort to camouflage the Tatter's dominant presence in the inde
pendent epoch.
This modification in the operational character had actually be
gun in less than a decade preceding the flag independence when devel
opment planning was introduced into Nigeria. It was designed to starve
off violent nationalization of the colonial industries in the strategic
independent era.
Empirical evidence in Onimode pinpoints that the major agri
cultural industrial products exported to the mother country (in the
colonial era) such as cotton, cocoa, rubber, groundnuts, palm oil, ker
nel silk and beniseed would now be manufactured into various Eurocentric
commodities of trade in Nigeria, in addition to what was already manu
factured by the colonial industries-just for local consumption not
for export. However, some agri-products needed as raw materials such
as cocoa, groundnuts, palm oil, etc. continued to be exported to the
center. But these were exported by the Nigerian marketing boards in
joint venture with the colonial industries representing that spe
ciality.
In retrospect, the colonial industries continued to proliferate
independent Nigerian markets with the consumer goods of the colonial
epoch, such as textiles, canned food, cigarettes, soap, margarine as
well as plastics and others. Even in the area of capital goods pro
duction, productivity was essentially the same and targeted to meet
the local demand as well as designed to avoid any mass production that
might cause surplus, and consequently loss of profit. Cement and boat
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building or small river crafts, for instance, continued as the capital
products that the latter produced.
The only products that colonial industries continued to export
to the mother country for complete manufacturings were those from extrac
tive industries. This was because the utility of these products, for
the most part, were desperately needed in the development of high tech
nological industries. Therefore, minerals like tin, iron ore, gold
and petroleum continued to be exported in the independent era. But
in the latter, our study asserts is the area in which the colonial
industries met with uncompromising or cutthroat competition from MNCs
based in other capitalist centers, such as Japan and the U.S.A. The
character of outputs and the colonial industries that produced and
distributed them remained essentially the same.*
Contingent on the preceding analysis of the functioning of the
colonial industries, a major striking issue then becomes, How did the
colonial industries' continue their dominance and exploitation in "in
dependent" Nigeria? In this context, the answer subsequent analysis
clarifies the issue.
Primarily, the elite Nigerian working class, formed to service
the colonial industries and superstructure (in the colonial Nigerian
political economy), now evolves as a replica of the colonial bour
geoisie in the post-colonial political economy. This class of Ni
gerians—very small, percentagewise—now would dominate the state and
* «u T? av?,!d repetltl<>n» which enumeration would cause here, we refer
to Chapter IV - Phases and Types of Colonial Industries/Products. For
a condensed detail on the latter, read Bade Onimode, 1982, 7881
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promulgate legislations that would affect the post-colonial state.
Thus we have the "bourgeoisification" of that fraction of the Ni
gerian working class elite that were originally "nationalist."
Because of the latter1s new status as a mechanical replica of the
colonial industrialist and colonial government, it essentially func
tioned as national bourgeoisie. Thus, since the FNDP was not designed
to enforce nationalization of the colonial industries but instead to
encourage indigenization within the framework of "open door" policy,
this national bourgeoisie had practically no control either over the
colonial industries or over the destiny of Nigeria as far as contain
ing foreign economic exploitation is concerned. As a consequence, they
functioned in practice as compradors in the government and petit bour
geoisie in the private sector. The latter had abandoned their national
ist objective of developing Nigeria, and were now mobilized to boost
their economic status to those of the Europeans in the colonial times.
This new status and aspirations essentially detached the state
leadership from the Nigerian masses. By aligning their aspirations
with the centers, the leadership essentially embodied colonial par
tisan politics for the colonies. The latter was designed to suppress
indigenous development. Hence, these findings further affirmed that
failure to base the First National Development Plan on authentic pre-
colonial culture only exacerbated politics of underdevelopment in post-
colonial era. Because of the latter, the leadership simply could not
commit itself to containing the exploitation of the economy by foreign
industries. Thus, the national bourgeoisie, now in conjunction with
foreigners, exploited the economy and the Nigerian masses. For in-
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stance, since the employment conditions in post-colonial Nigeria
remained basically colonial, only this national bourgeoisie, by their
status as replica of the Europeans benefited economically. Otherwise,
the income and wages of labor remained essentially colonial.
Simultaneously, the taste of the European life-style by the emer
gent comprador-bourgeoisie would now evolve a cutthroat politicking
in the state. The Nigerian elite now viewed political office as a means
to an end, vis a vis their earlier nationalist stand, which to them,
the latter was to be an end per se—a vision that after independence,
Nigeria would be transformed into an egalitarian state.
In sum, this mechanical Euro-capitalist ethos introduced and
catalyzed sectional politics, corruption, nepotism, tribalism and others
into post-colonial politics. This further frustrated the development
of the state, for the reason that their uncomrnitment to the welfare
of the masses and their preoccupation with personal aggrandizement
Handicapped their vision to see the need of evaluating the FNDP after
its implementation in spite of cries of penury from the masses. The
latter appraisal could have determined the causality of crises and
could have inspired the drive design an Afrocentric or an authentic
development model as a rational solution. But this was paid only pas
sive attention.
Since the underdevelopment problems remained basically what they
were before the implementation of the first national development model,
or the flag independence, we ultimately validify our second hypothesis.
We find more justification in the assertion of the critics of the First
Plan that this failure was because Nigeria
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. . .still adopted a development strategy which was applicable to
Victorian Europe and which is not oriented to the demands of our
society. [And] that our insatiable quest for imported products
and the resulting need to produce import substitutes have been a
direct result of a development strategy which is based on imported
technology.54
Synthesis of the First National Development Plan (FNDP)
In retrospect, whereas the FNDP failed to resolve incoherence
in the substructure, Nigerian economy under the First National Develop
ment Plan continued to function as a satellite of the metropole. This
in economic terms means that Nigerians did not take over such essential
technology that propelled the metropolitan industries.
Because the metropole still controlled the industries, they ba
sically controlled the output, the market and the financial benefits.
Hence, there was inadequate finance to "develop opportunities in edu
cation, health and employment," as envisioned in the plan objective.
Also the second objective, of improving access for all citizens in the
envisioned modernizing economy, "consistent with democratic, political,
and social aspirations of the people, turned out to be a fantasy; Ni
gerian businessmen and technologists could not compete successfully
with the expatriate firms. Hence, in view of these unaccomplishments,
our findings invalidate the governments assertion that the First Na
tional Development Plan was a success. Our disagreement stems from
the governments distortion of its accomplishment from its stated in
tentions in the goal of the plan and objective (see pp. 159-162).
In retrospect, judging from the industrialization standpoint,
the crises experienced by Nigerians in the colonial era persisted and
54Ibid., 8.
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stiffened. The economy was still dominated and exploited by European
firms. Local technological development was still stultified.
Whereas the economy was still eurocentrically oriented the super
structure that it supported was essentially unauthentic. Thus, the
leadership continued to view Nigerian development from the European
paradigm or colonial experience. Hence, economic osmosis increased
under the FNDP to epidemic proportions.
In the final analysis, since the continuation of colonial
philosophy did not bring about real and even development, but instead
increased the penury of the Nigerian masses; the colonial philosophy
was unquestionably a failure. It was a failure because the contra
dictions of the colonial capitalism and evolving politics of underde-
velopment continued unabated, according to our findings. But will this
error be corrected? This would be resolved as we analyze the Second
National Development Plan (SNDP) under the military regime of General
Yakubu Gowon.
It is in light of the anticipated failures that the military
government of Gowon developed the Second National Development Plan.
According to our findings —
The Gowon government, which succeeded the Ironsi government, was
confronted with four important problems—unemployment, high rate
of inflation, how to diversify the economy through industriali
zation and low level of indigenous ownership and control fof
industries].55
55Damachi, Development Paths in Africa and China. 63-65.
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In order "to combat these problems, Gowon government launched the
Second National Development Plan, 1970-74."56 The latter sought to
make Nigeria a "united strong and self-reliant nation; great and dy
namic economy; a just and equalitarian society; a land of bright and
full opportunities for all citizens; and a free and democratic society
[and is a continuation] of the same liberal policies of Balewa."57
Because of the above articulation of the plan, we hereby
characterize same as: The Second National Development Plan of Nigeria.
Here our fundamental question becomes: What were the objectives of
this Plan? Could this model enable Nigeria to resolve the rising cri
ses of Balewa1s administration, a crises of political underdevelopment
of colonial industrialization by containing its manifested crises, or
by activating industrial development? This would be analyzed with a
view to completely validifying our hypotheses "B" or vice versa. We
would precisely seek to determine whether or not the objectives of the
Second National Development Plan were realized.
The Objectives of the Second National Development Plan (SNDP)
As worded in the Plan,
What Nigeria lacks most in the past has been a national sense of
purpose in economic matters. [Hence] government intervention in
economic matters designed primarily to protect and promote the
public interest is therefore fully justified. [In this context,
the] five principal national objectives are to establish Nigeria
firmly as: (a) a united strong and self-reliant nation; (b) a
great and dynamic economy; (c) a just and egalitarian society;
571bid., 165-166.
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(d) a land of bright and full opportunities for all citizens; and
(e) a free and democratic society.58
In view of these objectives, the demanding and essential issues become,
To what practical extent would this second plan or model contain the
astronomical underdevelopment crises left uncontained by the ousted
republican government of Balewa? Could this plan ensure political de
velopment?
A realization of the said objectives would functionally imply
a different planning and implementation philosophy. Hence, the criti
cal issue now becomes, how different is the second plan in terms of
its priorities?
Here we find that for the military administration of Gowon
To encourage the employers to continue to play an important role
in the Nigerian development process, the government has very li
beral investment policies. As previously noted, the Balewa regime
extended \iery favorable investment terms to investors, foreign and
indigenous. The Gowon administration is continuing the same, if
not more, liberal policies of Balewa.
First, the government has stated unequivocally that it does not
intend to nationalize or expropriate foreign or indigenous firm
industries. But where nationalization becomes absolutely necessary,
the government will enter into negotiations with the company con
cerned and will pay compensation in accordance with the agreements
reached.59
It was in the latter light that the federal government set out to imple
ment the Second National Development Plan (SNDP) 1970-74.
,n™ federal Republic of Nigeria, Second National Development Plan.
1970-74 (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Economic Development, 1970), 32.
59For elaborate analysis of the implementation of this plan, see
Chapter 7 of Damachi, Development Plans in Africa and China. 152185.
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An Analysis of the Second National Development Plan fSNDP) 1970-74
In retrospect, as reviewed in the Third National Development
Plan (TNDP) 1975-80, the federal government, in order that it generated
economic development, "earmarked" a capital expenditure program of
$3,192 billion for the Plan period. This amount was to be "distributed
between the public and private sectors," with the sole objective of
stimulating industrial growth; or the "rise in gross output of the eco
nomy from a level of $3,028 billion in 1969-70 to $3,987 billion in
1973-74, in real terms." Such investment was designed to spawn a
seven percent average growth rate (approximately) during the Plan
period.
The intention here (based on the government's neo-classical/
Keynesian orientation) was that with a sustained growth in the economy,
the objectives of the Plan would be realized. Thus, efforts and
resources were targeted toward industrial modernization 1n order to
promote industrial growth and performances of the dominant industries.
But to a large extent, and like the preceding Balewas regime inequit
able attention was paid to the reactivation of the pre-colonial mode
of production, or the development of native industries, or suppressed
by colonialism and its evolving colonial mode of production. The in
dustrial growth anticipated in the Plan merely applied to the increases
in the performances of the dominant metropolitan industries at the ex
pense of colonial disarticulated native industries.
Hence, although the "Gross Domestic Product factor cost rose
from a level of $9,442 billion in 1976-77 to $14.40 billion in 1974-
75, indicating an average growth rate of about 8.2 percent per annum,"
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(a percentage higher than projected in the Plan) in terms of the Plan's
objectives, we ask: To what significant extent did this growth rate
been representative of indigenous industries?
According to the government's review of its accomplishments,
the following synopsis of accomplishments was attained. In the Eastern
states, for instance, most of the farms and plantations abandoned during
the Civil War were rehabilitated and brought back into production.
Second, the manufacturing industries in war-torn areas, such as cement
factories at Nkalagu and Calabar were reactivated; and "extensive expan
sion of facilities initiated." New ventures, for instance, the establish
ment of fish trawling and the paint projects, inauguration of Alcohol
Factory at Bacita, petrochemical and nitrogenous fertilizer projects
under construction were established. Third, more federal secondary
schools and colleges of technology and trade centers were established.
In mining industrial sector, for instance, "the government established
the National Oil Corporation through which it now participates actively
in the production sector." The latter was accomplished by acquiring
majority equity in the oil industry. The government precisely claimed
to have recorded improvements in social and economic infrastructure
needed for development. But the token wages increment recommended to
the proletariat during the Plan period was considered unwise, and fur
ther increases were ordered frozen while import liberalization was
ordered.
Therefore, according to governments review —
it can be justifiably claimed that despite the financial and
administrative difficulties experienced at the beginning of the
Plan period, Plan implementation, however, measured has been
reasonably satisfactory (which our findings contradict).
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Our findings reveal that Nigeria was far from being a self-re
liant nation, as in the objectives of the Plan. The economy was ex
cessively dominated and exploited by metropolitan multinational cor
porations (MNC) during the Plan period. In the face of this domi
nation, Nigeria was rather backsliding into underdevelopment. Most
of the country's industries prospering were controlled or owned by fo
reigners. This, in essence, pinpoints the fact that the profit made
by the industries, in real terms, belonged to foreigners, who, as usu
al, would plough them back for investment in the centers. Even so,
the little wages that were due the Nigerians now were frozen. That
meant that the natives would continue (even in post-colonial era) to
work for slavery-type wages for the metropolitan industrialist. There
fore, Nigeria was far from being "a great and dynamic economy or a just
and egalitarian society;"60 where full and equitable opportunities
could be realized.
Obviously, the national mood was from massive standpoint tanta
mount to crises which demanded that the Gowon administration urgently
acted to calm the massive fear of a bleaker economy or abdicate.
Therefore, faced with the excessiveness of the MNCs created by the
"open door" strategy of Balewa and an evolving masses discontent with
the continued exploitation of the economy by foreign firms
in 1966, an Expatriate Quota Allocation Board was established and
charged with the function of ensuring greater indigenous par-
60Federal Republic of Nigeria, Second National Development Plan,
1970-74, 32. ~" "
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ticipation in the control, development, and management of
certain economic resources of the society.61
Besides the establishment of the above board, another signifi
cant strategy to contain the exploitation by the MNC was the promul
gation of COMPANIES DECREE6* Of 1968. The 1968 Companies Decree pre
cisely and expressly demanded that:
?r^ foreign company shall in respect of its operations in
Nigeria be deemed to have been incorporated under this decree as
a separate entity from the company incorporated outside Nigeria
in whose name a place of business in Nigeria was established, and
the company so deemed to have been incorporated in Nigeria shall
have as part of its name the word 'Nigeria.'63
Among other things, "the 1968 decree forbade the MNC or companies in
general to assist any Nigerian to purchase its shares or shares in its
holding company.,"64 and set a f1ne of 2>000 Naira Qr lj00Q pounds
for companies and 200 Naira or 100 pounds for individuals who breach
the Decree, respectively. Because of the stern language of the latter,
the 1968 "decree was widely criticized by transnational corporations
in Nigeria and their home governments,"65 since they were left with
two options:
qo ,A61°?b?oIo? "I™ Ni9erian Indigenization Policy," African Affairs
8Z (April 1983): 248. ~~
62An order by the military government having the force of the
Parliamentary Acts promulgated to enable execution of the affairs of
the state in lieu of Parlimentary Acts, which of course were suspended
by the military government.
63Decree number 51 or 1968 (Companies Decree, 1968) Federal Re
public of Nigeria, Official Gazette, No. 70, Vol. 55, 16 October 1968
(Part A), Section 369 (1).
64Ibid., Section 35 (1).
O2 (A6r??b1983)-"24e N1genan Indi9enization Policy," African Affairs
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Either they had to continue operating in Nigeria, or they had
to end their business altogether in the country without being
able to repatriate their assets or even to get a Nigerian 'shadow'
owner to buy them or manage subsidiary companies as 'caretaker.'66
Faced by further serious pressure and criticism leveled espe
cially by the Nigerian business elite against military governments ini
tial, ineffective and go-slow politics, the planners of the Second Na
tional Development Plan of 1970-74 adjusted the plan priorities from
Nigerianization to indigenization model of the ousted Balewa's
government. Thus, the 1970-74 development plan became a composite of
indigenization promotion degree model or Nationalization Promotion
degree, cum import substitution component added.
But did the said modifications helped contain the exploitation
of Nigeria by the MNCs*. activated the development of growth of the
indigenous industries as a response to resolve the national crises?
And how different was the Nigerian economy from its satellite position
of the colonial through the Balewa's first development plan era? To
that end, an appraisal of the indigenization model is indispensable.
The Nigerian Indiqenization Promotion Decree
The state intervention to regulate the activities of the MNCs
using this model grew out of the massive outcry against exploitative
effects of the MNCs such as unemployment and inflation. This
intervention was done in an effort to attain even development as
espoused in the plan. Thus, "the state intervened in the private
sector in order to prevent undesirable and continued foreign monopoly
*Multinational Corporations.
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of the commanding heights or vital, productive sectors of the countries1
economy."67 In other words, "indigenization implied the grouping of
certain types of business activities and reserving these for exclusive
ownership and control by Nigerians."68
Under the 1972 decree, "twenty-two small scale enterprises in
Schedule 1 were reserved for Nigerians and thirty-three others in Sche
dule 2 in which Nigerians must have 40% equity participation."69
Although the Gowon administration toed the path of indigenization poli
cies of the Balewa government's development model, his swift move, at
least theoretically, to aggressively indigenize the economy was seen
as a threat to end the exploitation of Nigeria by the MNC and the local
compradors.
According to Onimode there was a "loud outcry of foreign enter
prises against Nigeria's indigenization of them [since the indigeni
zation promotion decree]* was launched in 1972."70 In fact, in
support of Onimode's contention above, Teresa Turner articulated that
the July 29, 1975 coup d'etat which ousted Gowon administration and
67ibid., 141.
* +u68?A^*cEkuk1nam' N19eria's Indigenization Policy, Proceedings
of the 1974 Symposium organized by Nigerian Economic Society on Indi-
gemzation: What Has Been Achieved (The Caxton Press, 1974), 1.
69a. Y. Yansane, Decolonization and Dependency: Problems of
Development of African societies ivj^tpnrt rr. a'^a a Prr~ im) ^
*Emphasis mine.
70Bade Onimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Niqeria (Lon
don: Zed Press, 1982), 165.
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installed Murtala Mohammed involved the political machinations of multi
national oil oligopoly and "led to the events which culminated in the
coup."71 At this juncture, perhaps the urgent striking question becomes,
What precisely led to the coup? And of what significance was the coup
d'etat to implementing of this indigenization decree model?
In retrospect, it was Gowon's move which evolved into tension
between collaborators-compradors*—who had been benefiting with their
alliance with the MNC and who had favored complacency—and technocrats**
in the oil bureaucracy. Consequently, according to Turner:
Since the compradors were alienating middle and military officers
by monopolizing, the tension spilled over into the wider context
dominated by triangular relationships when technocrats exposed the
compradors nexus with oil companies [because of aggressive attempt
to extinguish their essence by the bureaucratic compradors] In
their attempt to cover up this scandal, compradors [who were Gowon's
civilian top advisers] like Asiodu, Gowon's right hand man [who]***
was subscribing to rhetoric of statism to exclude middlemen and
the oil companies, were forced to act arbitrary.72
Most members of the military officers who were excluded from
influencing policies formulation and implementation by the administration-
which would have established contact between the latter and the MNCs-
?1l^resa Turner» "Multinational Corporation and the Instability
iS!9]rlta?ReViet' °f AfH P11t1' E N°- 5
By collaborator-comprador (according to Teresa Turner, p. 66),
meant corrupt Nigerian officials who work in alliance with "private
nedianes" and the MNCs to exploit the economy and attain personal
aggrandizement.
**Technocrats (according to Turner) are those technically skilled
professionals who were hired to put into effect the military's new policy





were mobilized to oust Gowon. In fact, the statement by the succeeding
Head of State Mohammed that Gowon was ousted because the "affairs of
state had become characterized by lack of consultation, indecision,
indicispline and even neglect" [and] that Governors had been running
their fiefs like private estates is an affirmation of Turner's
contention above. Also, it pinpoints the seriousness of the military
consideration of being ousted from policy-making and implementation
process, while the regime was military.
It is important to note in passing that this marked the origin
of the injection of oil into bureaucratic politics in Nigeria. Ac
cording to our findings, during the first Republican government (1960-
65):
. . .politicians took little interest in oil and civil servants
remained on the margins of the industry. No policy was initiated
But after January 1966, Shell B.P., responsible for most of the
oil production offered the new military regime improved financial
terms. Since these oil related matters had to do with funds, they
were handled by the ministry of finance, which established a pe
troleum section and began to initiate the making of oil policy
The oil ministry remained in the background and had even less
of a role with the decrease in production during part of the civil
war. Abudul Atta, permanent secretary* of the Ministry of Fi
nance, advocated a strong state role in the industry and formed
cadres of oil technocrats to realize his nationalist policies.73
Atta also tacitly sold the notion of Nigeria joining Organization of
Petroleum Countries (OPEC) to Gowon in 1971 and worked to establish
institutions to handle oil politics and policies, as well as the
By permanent secretary, it is meant (under the British bureau
cratic system or its prototype) the highest-ranking civil servant who
remains as chief bureaucrat or head of a ministry or department, as
some countries might call it
73Ibid.
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latter1s implementation in an effort to curb excessiveness by the pe
troleum MNCs. Thus, in Turner's view:
. . .the Petroleum Advisory Board (PAB) as a forum for decision-
making and the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) to
implement the policies in an efficient way administrators in the
ministry of mines and power view with alarm the expansion of
Ministry of Finance into their sphere of interest, oil companies
opposed the interventionist policies of Atta and the technocrats
who were concentrated largely in Finance. Nevertheless, Nigeria,
in line with OPEC, adopted a program of 'active participation in
the oil industry' as part of the 1970-74 Development
From the 1970s, the leadership and administration in the
ministry of mines and power and middlemen were being invaded by oil
politics given impetus by the MNCs. In this context lay the reason
for Gowon's administration's ouster by Murtala Muhammed. Muhammed
had cited Gowon's inability to contain exploitation of Nigeria by the
MNCs as a problem that needed to be challenged and resolved. But by
1976, there was no rational departure of significance undertaken by
Muhammed until his abrupt death by coup de tat in February 1976, or
by the succeeding Obsanjo's administration. Both Muhammed and Obasom
regimes had continued along the pathway of Gowon's 1972 indigeni-
zation promotion decree model. For instance, based on the latter
model:
^u??' !;nterPrises in Schedule 1 were increased by seventeen,
Schedule 2 was increased by nineteen, and indigenous equity
participation in them by government agencies or Nigerian citi
zens was raised by 60 percent. . .[and to]* a new Schedule 3




1" ^J"?.2" I!lese reclu1re 40 Percent indigenous participation.
In addition, the insurance decree No. 30 of 1976 offers majority
equity shares in foreign insurance companies to Nigerians.'5
Other strategies utilized by the Gowon regime to effect the
Second National Development Plan or to contain excessive exploitation
by Multinational Corporations (MNCs) included a Standard Decree of 1971.
This decree was to ensure that MNCs output was of world qualities or
standards. Also by 1977, the Price Control Decree Number 1, which was
to ensure that MNCs do not change excessive prices for their products
and other enterprises, was enacted. Other administrative regulations
such as foreign exchange regulations, labor code, et al. were pro
mulgated in order to regulate the activities of the foreign enterprises.
In light of these supposedly efforts to contain evolving crises of co
lonialism, our striking issue becomes, To what extent did these decrees
manifest or insured concrete national development? In this quest, our
findings reveal that despite massive quibbles over the critical issue
of immediate national economic liberation from an implementation stand
point, the indigenization strategy did not contain the centers exploi
tation. "Indigenization has been ambivalent, diversionary and in
effectual. "76 in retrospect, we observe that:
. . .from available statistics, a total of about 950 existing en
terprises excluding exemptions were effected by the [1972]
Decree 357 of which fell under 100 percent indigenization
Schedule 2). As of June 30, 1975, only 58 percent of Schedule
1 enterprises and 89 percent of Schedule 2 enterprises had
provisionary complied. Confirmed cases of compliance after
75Yansane, Decolonization and Dependency. 165.
76See "imperialism and Multinational Corporations: A Case Study
of Nigeria in Decolonization and Dependency, ed. A. Y. Yansane, 197.
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proper inspection numbered only 314 as of June 30, 1975;
about 33 percent. The enterprises exempted from the Decree,
many of them on questionable grounds numbered 81. Defaulters
have up to the time of this [observation in 1976]*, not been
brought to book--two years after the original appointed day of
March 31, 1974.''
Therefore, in absolute terms, while it may not be denied that since
independence in 1960 through 1990 (i.e., the period in post-colonial
era covered by our study), indigenization strategy or other development
models used resulted in an unprecedented growth in the number of native
entrepreneurs. Such "growth in number has, however, not resulted in
many Nigerians acquiring a meaningful role in the control and manage
ment of the 'commanding heights' of the economy."78 For two reasons:
first, historically according to Girvan:
. -#.the workers and state bureaucracy in the periphery [like Ni
geria]* deal initially with the managers of the local subsi
diaries. But these managers are themselves subject to the authority
of the parent corporation. . .The Transnational Corporation (TNC)
not only has tremendous resources of finance and technology, it
also has an enormous flexibility growing out of the fact that its
operations are based on a large number of countries. Such flexi
bility gives it options to shift accounting profits, and ultimately
new investment even existing production facilities from one country
to another. Furthermore, the TNC enjoys a close relationship with
the government of his home country which means that the center
Emphasis mine.
„„ +/7«eder?1 5e!?ubl1c of Nigeria, Federal Military Government's View
on the Report of the Industrial Enterprises Panel ti^n*. Fph^I
Ministry of Information, 1976), 4.
82 (Apr??b1983J-"The Ni9er1an Indi9enization Policy," African Affairs
*Emphasis mine.
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countries government will bring pressure to bear on the peripheral
goye^Jfnt ^ the interest of the firm - [e.g., ITT and US in Alendes
Therefore, because the national development practically further
stiffened an institutionalization of exploitative MNCs and Nigeria com
pradors, we further deduce that it was not authentically indigenized
and that failure to indigenize these plans exacerbated underdevelopment
politics in Nigeria.
Second, other obstacles cited for the failure of the indigeni-
zation model were viz:
The ignorance of a sizable majority with regard to the details of
government's indigenization effort, the intentions and the relevant
actions to take by interested members of the public who were desi
rous of availing themselves of the new opportunities for business
and industrial ventures; [especially]* information was inadequately
transmitted to the mostly half-educated and illiterate businessmen
and women who used to dominate or aspire to dominate the private
sector. Secondly, there had been low level of patriotism or moral
weakness of many Nigerians. This situation resulted in considerable
collusion between Nigerians and expatriates in order to avoid com
pliance with requirements of indigenization. Such unscrupulous
Nigerians who violated the decree, or acted as "fronts" or "screens"
for expatriate owners of companies [e.g.]* through sales of shares
which are merely on paper and not transferable to Nigerians, or
appointment of normal managers or directors who have no policy-
making functions as a result of unwritten or 'gentleman's agree
ments' with the real expatriate owners of the company.
—government errors at various stages of the exercise—the early
implementation processes were rushed and not preceded by thorough
pre-implementation planning—[as well as] inadequate staffing of
the board—obstructed its effectiveness and thereby retarding the
progress of indigenization efforts.
79Norman Girvan, Corporate Imperialism: Conflict and Expropriation
Transnational Corporations and Economic Nationalism in the ThirdWorTd—
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), 37. ~~
*Emphasis mine.
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-Widespread malpractices and violations of the decree [were!* not
fafsT nforL??™^^ P'1*.*! repOrtS of» 1
il 2!5 JS N E
.! « «1t
• ? Nl9erlan Enterprises Promotions Board
with the assistance of government officials.
j location of incompetent personnel in many strategic
hD eC°!°my> and the inadeq"ate manpower at the Nigirian
division!65 Pr°mOtlOnS Board 1tself' specially at the inspectorate
«!?? T"?1 ?ajOr ob.?tacle as far as the masses are concerned [was]*
capital shortage. The commercial houses would lend only to the
XT??? "CJ Ca Sract^ce Predom™ant among expatriate bankers before
t?at[on9OfnshaPrPnde!nek KThiS f?CtOr lar9^y accounts for concln-tration of shares in the hands of a few affluent Nigerians.80
In light of the above impediments to the successful implementa
tion of the plan, we think that the indigenization model was a cosmetic
solution to the substructural problem of colonial industrialization.
Thus, we assert that there can be no complete indigenization or
Nigerianization of any foreign industries without a simultaneous con
trol of the technology behind their operations. In fact, it is the
monopoly of this technology or its absolute control at the centers that
guaranteed the successful domination and exploitation of the Nigerian
economy. For one thing, owners of technology all over the world are
reluctant to part with their technology because the latter is the cau
sality or essence of their development and growth. And this, history
*Emphasis mine.
**
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board.
Emphasis mine.
rrhaH^San^a AIMnade' The Challenge of Nigeria's Tnriinpni^tTnn
(Ibadan: Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research; 1982),
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affirmed, is made possible because their respective development strate
gies are based on their national or cultural experiences for the most
part.
Other reasons cited for the failure were attributed to the ambig
uity in the formulation and operationalization of the key concepts in
the model. For instance, Section 23 (1) of the 1977 enterprises promotion
decree defined a Nigerian citizen as:
Any person of African descent, not being a citizen of Nigeria, who
is a national of any country in Africa which is a member country
of the Organization of African Unity and who continues to reside
and carry on business in Nigeria, if the country of which he is
a national also permits citizens of Nigeria to establish and
operate businesses or enterprises on the basis of reciprocity.8*
Because of the ambiguity of the latter, many alien investors simply
went into the neighboring African states friendly to Nigeria; these
aliens became citizens there and then came back to present their
documents to continue business as usual. Therefore to check these
abuses, the NEPB* redefined an African to be "any national of any
O.A.U. member country. . .that at least one of his parents is of
African descent. Naturalized citizens are therefore excluded."82
Again to the latter, we argued that such definitive action is
tantamount to chasing a shadow of a criminal instead of the actual
criminal per se. The fact of the matter is that whoever originates
the development model and evolving technology consequently controls
81Ibid., 65.
*Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board.
82National Enterprises Promotions Board, Fourth Progress Report
on the Implementation of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotions Decree,
1977 (November 1. 1978. February ?8T 1Q7Q), 14. —
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the economy. According to history an economy based on a foreign
development plan for the most part always remains an underdeveloping
satellite of the mother economy. Consequently, such economy has always
remained vulnerable to the exploitation by the center. In fact, what
made the Nigerian pre-colonial economy a developing one was that the
African then utilized his indigenous experiences as facts and factors
of his civilization. And thus, controlled the technology that pro
pelled or evolved developing modes of production.
Therefore, in absence of complete practical nationalization of
foreign firms, which should mean the control of all their operational
tenets, only those industries willing to sell their technologies within
a particular timeframe should have been permitted to function as part
ners in Nigeria. Any refusal to consider such arrangements should have
been interpreted as proof of the expatriates' hidden intention to con
tinue to exploit and underdevelop the economy. But this issue was
neither articulated nor implemented in the indigenization development
model; hence, the latter model failed to contain underdevelopment.
What is also significant of this model is that it rendered the already
underdeveloping economy to remain vulnerable to overt domination, con
trol and exploitation by foreign monopoly capital - just as it had been
in the colonial era. Anticipating imminent failures in the development
plan, the Gowon's regime decided to utilize an import substitution model,
as a modeled way out. But to what extent is this model authentically
Nigerian?
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The Import Substitution Model
This model in Nigeria evolved from the "first neo-classical budget"
speech of Balewa's government. In that manifesto, Chief Festus Okotie
Eboh, the Federal Minister of Finance, stated that "the governments
are all resolved to encourage the growth of local industry by providing
newly established industries with a degree of protection until they
are strong enough to stand on their feet."83
And such was the prevailing strategy which most flag independent
states, like Nigeria, considered as an economic option that could cata
lyze their national development. According to Helen Hughes: "As most
developing countries began to break out of their traditional economic
productive structures, balance of payments considerations became another
strong argument for import-substituting industrialization."84
In Nigeria, we also observe that:
. . .tariff policy, which in colonial times was used as an easy
source of revenue, became increasingly a two-edged sword for simul
taneously protecting infant industries and managing the balance
of payments. Tariff policy has been manipulated by successive go
vernments since 1960 to encourage import substitution in manufac
turing subsidiaries of many MNCs were established in the country,
both for fear of having their products excluded from the large mar
kets by steep custom barrier and for the advantage of exploiting
comfortable tariff protection.85
Therefore, the period of the establishment of these industries
in Nigeria "coincided with the imposition of tariff or increase in
83Chief Festus Okotie Eboh, Federal Government of Nigeria Budget
Speech quoted in Bade Onimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in
Nigeria (London: Zed Press, 1982), 179.
84Ghosh, Industrialization and Development, 2.
850nimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria, 180.
203
tariff."86 Now the issue becomes, Did the import substitution model,
as strategy of development, help activate industrialization or development
to the extent that Nigeria did become, in the words of the plan 'a self-
reliant' nation? In this context, our findings revealed the contrary.
This model further led to the influx of MNCs into the country. The
cumulative impact was that it has only intensified and sustained Ni
gerian technological inertia, as well as underdevelopment politics.
Second, the policy also frustrated whatever African pre-colonial tech
nological resilience was left in the Nigerian nationalism. In sum,
import substitution model only aggravated economic crises in the country
because as further findings indicate:
The present position of import substitution offers no possibility
of transforming the traditional import substitution industries into
export industries for high quality and durable consumption and in
vestment goods which would have a change of being saleable on the
markets of industrialized countries.87
Moreover, contingent on the preceding analysis, our findings
reveal that the indigenization and import substitution model has been
anathema instead of a panacea it was intended to be. The "Gowon's model"
simply intensified further underdevelopment of Nigeria.
The Gowon's model again failed to see Nigerian underdevelopment
problems as structural rather than as a functional problem just like
the first civilian government. To them, the problem was that of
failures of plan implementers whose lack of know-how prevented them
from implementing the development strategies. As far as the economy,
87Novebari Barati and F. Sellow, Perspectives of Strategy of
Collective Import Substitution (Vierteljahesbevichte, Nr 75, 1979),
80.
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GDP and 6NP indicators were increasing, the economy was developing.
Never did it occur to his administration to question the scientific
accuracy of the said indicators from a dialectic and massive national
development standpoint.
In this connection, such question arises as, Why does Nigeria's
economy grow asymmetrically to the penury of our masses? Such an issue
would have pinpointed to them that this was simply growth without develop
ment or at best it is simply a consequence of modernization not real
and even development. Real improvement should have (a) developed the
stultified indigenous industries, (b) indigenous industries replaced
the technical, not just the managerial control in the hands of Ni
gerians, (c) ensured even distribution of income among the proletariat,
and consequently enabled all Nigerians to have equitable opportunity
to acquire the assets of the expatriate firms, but not just functioning
as comprador-bourgeoeisie in an independent Nigeria; and (d) ensured
the re-development and growth of native productivity for export (if
not to the metropole, at least for marketing in the third world, or
Africa per se).
Besides the production of indigenous African commodities should
be incorporated in any development strategy by the government as a con
dition for authorizing any light foreign firms wanting to invest in
the economy. This in the long run would better the quality of African
products in a global market.
Through this strategy, African products would be exported to
world markets and the revenue would, for the most part, be retained
for further development of the economy. Further, the disarticulated
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neo-colonial economy would become a coherent developing Nigerian
political economy. But this was not considered in the indigenization
or the import substitution model, the latter model being vague in ad
dressing this point.
Thus, in terms of what was produced, Nigeria was still
dominated by metropolitan industrial products. At the end of Gowon1s
administration, these products were still produced by metropolitan in
dustrial capitalist firms. The colonial substructure and evolving bu
reaucratic leadership simply existed as guardians of the mother country.
Moreover, this is yet so because the model of development has remained
essentially colonial and metropolitan, unlike the pre-colonial era.
For instance, in terms of income distribution, since there was
"lack of income distribution policy. . .[and] any clear cut directives
on the spread of ownership"88 in the Gowon indigenization model,
there was essentially "apparent lack of an equitable distribution of
assets"89 among all Nigerians. Hence, assets were concentrated in
few hands, and the Nigerian masses were locked out of the economic
benefits. This pattern further intensified class contradictions,
which cut across industrial to bureaucratic agencies. Both within the
lower ranks of the military and the proletariat, there was an uneven
income distribution, which when viewed in the net, was below the sub-
sistent level vis-a-vis that of the Nigerian elite class.
88J. F. Rweyemamu, Industrialization and Income Distribution in
Africa (Dakar, Senegal, 1980J, 182. "
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Synthesis of the Second National Development Plan/Model 1970-74
In view of the preceding tenet by the critics of the Gowon ad
ministration's development strategies for the fiscal 1970-74, that
whereas: (a) the Gowon's open door model allowed for intensification
and exploitation of the economy by metropolitan industries; (b) that
the Gowon's center evolved model did not address the transfer of the
technology that propelled the mother industries in Nigeria to Nigerians,
hence the dominant industries were fundamentally still metropolitan;
(c) that the Gowon's model, by basing the development strategy on the
colonial and metropolitan experience and not a wholistic African or
indigenous experience, only intensified the indigenous technological
arrest and manifest underdevelopment politics of the colonial era.
We assert that the Second National Development model was in praxis a
failure and thus an anathema to the Nigerian masses. Such were the
circumstances which led to the overthrowing of Gowon in a coup of July
21, 1975 and consequently propelled General Muritala Muhammed to power.
The Muritala government inherited the Third National Development
Plan, which was basically an extension of the indigenization policies
of Gowon's plan; or a "product of the Gowon's military/bureaucratic
machine in government [from July 21, 1975].90 The 1975-80 plan stressed
business assistant programs for Nigerians. It also emphasized indigeni
zation measures aimed at containing the domineering and exploitative
excessiveness of the metropolitan industries and corporations. And
whereas the latter was the objective of the Nigerian masses. Its
9OOgbuagu, The Nigerian Indiqenization Policy, 32.
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compromise by the Muritala's military regime would naturally legitimize
and popularize the new leadership. Therefore, the Third Plan appeared
unquestionable by the new military regime. Only its implementation
strategy was considered modifiable to the public. But what significant
extent would this modification take place? And how authentic would
the modification be? An authentic modification would ensure a revi-
talization of indigenous industries, whereas it would utilize, to a
large extent, the pre-colonial development strategies, which generated
developing economies in pre-colonial Nigeria (See Chapter II). As we
found out this critical modification was not the intent of Muritala's
military government. Our findings indicate that in the understanding
of General Muritala's regime, the major obstacle to the national's
economic development centered on control of ownership stock of the
metropolitan industries and multinationals. Thus, if the ownership
of the industries-in terms of stock, at least —could be placed in the
hands of Nigerians while under the same indigenization model of Gowon's
administration, industrial development would become a reality. Hence,
to realize that objective, the Muritala regime promulgated a 1977 in
digenization decree. But in reality, the decree was indeed a supple
ment to the implementation strategy and the objectives of the Third
National Development Plan Gowon designed, as articulated below.
There was no structural difference because he still relied on the
same colonial bureaucracy that legitimized the preceding plans.
Objectives of the Third National Development Plan (TNDP) 1970-80
The Five National Objectives of Nigeria, as identified in the
Second National Development Plan, are not operational magnitudes
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against which the success of a plan can be unambiguously measured.
They do, however, provide a broad view of the ultimate aspirations
of the society. These national objectives are therefore still valid
for the Third Plan. [But] the specific short-term objectives aimed
at facilitating the ultimate realization of the Five National Ob
jectives under the Third Plan are as follows: (1) increase in per
capita income; (2) more even distribution of income; (3) reduction
in the level of unemployment; (4) increase in the supply of high
level manpower; (5) diversification of the economy; (6) balance
development; and (7) indigenization of economic activity.9*
However, in light of the failures of both the indigenization
as well as import substitution strategies of Gowon's administration,
General Muhammed's government appointed a panel of inquiry to re-
examine the Gowon indigenization model, and secondly, to advise the
Federal military government on how best to make the indigenization
program effective; as well as to "plan the methodology and mechanics
of [executing] meaningful and rapid indigenization scheme."92 Based
on the panel's recommendations, "the military government in 1977
promulgated another indigenization law which made major revision and
extension of the 1972 economic policy."93
Consequently, in 1977 the government received the following
yuidelines which emphasized the removal of:
. . .a few economic enterprises with an annual turnover of less
than 2 million from Schedule 2 (of the original 1972 Decree) to
Schedule 1 included wholesale distribution of all locally pro
duced and manufactured goods. Commercial agents or middlemen and
,«,. ^Federal Republic of Nigeria, Third National Development Plan,
1975-8O, Vol. 1 (Lagos: Central Planning Office, Federal Ministry of
Economic Development, 1975), 29-30.
92New Nigeria, Kaduna, 14 July 1976.
93Federal Government of Nigeria, Nigerian Enterprises Promotion
Decree, 1977 Supplement to Official Gazette, 64, No. 2. Part A /Laoos:
Ministry of Information Planning Division, 1977).
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virtually all transportation services in the Schedule 2 were added
thirty-three new economic activities such as commercial, merchant
and development banks, insurance companies, manufacturers of food,
basic iron and still production and petrochemical industries. The
new Schedule 3 included the capital intensive import substitution
industries which were exempted in the original 1972 Decree.94
But what concrete difference would these guidelines ensure? To
determine the latter, an analysis of the Third Plan is sine quo non.
An Evaluation of the Third National Development Plan (TNDP)
In retrospect, the 1977 Decree raised equity share participa
tion of native Nigerian associations in the productive and commercial
sphere of the economy. For instance, "in the Schedule 2 enterprises,
there was to be 60 percent Nigerian participation as against 40 per
cent in the original law [i.e., 1972 Decree]."95 Moreover, "the
very large commercial intensive industries which came under Schedule
3 were required mandatory to allow 40 percent Nigerian participa
tion. "96
Majority of Nigerians did not have the resources as well as the
privilege to buy the stocks of these foreign firms. As a consequence,
income distribution was alarmingly uneven. The latter, in turn, in
tensified and exacerbated class contradictions between the comprador-
bourgeoisie-Nigerians, and the proletariat. There was widespread po
verty among the underclass workers, even in the civil service. While
few Nigerian elite lived alongside foreign industrialists in wealth,
the majority of Nigerians were tied up in poverty. To some members
940gbuagu, The Nigerian Indigenization Policy. 253.
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of the latter class, the pathway to luxury was therefore through cor
ruption. Consequently, dishonesty pervaded the bureaucracy and the
private sector. In spite of the great natural resources of Nigeria,
given the said conditions, the Nigerian masses were still locked up
in penury. Therefore, so long as the colonial type of exploitation
was never contained, the economy was still underdeveloping and inco-
hesive. In sum, the even development hoped for in the 1977 decree
only continued the previous strategies that manifest economic despair.
Synthesis of the Third National Development Model
In light of the preceding analysis of the Third National
Development strategy, we profoundly support the critics' position and
tenet that the Third National (colonial-centric) Development strategy
was a failure because: (a) the anticipated objectives of making the
economy coherent, controlling the metropolitan industries, even income
distribution, reducing unemployment, developing indigenous human re
sources were not realized for the most part; and (b) the supplanted
colonial mode of production and colonial development strategy pre
vailed.
Thus, since the latter was not Africanized in praxis, the
underdevelopment of the indigenous industries and the domination, ex
ploitation of the economy by the metropolitan industries stiffened.
As a result, the penury of the Nigerian masses which the previous
Balewa and Gowon's regimes set to contain but failed continued unabated.
Nigeria was far from being a self-reliant nation.
Therefore the objective of the plan in terms of its realization
turned out to be a fantasy. From the preceding synthesis it becomes
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clear that the colonial oriented industrialization philosophy is a fac
tor of crises in post-colonial Nigeria. And Nigerians were beginning
to be convinced that its continuity will never lead to concrete devel
opment and a self-reliant economy.
In light of these failures, the guidelines of the Fourth National
Development Plan (FNDP) 1980-85, which for purpose distinction, we hereby
characterize as the Neo-classical Model of National Self Reliance, de
fined and stressed what the true national development should be. It
posits as objective thus:
Objective Guideline to the Fourth National Development Plan (FNDP) Stra
tegy (198O-8"5T1
The answer to that question has often been couched in terms of ma
terial things rather than people, in terms of creation, rather than
evolution. True development must mean the development of man—it
is also clear that development does not start with goods the things-
-it starts with people.97
Analysis of the Objective
From this articulation, although this model was an extension
of the Third Development Plan, it stressed the Nigerian "man as the
chief beneficiary of development efforts. In other words, even
development should be related to the development of man, of creating
opportunities for everybody, and this should mean people in towns and
villages and indeed every corner of the country."98
97Federal Republic of Nigeria, Guidelines to the Fourth National
Development Plan, 1980-85.
98Clement Isong, "Spreading the Benefits of Development to All
Nigerians" in Achieving Even Development in Nigeria: Problems and
Prospects, ed. E. I. Nwosu (Lagos: Economic Development Institute,
University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus, Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1985),
4.
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The point is then even development and self-reliant economy were
qualitatively not attained. The achievements of the indigenization
model during the Fourth Development Plan were worse, for the mere fact
that the state tinted its development strategies with Balewa's prototype
"open door policy." In sum, "indigenization failed to meet its primary
objective which was to turn over the stipulated foreign ownership, manage
ment and control of some industries to local Nigerians."99 Thus, in
the final analysis, since the post-colonial development models were
not scientifically indigenized, the latter continued to manifest as
underdevelopment crises. In essence, what these models did was to fur
ther mystify the neo-colonialist grip over the economy, while aggra
vating the contradictions of the colonial industrialization.
Probably, some catastrophical flaw of these development models
has been their continued articulation of development as basically
growth potential, measured in GDP. This, for a post-colonial state,
is deceitful, since in concrete terms, it simply does not mean the de
velopment of what has been underdeveloped, but instead modernization
of the economy. The fact is that:
. . .various post-independence plans have succeeded in making in
creases in the national product . . .; these growth rates
exceed what the developed countries attained during their early
years of development and indeed the long-term growth rate pre
vailing in the developed countries now ranges between 2 and 2.5
percent per year, [thus justifying the states claim that] the
efforts of Nigerian governments have yielded some fruits.100
5-7.
"Ogbuagu, The Nigerian Indiqenization Policy. 265.
100Isong, "Spreading the Benefits of Development to All Nigerians,
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While the contrary is the reality, the penury of the Nigerian
masses remained at just about the same before the flag independence.
Therefore, although "our national income has grown 30 times since 1960,
but [in reality] it is far from certain that the quality of life of
the ordinary Nigerian gripped as he is in the 'vicious circle of poverty1
has improved."101
Because of the articulated failures of the development models,
one of Nigeria's leading dailies characterize the development models
as "cosmetic exploitations of econometric models loaded with nice theo
retical concepts which fail to fulfill the aspirations of the people
in terms of need by the programme lapses."102
In summation, then, since the post-independent development models,
all distilled from the centers capitalist or neo-classical development
model, did not reflect the Nigerian historical materialist experience,
it simply enhanced the center-periphery relationship in Nigeria. This
is why the successive promulgations by the state could not activate
development, but only created optimal conditions for continued opera
tion and exploitation of the economy by foreign monopoly capital in
Nigeria. One source of the trend observed is as follows:
These laws among other things guaranteed to private investors tax-
free holidays, exemption from import duties on machinery and other
components, freedom to repatriate capital and profit and a rela
tively low level of company taxation.103
id., 63.
102Editorial Nigerian Statesman, 1 November 1980.
103"Nigerian Bourgeoisie," The Review of African Political Economy,
No. 13 (May-August 1978): 70.
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Given the innumerable exploitation of the post-colonial Nigerian
economy by MNCs, it was impossible to develop or industrialize Nigeria
under the contemporary development models. Thus Nigerian masses could
not reap the cumulative benefit from the vast natural resources with
which Nigeria is blessed. Therefore, it is not accidental that after
less than ten years of the much-trumpeted Nigerian petroleum boom,
the Nigerian economy continued to manifest such underdevelopment crises
of solvency, that the state became alarmed. Chased by the fear of mas
sive revolt, the leadership resorted to seek a loan of:
. . .one billion U.S. dollars [for instance]* from their main colla
borators in rendering the economy bankrupt. This is, n fact ?he
ideal situation which western mono-capitalism has placed Nigeria
in because the more dependent on them we are for credits to shore
up our own pseudo-capitalist economy, the greater the r own free-
£ SS^Tirta'SSWour whole econom*for their
The final issue then becomes, Could bank loans and foreign
exchange receipts remedy the Nigerian underdevelopment crises looming
looming so impending in the nation? In this context, the reality re
vealed the paradox, that:
. . .foreign exchange receipts from oil, in particular, increased
!°357hSll 9nht-folf,between ™* and 1974 (from N 612§m 11™S£
N 5057 million resulting in a balance of payment surplus in 1974)
foreign exchange expenditures soon caught up and by 1976, Nigeria
experienced the first of a series of growing, large balance of
payment deficits. Thus, oil did not transform Nigeria and the
tinu^d 105 ] COnstra1nt on Ni9eHa economic development Sn-
Emphasis mine.
77' ?For an elaborate appraisal of crimes of economic
105Schatz, "The Nigerian Economy Since the Great Oil Price," 33.
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As a consequence, Nigeria, in the words of Buhari, who took over from
Shagari in coup d'etat at the dawn of 1983, "Nigeria [remained] a debtor
and beggar nation."106
In sum by 1983, the economy was experiencing a serious balance
of trade deficit. The indigenization decree, characterized as NIGERIAN
ENTERPRISES PROMOTION ACT of 1977, has not generated and sustained even
development and growth. The latter Act was designed and implemented
by the military oligopoly with the objective of placing most industrial
control with the Nigerians. This was to be obtained by carving out
certain industrial sectors as vide our Table 4.1 for Nigerians only,
in order to ensure economic development. Industrial control, history
asserted, is synonymous with technological control. But according to
our findings, the technologies and essential expertise that Table 4.1
industries were founded, were for the most part, metropolitan. And
whereas the technological control of the industrial sector, history
has affirmed, means actual ownership, we infer that Nigerians were
merely employees but not their essential owners. As Ankie Hoogvelt
observed, "the indigenization model has been effective mainly as a
device for harmonizing foreign interest with small class of indigenous
entrepreneurs means"107 —the compradors* but what was the impact?
106Revolutionarv Worker. 13 January 1984, 9.
107Ankie Hoogvelt, "Indigenization and Foreign Capital:
Industrialization in Nigeria," Review of African Political Economy,
No. 14 (Jan-Apr 1979), 67. " *
*,
Comprador is a Portuguese concept designating those citizens
organizing foreign traders access to local markets, according to
Teresa Turner (1976:65), Review of African Political Economy, No. 5,
1976.
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Foreign firms in Table 3.2, we found, were still exploiting the
economy. Their exploitation was aggravated by the technological
control and regulation of these industries. Thus, the indigenization
decree failed to reverse the exploitation of colonial capitalism as
other preceding center oriented plans.
In practice:
The implementation of these decrees has left much to be desired
The indigenization decrees have created a few Nigerian merchant'
capitalists and worsened the distortion of income distribution
Throughout most of this period was an ever increasing and largely
unsatiated consumer of scarce economic resources, and it
contributed little of its return to the economy in terms of
productive services.108
Consequently, by 1983, Nigeria's "foreign debt added up to $14
billion, making Nigeria the largest debtor nation in all of Africa.
Every measure taken to alleviate it only intensified it."109 The
latter had been echoed by General Buhari's military leadership as the
raison d'etre for their seizing the leadership from a republican govern
ment of President Shagari. The Shagari's government had continued on
development strategies of his predecessors. Hence, his leadership
could not resolve an evolving crisis of colonial capitalism and politics
of underdevelopment. As the only viable option, his government per
ceived to seek development aids from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). The latter traditionally insisted that the beggar government
undertake austerity measures, such as cutting all other government
108Akin Iwayemi, "The Military and The Economy" in Niaerian
Government and Politics Under Military Rule. 1966-7Q. ed Oye lye
uyediran (New York: MacMillan Publishers, 1984), 47-48.
109Revolutionar.y Worker. 13 January 1984, 9.
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spending and quotas, otherwise there would be no loans or "aids." With
no remedy in sight, Shagari complied.
This was the austerity program Shehu Shagari began to unveil
before he was overthrown in 1983 by General Buhari in a coup d1 etat.
The critical question here is, had the coup failed and the
Shagari's government remained in power to implement the austerity pro
gram, would he had been successful?
What is historically noteworthy of the austerity model are its
center base and manifest "open door" economic strategy. This strategy
historically allows for a proliferation of local markets, like Nigeria,
with metropolitan industries and commodities, and manifest dominance
of the indigenous industries and consequently containment of the de
velopment and growth of the beginning of nation state. Thus, Shagari's
national development plan failed practically to contain foreign ex
ploitation as anticipated. This led to the outsting of Shagari's govern
ment.
With the overthrow of Shagari's leadership came into power
General Buhari. The latter1s administration positioned to reverse the
crises of underdevelopment but its strategy was in essence the develop
ment philosophy of the preceding administration. Buhari's leadership
again failed to question the causality of failure of the preceding ad
ministration's development models. A critical analysis of the latter
and a profound juxtaposition with the historical development strate
gies of the center would have revealed the contrary. It would have
compromised the universal development historiographical assertion that
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only an authentic indigenous development model could inspire in
developing en masse. Moreover, such a critical revisit to historical
development models would have affirmed that the golden epoch of Nigeria/
Africa was attained when indigenous development strategies were imple
mented in the pre-colonial era. (See Chapter II).
This lack of revistation into the past failing strategies of
his predecessors frustrated Buhari's effort to contain the crises.
By the failure of Buhari's neo-classical based development models to
contain dominance or excessives of the MNCs, the siphoning of the MNCs
surplus value needed for development of industrial projects was con
tinued unabated just as before the flag independence. As a consequence,
the Nigerian economy by the dawn of the 1980s was in shambles. As eco
nomic crises intensified, Buhari's administration was overthrown and
replaced by another military leadership headed by General Babangida.
By 1989, the new leadership of General Ibrahim Babangida opted
from indigenization strategy to privatization strategy. To that effect,
PRIVATIZATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION ACT was promulgated by July 5, 1988.
This Act sought to privatize federal government enterprises. This im
plied that the comprador class in the leadership would be contained.
But the fundamental issue the government failed to resolve was
whether or not an objective containment of the compradors would guaran
tee the control of foreign exploiters and their metropolitan capital.
And could the latter be realized under the center-based development
plans? In the absence of this critical question and the implementation
of the Privatization Act, the government failed again to inspire anti
cipated development. As a result, the economy at the end of 1990 could
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not overcome underdevelopment crises. This prompted the designing of
a three year development plan called "Guidelines for the National
Rolling Plan" which was scheduled for implementation from 1990-92.
This plan was to adjust the economic structure of Nigeria to the point
of self-reliance. According to the government:
2/s s:
JSSP 9 CUrrent high 1nc1de"ce of unemployment,
growth.'llO ""wary ™* the attainment of self-sustaining
What is noteworthy here is the government placing the back the
economy in the hands of metropolitan capitalists. Historically, insofar
as the ownership and control of assembly type industries rested in the
center, the circle of colonial exploitation and politics of underdevel
opment is bound to be unbroken.
In the final analysis, our study inferred that, Nigeria's
underdevelopment crises, such as unemployment, lack of self-sustaining
growth, insidious coup d' etats, the post-colonial development models,
which are essentially metropolitan, only aggravated the exploitation
of colonial capitalism and continued unabated because of continued de
velopment planning errors.
These essential errors are summed up by Mwalimu Julius Nyerere
thus:
tK?nabtn1fn?iT)riS J?ve/esulted fr™ too closely following -
trying to follow - the European models of political, economic,
c of Nigeria, Guidelines for the National
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bSLd^JhlTlr or9anjza^'o". Our independence constitutions,
based on these of our colonial masters, ignored (and for the most
Rffi.rs.iSS!fttle with our h1itof* °- **°™^y> oS 7o-
Thus, we resolve a hypothesis that the failure to Africanize
the post-colonial development strategies frustrates the resolution of
underdevelopment crises or authentic and sustained development in post-
colonial Nigeria.
Our position is validated by omni development historiography
which asserted that the fundamental fact and factors of sustained de
velopment in a society is founded, for the most part, in the authentic
indigenous experiences of that society. In the wake of the affirmed
failures in development strategies, the colonial substructure and
evolving superstructure grows in the reality of deepening underde
velopment crises. Could this deepening crisis and the inability of
post-colonial leadership be a consequence of evolving and sustained
colonial superstructure by the post-colonial regimes? This would be
our focus in our final hypothesis in our next chapter. Our final
hypothesis states that the perpetuation of colonial superstructure by
"post-independence" regimes catalyzed politics of underdevelopment in
Nigeria.
UlAfrican Commentary, May 1990, 4. President Nyerere's
address to the Economic Commission for Africa in 1988.
CHAPTER V
THE IMPACT OF EVOLVING COLONIAL SUPERSTRUCTURE
ON POST-INDEPENDENCE NIGERIA
In the preceding chapters, our findings resolved that pre-co-
lonial Nigeria or Africa en masse was an historically, developing or
civilizing until the dawning of colonialism. Our Chapter II affirmed
that upon colonialism, the colonist mechanically and systematically
implanted colonial capitalism in Nigeria by 1861. Consequently, the
latter catalyzed to suppress, contain, dominate, disarticulate, trans
form and integrate a coherent and developing indigenous feudal mode
of production (at a potential stage of transition to the indigenous
capitalism or socialism) with the center. This unequal integration
reduced the developing pre-colonial economy of Nigeria to a mere un-
derdeveloping satellite of the center. Thus, an authentic trans
formation from the feudal to capitalistic or socialistic economies
was stalled.
The latter modes of production, omni development history has
affirmed, is the next stage after the feudal mode. Historically, in
societies en masse, "there have been five major types of production
relationships known to man — communism, slavery, feudalism, capi
talism, and socialism.1
Nkrumah, Class Struggle in Africa (New York: Interna
tional Publishers, 1981), 13.
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Based on our preceding findings in Chapters II and III, pre-colonial
Nigeria/Africa did transform on its own through the preceding modes
until the pre-capitalist or socialist stage. The pre-capitalist stage
or the feudal mode featured flourishing kingdoms, empires and states.
This is the epoch that transformation to capitalism or socialism would
have been realized in Nigeria, but became stalled by colonialism.
Colonialism contained further transformation by imposing colonial ca
pitalism on the indigenous economy.
Based on the preceding facts and caveats, it follows that if
pre-colonial Nigeria (or Africa) has been historically and syste
matically transforming on its own, it primarily would have naturally
evolved either indigenous model of capitalism or socialism. Second,
it would have developed an indigenous capitalist or socialist rela
tions of production. These relations, history has affirmed, deter
mines a fact and manifest factors of quality capitalism or socialism
respectively.
Thus, whereas these social relations historically evolve from
the dominant mode of production, it follows that in such a natural
development, the evolving superstructure with inherent elite and lea
dership would have developed the pre-colonial societies into sovereign
developing states of Africa. This organic leadership would have been
committed to making Nigeria be and become like the centers. There
fore, we deduce that for authentic and even development to be realized,
there must be an authentic leadership whose mode of leadership evolves
from its indigenous mode of production. Social relations of production
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are based on a particular brand or mode of production. For instance,
as Eaton's findings indicate:
In the social production which men carry on, they enter into de
finite relations that are indispensable and independent of their
will. These relations of production correspond to a definite stage
of development. Of these relations of production constitutes the
economic structure of society - the real foundation on which rise
the legal and political superstructures [social institutions]*
and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness2
Indigenous developing mode of production would have meant even
development. But the latter was stalled by the colonist capitalism.
Thus, the colonial capitalism basically catalyzed the process of eco
nomic osmosis which drained and underdeveloped the flourishing pre-
colonial economy of Nigerians to supplement the magnitude of funda
mental capitalist development of the center. Consequently, the indi
genous feudal mode of production became disarticulated and unequally
integrated as an underdeveloping satellite of the center since the
Nigeria's indigenous mode of production, to a large extent, ceased
to be. Indigenous substructural and superstructural inertia became
a reality.
Hence, at independence in 1960, the post-colonial leadership,
itself being an outcropping of nationalism which protested the ex-
cessives of colonial capitalism, promised to contain or reverse colo
nial capitalism. And in its place, the post-independent leadership
promised to design and implement strategies which would reactivate
*Emphasis mine.
2John Eaton, Political Economy (New York: International Pub
lishers, 1966), 18.
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the stalled indigenous, once developing mode of production. Such
strategy claimed would inspire concrete and even development. To that
end, the post-colonial governments en masse separately developed stra
tegies which they explained to the masses, would contain the dominancy
and exploitation of colonial capitalism. But as our findings in Chapter
IV indicated, it failed.
Furthermore, whereas an authentic mode of production, history
has affirmed, in any society and even in the centers, is a fact and
manifest factors of sustained development and growing economy, it
follows that only an indigenous evolved development strategy would
have resolved underdevelopment and contain underdevelopment problems
in Nigeria. But because the development and implementation of the
latter was negated, according to our findings in Chapter IV, under
development abounds in Nigeria. Therefore, the post-colonial de
velopment plans continuously failed to reactivate or revitalize the
pre-colonial mode of production because they were, to a large extent,
based on the center's experience or capitalist development strategy
for the colonies. The center's colonial capitalist development stra
tegies were meant to retain and exploit Nigeria as an appendage or
dependency of the center.
In retrospect, the center oriented plans did not transform
a capitalist dependency of Nigeria into an independent capitalism,
capable of competing efficiently and effectively with the center.
Such a transformation, history has affirmed, would have been pos
sible had the post-colonial superstructure or social institutions,
for the most part, been indigenized. And whereas the economic
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structure is a base upon which social institutions and ideas arise
-- such as social, academic, and political institutions, and the latter
evolves a particular form of consciousness, it follows then that only
a concrete indigenization of the colonial substructure and superstruc
ture would contain colonial capitalism and politics of underdevelopment
in Nigeria.
The preceding findings, deductions and caveats, to this point,
which affirm that:
(a) pre-colonial Nigeria experienced and sustained development
when its substructure and evolving "societies institutions" were indi
genous;
(b) that underdevelopment in contemporary Nigeria is a conse
quence of restructuring the indigenous substructure and societies insti
tutions into a unique colonial of economy;
(c) that the development strategies or plans designed and
utilized by colonial government fundamentally institutionalized colo
nial capitalism by disarticulating, integrating, dominating and exploit
ing the developing pre-colonial economies in Nigeria.
(d) that the post-independent development strategies utilized
by post-colonial regimes which, to a large extent, were distilled from
the colonial and metropolitan development strategies, have significantly
failed to contain the center's exploitation and reverse underdevelopment
in contemporary Nigeria.
Thus, whereas, the above factors are inherent in the colonial
superstructure which has not been indigenized since independence, we
conclusively hypothesize - that the perpetuation of colonial super-
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structure by post-colonial regimes catalyzed politics of underdevelop-
ment in Nigeria. Our hypothesis evolves from a historical position
that the pre-colonial substructure of Nigeria manifested essential
superstructure from which arose spontaneous leadership, which orga
nized flourishing societies, kingdoms and empire-states until the
dawning of colonialism in 1861.
In light of this assertion and caveat, the striking issues
become: why and how have Nigeria's post-colonial leadership failed
to indigenize the colonial superstructure in spite of the failures
of metropolitan-based post-independent strategies to reverse under-
development? And, on what basis do we hypothesize that indigeni-
zation of colonial superstructure would contain colonial capitalism
and politics of underdevelopment in "independent" Nigeria?
A resolution of these issues fundamentally is the resolution
of our hypothesis. Consequently, it would suggest a viable and authen
tic theory for the development and growth of Nigeria. To that aim
a reminiscent and epitomization of our preceding findings on pre-co
lonial and colonial substructure is profound and fundamental. Such
a reflection would enable us to assert the historical and essential
position of colonial superstructure in a post-colonial state like Ni
geria, and most of "independent" Africa. In retrospect, a revisit
to historiography of colonial superstructure and findings therefrom
resolved that: in a post-colonial state like Nigeria, the evolving
superstructure at independence is an outcropping of the mother sub
structure. Second, whereas historiography of developing economies
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en masse, resolved that any superstructure or the societies institu
tions is a consequence of the mother substructure, it follows that
the dominant societies institutions or superstructure in post-inde
pendent Nigeria would be a satellite of the mother experience or cul
ture. Thus, whereas a superstructure is a composite of essential so
cieties leadership, it naturally follows that the essential leadership
class to be in post-colonial Nigeria has to be an embodiment of the
mother culture. Third, whereas the superstructure is a fact of so
ciety's genuine cultured personalities and whereas the universal in
stitution that evolves the position, it follows therefore that the
institutionalization of the center school satellite was considered
sine qua non by the colonial administration.
Moreover, whereas omni historiography affirms that the leader
ship in any society is a manifestation of the dominant mode of pro
duction, by virtue of the fact that they are an outcropping of that
society's institutions and culture, it follows therefore that in a
colonial setting the native elite are historically an embodiment of
the mother culture. Hence, in colonial Nigeria, since the dominant
mode of production was colonist capitalism, which our findings have
affirmed, post-independent elite in Nigeria, for the most part, per
sonified the mother ethos.
Second, whereas the colonist recognized the above tenet as
a fact and evolving factors consolidating their grip over a colony,
an establishment of an essential English cultural institutions was
a prima facie in colonial Nigeria.
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Thus, in the process of institutionalizing colonial capi
talism in Nigeria, the British crown systematically replaced and
dominated the indigenous societies institutions and culture with the
centers. To that end, an establishment of schools was a priority.
Nwafor Orisu recalled --
English schools were established in Nigeria and young boys at
tended these with one ambition: to learn enough to become clerks
Sn tfrpre*rSi*2r emPlo^ees of European traders. From these
pinnacles they thence forward surveyed their ancestral culture
with contempt, obeying no laws and observing no rules but the
Englishman s. This contempt for cultures and institutions of
their own people then became a sign of "education." The educated
class became a "new privileged" class - privileged because they
felt themselves above the elders, above the Nigerian diet, above
the Nigerian attire, above the Nigerian form of marriage, above
the people s ceremonies, in fact above Nigeria - [customs and
traditions] . . .This class now exploits the masses. It has no
use for the poor and underprivileged millions of the country
. . . they prefer it [the latter] to returning to a creative
aspect of Nigerian life - the reclamation and acceptance of
things Nigerian, the construction of new institutions upon the
best in the old ways added to new ideas.3
Thus, the post-independence leadership became committed to
utilizing the center-based development plan. In order to institutio
nalize the colonist culture, and thereby effectively sustain the cen
ter's capitalism, schools were developed.
These schools would now develop into contemporary academies
and manifest superstructures in Nigeria. As articulated by Orizu,
the educated class being colonial by orientation has yet to indigenize
the colonial superstructure.
In retrospect, findings by Ebitimi Chikwendu reveals that:
3See Nwafor Orizu in Martin Kilson, Independent Africa (New
York: Vintage Books, 1970), 65-66.
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in the waning years of the 1970s because the quality of our cur
rent education for the upliftment of our nations and race falls
short of our developmental needs ... our education is directed
towards the wrong set of goals; it is focused on the creation of
urban-based institutions, oriented towards interaction with wes
tern capitalist institutions. The staff of these institutions
[for the most part]*, a small but inefficient middle class of lo
cal agents are trained along capitalist, liberal-democratic ide
ological lines to uphold unachievable models of western develop
ment. The western model is unachievable because while the west
operates capital intensive technology, with the underdeveloped
world as the hopeless dumping ground for their contaminated sur
pluses, we, in Africa are faced with reality of a capital short,
labor intensive society with no recourse to captive European market.
Thus, colonial education has grossly failed to civilized authen
tically post-colonial Nigeria. Colonial "education" has remained
relatively conservative and stagnant, geared to the needs and self-
image of a restricted elite. Education has lost its dynamic in
novative and change-oriented potential. The recipients of such
education are incapable of bringing about far reaching social and
economic changes because the broader strata of society are denied
full participation in a common political system.4
In Nigeria and the rest of former British colonies in Africa,
such education targeted to create an indigenous elite class to embody
and continue the structural functional ism of the center was a common
place. In retrospect, our findings revealed that through colonial
education:
European-style elites — discerned among the African [or Ni
gerian] bourgeoisie. Under colonialism, the Africans were chiefs
in the colonial legislative councils, and in the colonial admini
strative services; lawyers and doctors; judges and magistrates;
top civil servants; senior army and police officers. After in
dependence, the old elites remained virtually in tact, and ac
quired greater strength. The position of members of Parliament,
national assemblies, cabinet ministers, top civil servants, senior
*Emphasis mine.
4Yolamu Barango, Political Science in Africa (London: Zed
Books, Ltd., 1985), 38:
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army officers and so on were enhanced. They were no longer sub
ordinate to colonial authority. For example, [most]* teachers
lawyers and doctors - emerged [as]* the "party nouveaux riches,"
an elite which developed from among the ranks of the party which
successfully won political freedom from the colonial power. .
. .They exploit their new positions of power and indulge in nepo
tism and corruption, thereby discrediting the party and helping
to pave the way for reactionary coups de e'tat.5
Thus, the evolving elite has no need of committing the government
to authentic Africanization of the superstructure. A concrete indigeni-
zation of the latter would naturally, create by education functional
literates and leadership, as in the pre-colonial civilizations, essen
tial or committed to even development of Nigeria/Africa. In fact,
our findings in Chapters II and III affirmed the latter.
Pre-colonial African education was relevant to Africans. It had
close links with social life. And it was directly connected with
the purpose of society. By contrast, colonial education did not
grow out of Africa; neither was it designed to promote the most
rationale use of material and social resources. It was not an
educational system designed to give confidence and pride to young
people as members of African societies. Instead colonial schooling
was education for subordination, exploitation, the creation of
mental confusion and the development of underdevelopment.6
Hence, after independence, the evolving elite just exploited
the nation as did the colonist. The government development plans are
center-oriented as well as the superstructure. In retrospect, after
independence, and with the implementation of development plans — in
digenous business enterprise, local budding capitalists, to some extent,
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tions connected with the receipt of so-called "aid " The Afri-
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Thus, because of the latter benefits realized by the post-in
dependent elite, there has been no profound and an authentic Africa
nization of the essential superstructure. Therefore, the colonial
superstructure continues and becomes more institutionalized in co
lonist traditions of exploitation. For instance, in Nigeria, the
post-colonial "ruling class" owns and controls the means of production
by virtue of economic power thus conferred upon it, to use the state
as its instrument for the domination of society.8
In view of our findings, the consequences of unauthentic Afri
canization of the superstructure become a profound and fundamental
issue.
Consequences of Perpetuation of Colonial Superstrnrturp
in Post-Independent Niglria
As we reflect on our current disorders, we are struck forcibly
by the ommpresence of those Nigerians conventionally referred
to as intellectuals, we are struck not merely by their prominence
but alas by their notoriety, by their opportunism, the pa™chi2l!
innL aEVhe ne9atiYi^ of t"eir activity. To those persons who
hope that greater diffusion of education will carry with it a
?Huaatr/W?rene!S and civil1t*» the present activity of the most
educated elements in society must seem a betrayal of hopes We
a?W?SI^a;;VVhe T6!!* bea i l r'
m a betrayal of hopes W
V h ' cause' n ar9e measu e,'our
leaders of thought have put us there.
Ukpabi Asika 1967
c, e?NkS?af» Class Struggle (New York: International Publi-
sners, iy/uj, 45.
8Ralph Mini band, The State in Capitalist Society (New York-
Basic Books, Inc. Publishers, 1961), 23.
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In retrospect, further findings reveal that in post-independent
Nigeria or Africa at large, the African elite or:
that rich and politically influential Africans have no nationwide
base in production because productive industrial capital remains
largely in foreign hands while foreign firms also remain dominant
in the market. Hence, self-sustaining economic growth seems remote
and the economy is inefficient and deformed, "a kind of drain for
the outflow of surpluses."9
This drain in our findings is the catalyst of economic osmoses,
inherent in colonial capitalism. It manifests politics of underdevel-
opment in the leadership.
In fact, we find that in Nigeria:
. . .it is this elite bourgeoisie that is subordinated by foreign
capital and dependent upon it, yet seeking its own space in typi
cal entrepreneurial fashion, Nigerian compradonism has not pre
vented the growth of sectors of the [colonial]* economy.10
Further findings eclipsed any hope of optimism of ending the
post-colonial crises insofar as the contemporary academic system re
mains colonial. In fact, the crises is well positioned by Chief
Semeon Adebo, on the occasion of his retirement as chairman of the
National Universities Commission. Adebo, succinctly, has this to
say:
I don't think what is coming out of our universities is satis
factory at all. They are indolent in public life. They don't
think and teach themselves. We are producing intellectual ro
bots. 11




nYusufu Bala Usman, For the Liberation of Nigeria (London:
New Beacon Books, Ltd., 1978), 241.
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Hence, albeit the post-colonial elite dominantly evolve from
Nigerian universities which are colonial and metropolitan oriented
and dominated the post-colonial superstructure, they remain essentially
cultured in the colonist customs and tradition of exploitation; their
nation just like the center. The latter is a fact of politics of un-
derdevelopment since the Nigerian academia is a creation of Britain
and had not been indigenized or authentically Africanized since in
dependence in 1960. Thus, the functional ism of the elite is that of
robots for the center. A human robot, according to Usman (1978:241)
is "somebody whose structure of motivation and thoughts makes him or
her incapable of thinking, feeling or extending to the very objectives
of his thinking and action and existence."12
Therefore crises abound the post-colonial political system
today because there is yet to be an authentic Africanization of the
academia which produces even in the developing centers, which under-
developing countries like Nigeria commits to emulate the elite that
dominates its national politics. A concrete Africanization of the
superstructure would have fundamentally meant a re-establishment of
indigenous paradigm and manifest indigenous scientific mode of pro
duction, essential for the civilization of post-independent Ni
gerians. Such was the paradigm in pre-colonial Africa and it is a
historical fact of development of the center. But the abandonment
or uncommittedness of the post-colonial leadership consequently
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breeds, to a large extent, miseducated elite and uncommitted lea
dership in contemporary Nigeria.
This crisis of miseducation is highlighted by Usman when he
says:
Teaching and research in the majority of disciplines in Nigerian
universities involve uncritical imbibing of concepts and theories
accepted in Britain and America. The notion of economic man, cen-
trality of demand and supply, analysis (party system) believed
so unquestionably by many Nigerian economists are only held outside
dependencies like Nigeria . . . what you have are backward robots
increasingly . . performing the function set for them by their
masters [or the center]*13 J
Hence, there is no marked even development in the post-colonial
economy of Nigeria. In every respect it seems the contention of Bel
gian Lieutenant General Emile Janssons that in Congo "before indepen
dence [is same as]* after independence"14 in Africa is becoming a
reality in contemporary Nigeria. And this has remained a reality be
cause the colonist educational system is not as civilizing as the ci
vilizing educational system of pre-colonial era (See Chapters II and
III - Colonial Education), but for the most part was a "repressive
education" and such is its manifest in post-independent academia of
Nigeria.
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. . .formulated and administered by an administration desirous
of extending its dominant ideas and thought process to us. We
wee trained to be inferior copies of Englishmen, caricatures to
be laughed at with our pretentions to British bourgeoise gentil
ity, our grammatical faultiness and distorted standards betray
ing us at every turn. . . .we denied knowledge of our African
past and informed that we had no present . . .what future could
they be for us? We were taught to regard our culture and tra
ditions as barbarous and primitive. Our textbooks were [and
are dominantly today]* English textbooks, telling us about En
glish history. English geography, English ways of living, En
glish ideas.15
Thus, Nigerian/African elite, civil or military remained largely
committed to the institutionalization of colonial capitalism. They
manifest theories that sustain satellite capitalist growth in Nigeria.
Regrettably, further studies affirmed that in reality in Nigeria, al
though the African bourgeoisie is small numerically and lacks the fi
nancial and political strength of its counterparts in highly industri
alized countries, it gives the illusion of being economically strong
because of its close tie-up. According to Nkrumah:
. . .with foreign finance, capital and business interests. Many
members of African bourgeoisie are employed by foreign firms and
have, therefore, a direct financial stake in the continuance of
the foreign economic exploitation of Africa. Others notably in
the civil service, trading and mining firms, the armed forces,
the police, and in the professions, are committed to capitalism
because of their backgrounds, their western education, their
shared experiences and enjoyment of positions of privileges. They
are mesmerized by capitalist institutions and organizations. They
are the way of life of their old colonial masters and are deter
mined to preserve the status and power inherited from them.16
Thus, the superstructure remained the same for the most part since
independence.
*Emphasis mine.
15Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (New York: International
Publishers, 1963), 43.
16Nkrumah, Class Struggle. 12.
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Historically, the post-colonial elite and evolving leadership,
as depicted by the social functional ism of the various regimes that
we analyzed in Chapter IV are evidently self-contradictory. Both the
military and the civilian governments seek to retain their compradoral
esprit de corps and evolving exploitative class relationships with
the center, instead of developing authentic development strategies
for redevelopment of the society as was the case in the pre-colonial
era. Consequently, the military regimes and civil governments became
political adversaries and never compatriots. But whereas the military
has the "guns," they dictate and contain the civil leadership. In
fact:
the occasional creation under military auspices of national "po
litical" parties is evidence, however, that the army is
sometimes aware of its quasi isolation from the bulk of the popu
lation and seeks the legitimization that might be gained through
such structures. On the other hand, fearful that any such "libe
ralization" might snowball into a demand by their own "parties"
that they step down from power, military juntas have seen to it
that the political organs created to date have either been paper
structures or under their tight control.17
Thus, the post-colonial leadership simply are non-representa
tive of the masses. They govern without a mandate from the people.
Such mandate was a custom and political tradition in pre-colonial so
cieties of Nigeria/Africa. In fact, further findings indicate that:
[in post-colonial] Africa, where economic development is uneven,
a wide variety of highly sophisticated political systems were in
existence over many centuries before the colonial period began.
. . .The political maturity of African masses may, to some extent,
17Samuel Decalo, Coups and Military Rule in Africa. Studies
in Military Style (London: Yale University Press, 1977), 33.
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be traced to economic and social patterns of traditional times.
. . .Chiefs were strictly controlled by counselors for legitimate
representatives of the masses]* and were removable.18
In retrospect, the contemporary factional leadership and oppor
tunist politics of underdevelopment, uncustomary of pre-colonial Nigeria
became the order of colonial epoch. Hence,
at the end of the colonial period, there was. . .a highly developed
state machine. . .and a veneer of parliamentary democracy concealing
a coercive state run by elite bureaucrats with practically unlimited
power. . . .There was an intelligentsia, completely indoctrinated
with western values. . . .professional army and police force with
an officer corps largely trained in western military academies;
and chieftaincy used to administering at local level on behalf
of the colonial government.19
Today, this colonial-oriented elite, which manifests contempo
rary leadership continuously serves the metropolitan interest as in
the colonial era as compradors. Hence, they have not committed to
authentic Africanization of the superstructure. Therefore, whereas
the latter remains, to a large extent, westernized (i.e., British
bureaucracy persists) this perpetuation of colonial superstructure
by post-colonial regimes exacerbates politics of underdevelopment in
Nigeria.
In Nigeria, contrary to timely euphoria which successive mili
tary regimes, traditionally inculcate in the unpoliticized masses:
military regimes have not proven more than their civilian counter
parts and remain tied to the financial apron strings of metropolitan
countries and the west creating a neo-colonial relationship.
*Emphasis mine.
18Nkrumah, Class Struggle, 13.
19Ibid, 16.
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In the final analysis, in military regimes, . . .stability - the
ultimate justification for military rule is not a necessity outcome
of the replacement of bickering and plotting civilian leaders by
a military junta. . .a detailed analysis of features and charac
teristics of army rule. . .validated by scholars validate a negative
image of military elites in office. The specific army faction
that initiates the coup, and the officer corps, in general, is
neither more cohesive, nationalist, progressive, nor self-denying
than the civilian clique being toppled. While there is no reason
to doubt the sincerity and good intentions of some military leaders
(especially in the earlier phase of coups) their motives for inter
vention have always been complex and included personal considerations
or corporate motives camouflaged. Once in power, military leaders
have not been able to resolve the socioeconomic and political issues
facing them; many are linked to external factors outside their
control.^0
Thus, from the preceding analysis, we deduce that whereas the
postcolonial leadership is evolving personification of the colonial
superstructure, they essentially perpetuate the latter. Consequently,
they align themselves to a large extent with the centers to continue,
unabetted the exploitation of the Nigerian masses. Therefore, albeit
the physical presence of the colonist is missing since independence
in 1960, the character colonial political economy remains essentially
the same. In post-independent economy colonial mode of production
becomes fully established or institutionalized. Therefore by mecha
nical institutionalization of colonial capitalism and evolving British
culture as a universal model of development and civility, most educated
Nigerians who sought universal recognition as elite, mobilized to em
brace colonial philosophy and ethics in their post-colonial status
and roles. Through this elite from which evolved most post-colonial
leadership, colonial superstructure, such as bureaucracy was sustained
and vitalized.
20Samuel Decalo, Coups, 36-37.
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Consequently, British ethics was celebrated as a high culture
by most elite and leadership. British culture was embraced as a fact
of national development and growth worthy of sustenance and emulation.
Hence, there was no revolutionary uprising for concrete transformation
of the superstructure by the leadership. As a result the colonial
status quo was maintained. Through the latter the center continued
to control and exploit post-colonial Nigeria.
Thus, Great Britain was able to overcome all serious challenges
to its superiority.21 The crown's control and exploitation were to
Nigeria as the king is to feudalism, the colonial position that some
humane British disliked.
Britain's behavior in Nigeria was not different from her im
perialism in the 18th century which her foremost political philosopher
Burke dreaded in 1793. In revisiting British imperialism, Burke has
this to say:
. . .1 dread our own power and our ambition. I dread our beina
too much being dreaded. It is ridiculous to say we are not men,
and that as men we shall never wish to aggrandize ourselves, in
some way or other. Can we say that even at this very hour we
are not invidiously aggrandized? We are already in possession
of almost all the commerce of the world. . .absolutely able
... to hold the commerce of all other nations totally depen
dent upon our good pleasure.22
In the ultimate analysis: Great Britain. . . with cultural im
perialism. . .won a more complete victory. . .on a more stable
ground than any military conqueror or economic master. . .by per
suasiveness of a superior culture and a more attractive political
philosophy." r
21Hans J. Morgenthan, Politics among Nations: The Struqqle




In the last analysis, our findings deduced that the perpet
uation of colonial superstructure by post-colonial regimes is the ful
crum around which the metropole spins Nigeria in politics of under-
development. As a consequence, post-colonial Nigeria, for the most
part is still a colonial capitalist satellite. The economic, social
and political crises of the colonial era abound the nation as a vicious
circle today.
Today, Nnamdi Azikiwe's reflection on the colonial era holds
true and prophetic. In the colonial era Zik stated:
5?!:,1?!1*1 *5S Ogre °f ?oc1al segregation makes it extremely dif
ficult for the colomal to develop his personality to the full
™^m"\ \;1S ll'mited J° the Privileged. Hospitals are not
JJ»« -J 2 Jf6 9reat "Umber Of people' but onl^ t0 a negligible
minority. Public services are lacking in many respects. There
are not sufficient water supplies, surfaced roads, postal services
and communication systems in most communities in Nigeria The
prisons are medieval, the penal code is oppressive and reliqious
freedom is a peace of great price. Economically, the colonial
people have been made to appreciate that colonial possessions
constitute "underdeveloped estates" specially reserved as a le
gacy for the exploitation by control. . . .as a dumping ground.
. .of the protecting states.24 fas
Thus in light of the preceding findings and evolving caveats,
we ultimately resolved our final hypothesis that - THE POST-COLONIAL
SUPERSTRUCTURE BY POST-COLONIAL LEADERSHIP has only mechanically in-
stitutionized and exacerbates the growth colonial with metropolitan
capitalism in post-independent Nigeria.
In the final analysis with the resolution of our final hypo
thesis, the striking and demanding issue becomes what do we deduce
of +hf2^u ^elive^ed by Nnandi Azikiwe at the Plenary session
of the British Peace Congress in London, October 23, 1949, Wilfred
Cartey, Independent Africa. 1970. ""rrea
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to generalize about the causality of underdevelopment in post-inde
pendent Nigeria. To that end a revisitation or the synthesis of our
respective hypothesis is highly indispensable.
CONCLUSION AND FUNDAMENTAL REMEDY
HYPOTHESIS REVISITED
In light of underdevelopment crises which have dominated post-
colonial Africa at large, and its composite confederate nation, of
Nigeria in particular, we decided to revisit a holistic historio
graphy or Africa at large and Nigeria in particular — pre-colonial
and colonial. Our intention here was to determine the causality and
character of contemporary underdeveloping economies of "independent
Africa." To that end, we tentatively assembled and critically jaxta-
positioned the historiography of sovereign pre-colonial Africa, and
compared it with colonial Africans.
In our critical exploratory analysis we found tentative fact
and factors which suggested that PRE-COLONIAL AFRICA was civilizing
or developing on its own before European adventurism and colonization
of the continent, vis-a-vis an imperial implantation of colonial ca
pitalism on indigenous mode of production (see Chapter II). Thus,
we tentatively articulated that whereas sovereign Africa was developing
until the creation of colonial Africa probably, colonial capitalism
is the causality for underdeveloping historically developing pre-co
lonial Africa. Hence, colonial capitalism probably has correlation
to politics of underdevelopment in Africa since emancipation; and
whereas Nigeria personifies much of eminent pre-colonial societies
and kingdoms such as (a) the Yoriba's whom elimological connection
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to pre-colonial star civilization of Egypt, and (b) the Hausas' whose
population is widespread in pre-colonial and colonial Africa are his
torically affirmed, we considered Nigeria as a fundamental case study
whose findings would have a profound fundamental and significant impact
on African development strategies beyond this century.
In light of the latter, we hypothesized viz: (a) that colonial
capitalism catalyzed contradictions of underdevelopment crises in post-
colonial Africa; (b) that failure to Africanize the post-colonial de
velopment strategies frustrate the resolution of underdevelopment cri
ses, or authentic and sustained development in post-colonial Nigeria;
(c) that the perpetuation colonial superstructure by "post-indepen
dence regimes catalyzed politics of underdevelopment. And whereas
our findings and evolving caveats have affirmed these hypothesis in
Chapters II, III and IV respectively, we resolved that colonial ca
pitalism, as personified by Nigeria is the causality of politics of
underdevelopment in post-colonial Africa. In light of the latter
generalization, the critical and fundamental question becomes, how
do we contain these crises? How do we generate political development
in Nigeria and post-colonial Africa? What is a viable way out? These
issues call for a realistic and scientific strategy which historically
did catalyzed authentic development in pre-colonial Nigeria and Africa
at large, with a potentiality of accommodating by containment, the




According to history, leadership is a cultural fulcrum around
which national fate rotates. Thus, leadership is a manifestation
of the dominant societies culture. Therefore a leadership that does
not embody the dominant culture of the majority is a pseudo and vicious
leadership. A reminiscent to history asserts that effective leadership
is a manifestation of the dominant mode of production by virtue of
its being an outcropping of the superstructure. Hence, it objectively
follows that only an authentic leadership could inspire concrete devel
opment. And whereas authentic leadership history has affirmed, are
manifestations of indigenous experience or culture that personified
by indigenous school systems, we deduce that efficient and effective
leadership in Nigeria is contingent for the most part on leadership
that embodies, finetunes and executes a holistic indigenous culture.
Whereas culture is a historical fact of societies development and
transformations, it follows therefore that only a post-colonial lea
dership rooted in pre-colonial Nigerian culture would inspire, sustain
and catalyze political cohesion essential for stable, social political
and economic development.
In pre-colonial African kingdoms leadership was mandated by
the majority of the society. This is a historical fact in model emi
nent pre-colonial Egyptian, Nubian, Yoruba, Ife, Hausa states, Mali,
Songhay, et al. kingdoms. The monarchy was a collective leadership
or a people-oriented authority. Thus, leadership was an organ of the
people but never the mind of the people. Hence, authoritarian king
ship historically is un-African. Therefore we deduce that indigenous
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African leadership was a manifestation of the people. Moreover, today,
the process of election of chieftains is in rural Nigeria, where indi
genous culture is in tack is very democratic and peaceful. The fact
that there has never been factionalism aimed at overthrowing the na
tive leadership, at least at the rate we have coup d1 etat in post-
colonial regimes in Nigeria is a testament to our assertion. There
fore, since pre-colonial leadership was democratic, and whereas con
temporary Nigeria is a composite of varied pre-colonial kingdoms,
states and chiefdoms, only an authentic bicameral, democratic federal
government would be viable. Only the latter would reconcile the in
digenous and colonial mode productions in contemporary Nigeria. The
contemporary politics of underdevelopment our study indicates is a
consequence of clash of both economic philosophies and systems.
Thus, we recommend that for the containment of factional po
litics, a bicameral democratic federalism enveloped in Nigeria's do
minant indigenous lingua franca must be embraced, legitimized and
formalized by subsequent federal governments as a national language.
Any foreign language should be systematically phased out in the su
perstructure to remain a secondary language. The contrary is tanta
mount to a retention of status quo. By that we mean the vitalization
of colonial capitalism with its mechanical life support system that
sustained Nigeria as a satellite of Britain. In retrospect, omni
history has affirmed that a people's culture could best be preserved
as a catalyst of unity and manifest factors of development, only on
its etymological foundation, and vice versa.
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Penultimately for the containment of politics of underde-
velopment subsequent administrations should consider - implementation
of our authentic bicameral democratic federalism as shown on the next
page (Fig. 5.1). On the preceding page, cum most of Ancient African
Constitutional and Fundamental Rights of the African People (See Appen-
d1x !) - the people are the first and final source of all power.25
Our bicameral ism suggests the retention of eclecticism on authentic
indigenous superstructure. The latter guarantees an authentic po
litical separation of powers with systematic checks and balances.
For instance, our model suggests that the senate should be a com
posite of authentic indigenous leadership, and that each member
state of the federation should have equal representation and vote on
evolving bills, regardless of natural resources or population, while
the house of representatives and the presidency should be elitist.
In our model the senate must ratify treaties and sanction critical
foreign affairs to ensure that indigenous interest is preserved.
Additionally, the National High Court should be relatively repre
sented by justices appointed by the president and affirmed by the
senate, for a decade, as well as members of the senate on a fifty-
fifty basis. In all juris prudence, Ratio Decidendi - the basis of
decision,26 in any area of Diversity Jurisdiction.27 common law or
25Chancellor Williams, The Destruction of Black Civilization
(Chicago: Third World Press, 1987), 170. "
26Harold J. Spaeth, An Introduction to Supreme Court Decision




























As vide our model above based on authentic African high cultures enveloped
in a dominant indigenous lingua franca is sine qua non.
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international issues should be by simple majority vote. This would
ensure the cultural authenticity of indigenous democracy as an Afro-
centric fact of Nigeria Republicanism, as a continental model. To
that aim, an authentic revolutionary people-oriented, objective lea
dership committed to revitalization of pre-colonial mode of produc
tion as well as concrete indigenization of all aspects of centers
mode of production and eclectism must be a priority. Moreover, most
importantly, in order to contain foreign oriented distabilizing po
litical action factions (PAF) in government, aliens campaign contri
butions should be outlawed, and senate elections should be non-par
tisan and nationally funded. Only an authentic nonpartisan senate
would manifest or culturally united leadership committed to re-devel
opment of our underdeveloping mode of production, through a syste
matic indigenization of school programs as a fact and manifest factors
of even development. The contrary is manifest politics of underdevel-
opment.
The Functional ism of the African House
The fundamental issue now becomes, how would our designed African
House function to manifest our recommendation and why? Thus, an expla
nation of the process of implementing our recommendation becomes indis
pensable.
The test of science of a basic research effort, history has
affirmed, is the measure of positive impact of the researcher's resolve
at the implementation stage. Thus, a research finding is characterized
as superficial, insignificant and obsolete if the evolving deductions
cum recommendations are irreconcilable in praxis.
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Hence, scientific generalizations and resultant viable so
lutions positioned, to a large extent, must manifest positive impact
when operationalized. Therefore, it follows naturally that whereas
the priority of a basic research, like ours, is a relative, positive
transformation of societies (post-colonial Africa) into a harmonizing
place to live any impracticability of viable ways out frustrates the
preceding objective. Consequently, the problem remains unminimized
and astronomical.
Therefore, history resolves that a successful operational 1.
zation of a research recommendation is the hallmark of a theory and
vice versa. By this very fact, we resolve that if our quest to de
velop "Afrocentric" theory of development for Nigeria and Africa
must materialize, our paradigm must reflect this assertion. The
contrary, is an eclipse of Afrocentric theory of development, and
manifest Darker Africa. Therefore, whereas our ultimate purpose is
to contribute our generalizations toward the formation of Afro
centric theory, a discussion of process of realizing our research
recommendation, (as personified by our model), - Nigeria Bicameral
Democratic Federalism is sine qua non. Such elaboration could not
be out of order, since it would objectively illuminate our position.
To that end our graphic presentation depicting the "structural func-
tionalism" of the African House (see Fig. 5.2) is highly indispen
sable.
In light of Fig. 5.2, the critical fundamental question be
comes, why and how would this government or "African House" function
to reverse politics of underdevelopment. To this aim, a review of
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our deductions in the preceding chapters is quite in order. To a
arge extent, the resolution of these issues could guarantee the re
versal of politics of underdevelopment in Nigeria/Africa. The issues
personify the academic crises in our efforts to construct strategies
for the development of Africa. This is where scholars and academics
on African problems and future differ. This is where we vary. Our
variance is born by our findings on an authentic historiography of
developments in pre-colonial epoch. This is the era when African mode
of production -- was authentic, and never was disharmonized by any
colonist. This assertion unquestionably resolved that the causal fact
and factors which civilized tribal communities into magnificent king
doms, empire-states and chiefdoms, such as Nubia, Egypt, Songhay, Mali,
Sudan, (Yoruba, Oya, Binin, Housa-states, Ibibio, Ibo of contemporary
Nigeria, et al) was authentic cultural harmony.
Authentic cultural harmony, omni historiography of developing
societies resolved, is the fulcrum around which developing centers
gravitate to sustained development and growth. The latter assertion
is sustained by development history of European powers of the centers.
What Must Be Done; An Authentic Operationalization of
Our Recommendation
In light of the latter deductions and caveats, the infusion
of aboriginal or pre-colonial democratic culture of Nigeria/Africa
(see Appendix 1), into the "structural functional ism" of our recom
mended bicameral federal government — African House, underscores the
validity of our recommendation. And consequently guarantees the con
tainment of politics of underdevelopment.
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Thus, the striking questions then become: How could this be
realized? What is the possibility of a successful implementation of
our recommendation? And what validates our optimism, having in mind
the prevalent contending violent factions cum systematic factors such
as: "tribalism," religious conflicts, foreign ideologies, colonial-
based academic programs, metropolitan economic dominance and Nigeria,
colonial-based bureaucracy and compradorism? All which have frustrated
a catalization of a concrete and sustained development, as well as
an institutionalization of sovereign republican federalism in post-
colonial Nigeria/Africa? How do we bridge the gulf in political inco-
hesion that transcends socio-politico, and economic cleavages in the
post-colonial regimes in Nigeria/Africa?
In retrospect, deducing from our findings in Chapter IV on
the failure of post-colonial development strategies to evolve authen
tic republicanism in Nigeria. A failure which evolved civil war, and
catalyzed factional violence. A profound and fundamental issue becomes
how to ensure that African house execution of our recommendation mani
fest politics of even and sustained development.
A resolution of these issues, in itself is the containment
of politics of underdevelopment. To that end a revisit of the basis
of power the Nigerian party government is quite in order.
Nigeria's Party Politics
According to K. W. J. Post findings in COLONIAL AFRICA by Cartey
and Kilson, the sanctioning of party and party politics by Britain
in 1951 evolved around three key nationalist fathers from the three
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was Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, West was Chief Obafem Owolowo and in the North
was Sir Abubaka Tafawa Belewa. Each of these leaders which personified
the dominant ethnicities in their respective regions formed and headed
a political party. In the east, Dr. Azikiwe led the National Council
of Nigeria and Cameroon (N.C.N.C). In the west Chief Owolowo headed
the Action Group (AG) and in the north, Sir Abubaka led the Northern
Peoples Congress (NPC).
What is more, the big three also dominated their intra-regional
party politics. Post further found that the:
control regional governments did not give the major parties an
llZlnn%t0 apP?;nt,members of Pub?1c boards?J?hey mil also
able to influence the decisions of a number of boards which had
KnC°KSldrabl? amount of mone* at thei> disposal The mar
keting boards which came under the control of the regional Go
vernments in 1954, had large reserves, the resuH if'tKir pur
chase of cash crops from the farmers at a guaranteed price each
season, and sold them on the world market at a price wh ch for
£5V *arS W3S consi'de™bl* higher than that paid to the
Thus, Post's findings resolve that:
niS?os 5Jen> a3d^d another dimension to politics in Nigeria
H19 : « created new interest and relationships, new ill ances
losSJ'S IJSirt^hS^h*0 bl'nd l°glther the maj°; Parties £"
to tdlLtl til? I t-ei" the Suppo5J of Pe°Ple wh0 n°Ped thoseto advance their business career.29
Hence, the latter evolved into a spoils party system. The
leadership of these parties became elitist powers that be in the re
gional politics. They led their ethnicities to dominate their regional
minorities.
E $. > COiO"1a1
29Ibid., 235.
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What more? It became a tradition for each of these major con
tending political parties to resent their contemporaries' extension
of powers into their regional sphere of dominance of regional politics
and governments.
In the assertion of Post:
without going into vexed question of morality, it may be concluded
that there was a general failure in Nigeria to distinguish between
E£ nnS1?3!^' fd prIVate f1nancial interest. Thus, the former
«ni«"J 1? J ?£S Wh° Professed t0 liberate Nigeria from British
exploitation of the masses would now establish themselves as auto
crats in their respective regions as a consequence of these privi
leged positions.JU
From that political pinnacle these three political leaders
and their parties vied for control of the remains from colonial economic
osmosis. Such was the constellation of political cleveages at indepen
dence in 1960. Albeit the three autocrats no longer play an active
role since the first republican government, their elite followers in
subsequent civil and military regimes still embodied and exercised
a prototype of their factionalism.
Consequently, violent factional politics abound and undermined
Nigeria's post-colonial regimes. But to what extent is this a violent
factionalism which evolved into the Civil War of 1967 a consequence
of tribalism as is popularly characterized in the international media?
And how would the African House contain it?
In this quest, the African House would enact legislation that
would legitimize only a two party political system. In that act, there
would be a clause guaranteeing that each of the two parties would
30ibid.
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separately reflect the population ratio of Nigerian ethnicities in
their respective party organs. Such entrenchment would basically de
mocratize the electoral process and consequently ensure that all na
tionalities are truly represented.
Second, the role of all political party organs (PPO) would
be limited to politicism and organizing the electorate to embody their
respective platforms, while being restricted from raising funds for
any political agenda. The federal government through revenue from
taxation would fund all federal elections. Through this restriction
the influence of the Multinational Corporations (MNC) which were ex
ploitative and metropolitan owned, and only managed by Nigerian com
pradors would be contained. The latter business influenced as post
findings affirmed, is what corrupts, for the most part, the post-co
lonial leadership.
Third, there would be a clause, making it a priority that be
fore any bill, affecting the external relations or affecting the go
vernmental structure be signed into law before any bill signed into
law by the president that deals with intra-African and international
relations, or changing the governmental structure, a national re
ferendum would be conducted. Such an act would serve as a check by
the masses on the mandate of the legislative assembly. In this ca
pacity, the president would channel that bill to the respective state
assemblies. The latter then would, on the nationally fixed date, con
duct the referendum. In the pre-colonial ear such referendum was not
uncommon. It basically guaranteed against oligarchy, autocracy or
any form of absolutism in evolving leadership.
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In pre-colonial Nigeria, the leadership was an organ but never
the mind of the masses. The contrary had been the case since the co
lonial era. The colonial leadership and the evolving post-colonial
regimes thinks and claims to know and do it all for the masses. This
leadership by their metropolitan elite orientation regarded the masses,
as the know nothing, just as the colonial officials viewed the Nigerians.
Through this referendum, the ordinary citizens would have an
input into the formation of public policy. Thus, the government would
be a true republic in principle and process.
Approval ratio of the referendum would be three-fifths of the
electorate, but not the states. This would inspire patriotism as the
masses would be voting above their ethnic cleavages, which the states
personify.
Fourth, there would be a ban on politicians or their nuclear
family members having a foreign bank account or buying foreign stocks.
Such would contain conflict of interest which had characterized Ni
gerians and make them demagogues. The latter had catalyzed political
puppet regimes in post-colonial Nigeria/Africa.
Fifth, the African Assembly would legislate for the transfer
of mother technology with any foreign industries operating in Nigeria
for at least a decade. Otherwise, the latter should only sell the
products in Nigeria, but not produce it even under patent rights se
cured by Nigerians after a decade. This would essentially indigenized
the metropolitan mode of production. Thus the economic gains would
be retained for authentic industrial research and development. This
would increase tax base for the federal government, which in turn it
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would use to the Aboriginal Research Council (ASRC) [see Fig. 5.2].
The latter would be in charge of authentic scientific research and
development of the indigenous mode of production.
Sixth, to contain foreign ideological and religious factional
ism, the federal government would nationalize all colleges and univer
sities. The colleges' enrollment would be based on population quota,
regardless of the location. This would imply that biological factors,
which dominated the university structure, whereby students were at
tending schools where their aboriginals evolved, would be practically
replaced by sociological factors depicting national personalities or
character. This genuine composition would minimize and strategically
contain ethnic chauvinism, and balkanization of the federation, based
on ethnic origin. In post-colonial academia it is not uncommon to
find federal government supported institutions lacking in the latter
composition. For instance, most colleges in the western region are
dominated by the Yorubas, the dominant ethnicity there in the north
by the Hausa Fulani, the dominant ethnicity and in the east by the
Ibos the dominant nationality.
In this regard a cultural renaissance act would be enacted.
There would be a clause illegalizing any establishment of a religious
academy. All religions would be taught in the university. This
clause would allow for the revitalization of indigenous religious
orders which had sustained the golden heritage of Nigeria and Africa
in the pre-colonial developing civilizations. These orders were
eclipsed and downgraded during the colonist invasions of pre-co
lonial Africa.
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Penultimately, the African Assembly will utilize its revenue
to recruit at any affordable cost indigenous scientist abroad, as well
as foreign born scientific best into the Aboriginal Scientific Re
search Council (ASRC). But for the latter academics, they should be
made naturalized citizens. The ASRC should be funded enough to enable
it to procure dissertations or theses written by Nigerian scholars,
to study or analyze them and utilize their academic fundings to devel
opment of Afrocentric theories. To that end, a research fund should
be provided at a post graduate level by Nigerians for the dissertation
acquired, the authors should be fairly compensated. At the present,
many profound research findings by Nigerians/Africans never found a
way, for the most part, into African development strategies.
Last, a legislation would be promulgated authorizing ministry
of internal affairs to indigenized school curriculum. This would en
tail the stressing of authentic indigenous mode of production in stead
of the metropolitan mode. This would inspire nationalism and patri
otism and consequently make the subsequent elite in military or ci
vilian be and become authentic personalities of culture, committed
to the development of Africa, as in the pre-colonial developing so
cieties.
As a final operational procedure whereas our findings further
resolved that concrete positive transformations in Nigeria/Africa came
to a halt since the imposition of colonial mode of production, and
entailed a planned disharmonization of indigenous culture. And where
as colonialism evolved politics of underdevelopment in Nigeria/
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Africa, our study affirmed, it follows naturally then that a stead
fast scientific revisit, embodiment and exercise of pre-colonial lea
dership philosophy (see Appendix 1) is sine qua non. Authentic culture
must dominate the African House. To that end, all legislative lingua
franca, like Hausa; and in turn further translated into other national
languages. Such would politicize the masses and therefore inspire
cultural cohesion of the nation. Such cultural harmony being rea
lized, political stability of the pre-colonial era would catalyze po
litical development. Cultural unity, omni history resolved is a fact
of sovereignty and manifest factors of development. Therefore, a re
jection of a people's aboriginal culture by its leadership, histori
cally, is tantamount to lack of sovereignty per se. Such a leader
ship and its citizens could not be independent. Politics of under-
development becomes obvious and that is a reality in post-colonial
Nigeria/Africa.
In spite of this reality, some African scholars, like Davidson,
refute any hope in cultural renaissance as a viable remedy for Nigeria
and Africa. To him the past is obsolete. It cannot be recalled.
The implication here is that we should ignore or get about the pre-
colonial culture because we cannot recollect most of it in the least.
To Davidson and Davidsonites we ask: Could a people exist
without ancestors? And could societies come to be and become without
aborigines? Could there be the present without the past? And the
future without the present and the past? We think it is impossible
in reality. Aboriginal culture of a people is the seed-plant of a
society's development and growth. And that is the universal logic
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which Nigeria or Africa cannot be a scientific exception if a
people's cultural traits must reflect such traits as indigenous lan
guage as a fact of communication and manifest recalling of a people's
holistic experience.
Thus, colonial language is a fact of neo-colonialism and under-
development. Whereas language is a fact of society's conceptulization
of its being and characterization of its nature, authentic language
is a social magnetic looking glass. It is a composite of the do's
and don'ts of a people's holistic experience or history. So far,
experience is history, and history is an account of how factions har
monized to improve their conditions of being and becoming. Language,
by that fact is to culture what natural blood vessels are to humanity.
Therefore, authentic language is indispensable of authentic culture.
Thus, authentic culture is a natural looking glass. As a looking glass,
it reflects instant personality functional ism, and enables societies
to comprehends their present nature with a view to adjusting into abo
riginal imprint. In light of this caveat, which are deductions from
cosmic historiography, we resolved that language is creation by itself.
Without it no humanity can relate to its kind. And without social
communications such a humanity is dead. Whereas death is the end of
social communication, it follows naturally then that without a
people's language a society is dead. Without indigenous language,
Nigeria is dead. Foreign language is "robotism," to borrow a term
from Bala Usamn.
Secondly, based on omni historiography, no ethnicity could
exist without a historical medium of communicating their experience.
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Hence, Africa's nationalities could not be and become without indi
genous language. Whereas aboriginal languages are still dominantly
spoken, we scientifically invalidate the Davidson's assertion that
African past is obsolete as a mythology. Since our proposed African
House would function in indigenous language, it will like pre-colonial
developing governments, become an arbiter of concrete development in
Nigeria/Africa. Therefore, to enforce our recommendation our
proposed democratic Bicameral Federalism has to have authentic per
sonalities of aboriginal culture at every state. To that aim, our
National Security Council (NSC) must be composed of authentic per
sonalities of culture, half from national universities based on aca
demic merit and the remainder from aboriginal leadership, (e.g.,
kings) from every composite state of the federation and from the
federal government. Their roles would be to convey the government's
significant intentions to the masses and replay the people's reactions
to the government too. Through the National Security Council, Nigeria
would become a truly sovereign nation.
The dichotomy in leadership qualities since 1861, when Nigeria
was colonized until the present, is that there were culturally pro
grammed to function in the mother's culture, as warrant leadership,
according to our findings in Chapter V. To resolve the linguistic
issue, the federal government must establish a national language -
in the superstructure and exercise the latter as a sole medium of
exercising its sovereignty by systematic scientific indigenization
of academic programs.
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In retrospect, the National Security Council would be a fact
of indigenous democratic federalism in principle and process. To rea
lize that objective the government would be eccentric. It would set
up an Aboriginal Scientific Research Council (ASRC) whose objective
would be to aggressively seek, attract and naturalize foreign sci
entists as well as attract and retain Nigerian professionals and
scientists abroad, to camp research and reactivate the pre-colonial
mode of production, as well as create new technological basis for
Nigeria.
Hence, for the containment of colonial capitalism and po




SOME POLITICAL THEORIES AND PRINCIPLES
OF ANCIENT AFRICAN CONSTITUTION LAW
AND
THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE AFRICAN PEOPLE
(Drawn from African Traditional Constitutional and Customary Laws.
Different versions and modifications of the same laws occurred in dif
ferent societies.)
I. The People are the first and final source of all power.
II. The rights of the community of people are, and of right ought
to be, superior to those of any individual, including Chiefs
and Kings (a) The Will of the People is the supreme law; (b)
Chiefs and Kings are under the law, not above it.
III. Kings, Chiefs and Elders are leaders, not rulers. They are
the elected representatives of the people and the instruments
for executing their will.
IV. Government and people are one and the same.
V. The family is recognized as the primary social, judicial, eco
nomic and political unity in the society; the family council
may function as a court empowered to try all internal (non-
serious) matters involving only members of the Extended Family
Group.
VI. The Elder of each Extended Family or Clan is its chosen repre
sentative on the Council.
VII. Decisions in council are made by the Elders. The Chief or King
must remain silent. Even when the Council's decision is announ
ced, it is through a Speaker (Linguist). Decrees or laws are
issued in the same manner to assure that the voice of the Chief
or King is the "voice of the people." (This is an example of
a provision that had wide variations.)
VIII. The land belongs to no one. It is God's gift to mankind for
use and as a sacred heritage, transmitted by our forefathers
as a bond between the living and the dead, to be held in trust
by each generation for the unborn who will follow, and thus




thereforei has * right to land, free of charge,
cient in acreage for its economic well-being; for the
rlgK to° ^e°PP°rtun1t^ ™* ««•« to make a livfng is the
(a) The land, accordingly, cannot be sold or given away.
0" t0 the
(c) The Chief is the Custodian of all land, the princiDal dutv
being to assure fair distribution and actualPuse *
*' S^Ti?1'^' taf\tnd Other forms of ^nations to Chief
0SLt?the people for re]ief o id ^
(a) The procedure was from the Chief's Village Court to the
District Court, to the Provincial Court, to the King's
(b) Such appeals were allowed in serious or major crimes onlv
(those affecting the whole society). y
c°Urcf;™CJancellor Williams, The Destruction of Blank Civilization
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